Independent quasi-judicial discretion in stage carriage permits cannot be fettered by a binding government policy order.

A permit authority deciding a stage carriage application under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 must exercise an independent quasi-judicial judgment on the relevant statutory factors. A Government Order issued under section 43-A cannot fetter that discretion or operate as binding policy where it excludes matters relevant to section 47. If the authority treats such an order as obligatory, the decision is vulnerable because relevant considerations are displaced. On the analysis noted, the Tribunal's language showed it felt bound by the Government policy, and the High Court's remand for a fresh decision without that constraint was upheld as correct.

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Issues: Whether the Transport Tribunal's grant of stage carriage permit was vitiated because it treated the Government Order issued under section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as binding, and whether the High Court was right in remanding the matter for reconsideration without that constraint.

Analysis: The statutory authority making a permit decision under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was required to exercise an independent quasi-judicial judgment on the relevant factors. A Government order issued under section 43-A could not operate so as to control or fetter that discretion, because once the executive direction is treated as obligatory, considerations relevant to section 47 but absent from the direction are automatically excluded from the decision-making process. Even though the Tribunal considered some factors that were germane under section 47, its own language showed that it felt bound to follow the Government policy and to act in accordance with it. That rendered the decision vulnerable to challenge.

Conclusion: The High Court was correct in holding that the Tribunal's order was influenced by the Government Order and in remanding the matter for fresh decision without such constraint.

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