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Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte decree in the earlier suit could be cancelled on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation; (ii) whether the appellant could assail that decree on the further ground of denial of opportunity to cross-examine and other procedural objections; (iii) whether the appellant was entitled to a declaration of absolute ownership and of the first respondent having no redeemable right over the suit property.
Issue (i): Whether the ex parte decree in the earlier suit could be cancelled on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation.
Analysis: A decree obtained by fraud or deliberate misrepresentation is liable to be treated as a nullity, but a party seeking such relief must plead the particulars of fraud with clarity and prove them by reliable evidence. The pleadings in the suit did not set out a clear and specific case of fraud or false representation, and the evidence did not establish any deliberate suppression or false statement by the predecessor of the first respondent. Mere lack of legal sustainability of a claim is not enough to constitute fraud or misrepresentation.
Conclusion: The challenge to the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation failed.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellant could assail that decree on the further ground of denial of opportunity to cross-examine and other procedural objections.
Analysis: A defendant whose defence is struck off may participate in subsequent proceedings, but any complaint that the trial court denied a fair opportunity had to be supported by proof. The record showed that the appellant did not establish that he was unlawfully prevented from cross-examining witnesses, and the earlier decree could not be converted into a fresh appellate challenge through a separate suit. Procedural objections such as alleged non-speaking disposal or alleged irregularity in the earlier proceedings did not furnish an independent basis to invalidate the decree in collateral proceedings.
Conclusion: The procedural challenge to the earlier decree was rejected.
Issue (iii): Whether the appellant was entitled to a declaration of absolute ownership and of the first respondent having no redeemable right over the suit property.
Analysis: The mortgage deed contained a power of sale under Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and the sale pursuant to that power, followed by the later purchase by the appellant, occurred during pending litigation and was therefore subject to lis pendens. Since the appellant failed to invalidate the earlier decree and failed to prove a superior title, the consequential prayers for absolute ownership and for negating the first respondent's redeemable right could not stand. The appellant's conduct also supported the finding that he had not approached the court with clean hands.
Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to the declaration of absolute ownership or to the declaration that the first respondent had no redeemable right.
Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the suit was upheld, as none of the substantive grounds for setting aside the earlier decree or for granting declaratory and injunctive relief was established.
Ratio Decidendi: A separate suit to impeach an earlier decree on fraud or misrepresentation is maintainable only when the pleading specifically alleges and the evidence proves deliberate fraud or false representation; absent such proof, the earlier decree cannot be collaterally attacked, and consequential declaratory relief based on a pendente lite transfer cannot be granted.