Lock-out notices, automatic discharge for prolonged absence, and tribunal limits on dismissal interference under industrial law.

A lock-out notice, read with later notices inviting employees to resume work and extending the reporting time, does not necessarily amount to discharge; in the stated facts, employees who reported within time were entitled to return, and limited compensation was maintained. A standing order providing automatic discharge for 14 consecutive days' absence without permission was held to operate even where the workmen were in police custody, since custody did not by itself suspend the employer's discretion over leave. The text also states that industrial tribunals may interfere with dismissal only for mala fides, victimisation, unfair labour practice, breach of natural justice, or a baseless or perverse finding.

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Issues: (i) Whether the notices declaring lock-out and inviting employees to resume work amounted to discharge of the workmen, and whether the workmen who reported within the time extended by the employer were entitled to reinstatement and compensation. (ii) Whether workmen absent for 14 consecutive days without permission, though in police custody, could be treated as automatically discharged under the standing orders. (iii) Whether the findings sustaining or rejecting dismissal in the individual cases of a workman alleged to be a workman, a nurse accused of misconduct, and a suspended employee involved victimisation, perverse finding, or basic error warranting interference.

Issue (i): Whether the notices declaring lock-out and inviting employees to resume work amounted to discharge of the workmen, and whether the workmen who reported within the time extended by the employer were entitled to reinstatement and compensation.

Analysis: The notices were read together against the background of the labour dispute and the language used in them. The first notice declared a lock-out and the later notices spoke of employees resuming work and extending the time for reporting, which showed that the employer had not finally terminated service but had temporarily refused employment during the lock-out and then permitted resumption on specified terms. The finding that the workmen who reported by the extended date were entitled to return to work was therefore supported. On compensation, the Tribunal had taken into account the workmen's own conduct and the fact that no actual work had been done during the relevant period.

Conclusion: The lock-out notices did not amount to discharge, and the direction to take back the workmen who reported in time was upheld. The award of limited compensation was also maintained.

Issue (ii): Whether workmen absent for 14 consecutive days without permission, though in police custody, could be treated as automatically discharged under the standing orders.

Analysis: The standing order made absence without permission for 14 consecutive days an automatic ground of discharge. Custody by the police did not by itself suspend the operation of the standing order or compel the employer to grant leave. Leave in such circumstances remained a matter for the employer's discretion unless the refusal was shown to be colourable, mala fide, or by way of victimisation. The tribunals below had proceeded on an erroneous view of the standing order.

Conclusion: The automatic discharge under the standing order was valid in these cases, and reinstatement of those seven workmen was not justified.

Issue (iii): Whether the findings sustaining or rejecting dismissal in the individual cases of a workman alleged to be a workman, a nurse accused of misconduct, and a suspended employee involved victimisation, perverse finding, or basic error warranting interference.

Analysis: As to Samar Sen, concurrent findings held him to be a workman, and there was no exceptional ground to disturb that finding. In his case the dismissal was treated as victimisation and the tribunal's factual conclusion was left undisturbed. In Abharani Debi's case, the charge was found to be baseless and the dismissal fell within the category of a finding that was completely baseless or perverse, justifying interference. In Himansu Chattoraj's case, the tribunal itself found prejudicial and subversive conduct, yet ordered reinstatement despite the pending suspension matter and the established misconduct; that approach suffered from a basic error. The governing rule is that industrial tribunals do not sit in appeal over managerial discipline and interfere only where there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, breach of natural justice, or a finding that is baseless or perverse.

Conclusion: The finding that Samar Sen was a workman was sustained; Abharani Debi's reinstatement was upheld; and the reinstatement of Himansu Chattoraj was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The common judgment was sustained in part and interfered with in part: the employer succeeded on the appeals concerning automatic discharge for prolonged absence and the reinstatement of one suspended employee, while the workmen succeeded on the construction of the lock-out notices and on the relief granted in the case of a dismissal found to be baseless. The appeals of the company and the connected workmen were therefore disposed of partly in favour of each side according to the individual issues decided.

Ratio Decidendi: Industrial tribunals may interfere with dismissal for misconduct only where the action is mala fide, amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice, violates natural justice, or rests on a finding that is baseless or perverse; and a lock-out notice, read with subsequent notices permitting resumption of work, does not necessarily amount to discharge of service.

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