Independent disciplinary discretion cannot be overridden by binding vigilance advice or executive directions in service matters.

Quasi-judicial disciplinary and appellate powers under the service regulations had to be exercised independently, so vigilance advice could not operate as a binding command or reduce the authority to a mere implementing body. The executive lacked power to issue a directive compelling acceptance of that advice in individual disciplinary matters because the governing statute permitted only policy directions in matters of public interest. The impugned executive instructions and bank circulars were therefore set aside, and the disciplinary matter had to be reconsidered by the competent authority in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission and the directive of the Ministry of Finance could bind the disciplinary and appellate authorities so as to foreclose independent consideration of punishment under the applicable service regulations; (ii) Whether the Ministry of Finance had jurisdiction under the governing statute to issue a direction requiring acceptance of the Commission's advice in disciplinary matters.

Issue (i): Whether the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission and the directive of the Ministry of Finance could bind the disciplinary and appellate authorities so as to foreclose independent consideration of punishment under the applicable service regulations.

Analysis: The disciplinary and appellate powers under the service regulations were quasi-judicial in character and required an independent decision on the proved misconduct and the appropriate penalty. Consultation with the vigilance authority was not the same as surrendering decisional freedom to that authority. The advisory role of a vigilance or public service commission does not convert its opinion into a binding command, and the punishing authority cannot be reduced to a mere post office for carrying out an external recommendation.

Conclusion: The advice of the Central Vigilance Commission was not binding, and the disciplinary and appellate authorities were required to exercise their own discretion.

Issue (ii): Whether the Ministry of Finance had jurisdiction under the governing statute to issue a direction requiring acceptance of the Commission's advice in disciplinary matters.

Analysis: The enabling statute empowered the Government only to issue policy directions in matters involving public interest. A direction dictating the result of individual disciplinary proceedings, or compelling acceptance of a particular punishment, did not fall within that power. Since punishment depends upon the facts of each case and the gravity of the misconduct, such matters could not be controlled by a general executive mandate. The impugned direction was therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme governing disciplinary action in the Bank.

Conclusion: The Ministry of Finance lacked jurisdiction to issue the directive making the Commission's advice binding in disciplinary matters.

Final Conclusion: The executive instructions and consequential bank circulars were set aside, and the disciplinary matter was required to be reconsidered in accordance with law by the competent authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service regulations confer quasi-judicial disciplinary power, executive instructions cannot compel acceptance of external vigilance advice or fetter the authority's independent discretion unless the statute expressly authorises such binding direction.

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