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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in second appeal in reversing the concurrent finding of fact and treating the impugned gift deed as vitiated by undue influence, when undue influence had not been specifically pleaded or proved, and whether the burden of proof shifted to the donee.
Analysis: A plea of undue influence must be specifically pleaded with material particulars and proved. A general assertion of confidence, age, or intimacy is not enough to constitute such a plea, particularly where the case set up in the plaint is fraud and misrepresentation. The governing rule under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act requires proof, first, that the donee was in a position to dominate the donor's will and, second, that such position was used to obtain an unfair advantage. Only if those elements are established does the burden shift under Section 16(3). The finding whether a party was in a position to dominate the will of another is ordinarily a finding of fact, and under Sections 100 and 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court could not reappreciate that finding in second appeal absent the statutory grounds for interference. On the evidence, the first appellate court had found that the donor was physically and mentally , that the relationship was one of affection akin to father and son, and that the transaction was voluntary and understood by the donor. The High Court therefore erred in reconstructing a new case of undue influence from the written statement and in shifting the burden without the foundational facts being proved.
Conclusion: The High Court's interference was unjustified; the plea of undue influence failed, the burden never shifted, and the concurrent factual finding in favour of the defendants stood.
Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, a finding that a donee was or was not in a position to dominate the donor's will is a finding of fact not open to interference except within the limited grounds under Sections 100 and 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the burden under Section 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act shifts only after the foundational facts of dominance and unconscionability are proved with specific pleadings and evidence.