Writ petition dismissed, Requisition Act upheld, assignment deed deemed colorable device.

The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the requisition proceedings under the Requisition Act. The court rejected the petitioners' claims under the Rent Act and the Constitution, determining that the assignment deed was a colorable device, making the premises vacant and justifying the requisition. The Requisition Act was deemed constitutional, not infringing on the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the proceedings taken by the respondents under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948.
2. Interpretation of the assignment deed dated August 18, 1964.
3. Applicability of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
4. Constitutionality of the Requisition Act under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Proceedings under the Requisition Act
The petitioner sought to quash the proceedings initiated by the respondents to requisition the premises under the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. The respondents argued that the premises had become vacant and were liable to be requisitioned under Section 6(4)(a) of the Requisition Act. The court held that the assignment deed in favor of the petitioners was effectively a transfer of tenancy rights, which was not protected under the Rent Act, and thus, the premises were deemed vacant, giving the State Government the jurisdiction to requisition the property.

2. Interpretation of the Assignment Deed
The assignment deed dated August 18, 1964, transferred the business and tenancy rights from Mrs. Dorethea Kumpig Leo to the petitioners. The petitioners claimed that this assignment was valid under the Rent Act. However, the respondents contended that the assignment was a colorable device to transfer tenancy rights, which was prohibited under Section 15(1) of the Rent Act. The court agreed with the respondents, stating that the assignment was not protected by the Rent Act and was essentially a transfer of tenancy rights, making the premises vacant.

3. Applicability of the Rent Act
The petitioners argued that the assignment was permissible under Clause (2) of the Notification issued under the proviso to Section 15(1) of the Rent Act, which allowed transfers incidental to the sale of a business as a going concern. The court examined the scope and purpose of the Rent Act and the Requisition Act, concluding that the two statutes were not in pari materia. The Requisition Act dealt with property requisition for public purposes, while the Rent Act regulated landlord-tenant relationships. Therefore, the permissible assignments under the Rent Act did not affect the requisition powers under the Requisition Act.

4. Constitutionality under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g)
The petitioners claimed that the Requisition Act infringed their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court held that the Requisition Act dealt with property and not trade or business, thus Article 19(1)(g) was not applicable. Regarding Article 19(1)(f), the court found that the assignment was a colorable device and not a genuine transfer protected by the Rent Act. Therefore, the petitioners could not claim any fundamental rights based on the assignment deed. The court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the Requisition Act did not violate the petitioners' rights under Article 19(1)(f) and was not unconstitutional.

Conclusion
The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the requisition proceedings under the Requisition Act and rejecting the petitioners' claims under the Rent Act and the Constitution. The assignment deed was deemed a colorable device, and the premises were considered vacant, justifying the requisition order. The Requisition Act was found to be constitutional and not in violation of the petitioners' fundamental rights.

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