Alternative statutory remedy and writ discretion under Article 226 governed dismissal, though a curtailing court rule was ultra vires.

Availability of an adequate and efficacious alternative statutory appeal was treated as a material factor in writ discretion under Article 226, and the High Court properly refused to entertain the petition in limine because the appellate remedy was not shown to be ineffective, onerous, or practically unavailable. The court also held that a rule requiring dismissal whenever an alternative remedy exists cannot curtail constitutional discretion under Article 226 and was ultra vires to that extent. Even so, relief failed because the body against which the writ was sought had ceased to exist and no effective remedy could be granted against an extinct authority.

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Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was rightly dismissed in limine on the ground that an adequate alternative statutory remedy of appeal was available under the taxing statute, and the conditions attached to that remedy did not make it ineffective or onerous; (ii) whether Rule 6 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court, which required dismissal where an alternative remedy existed, was ultra vires the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, and whether relief could be granted against an extinct body.

Issue (i): whether the writ petition was rightly dismissed in limine on the ground that an adequate alternative statutory remedy of appeal was available under the taxing statute, and the conditions attached to that remedy did not make it ineffective or onerous.

Analysis: The availability of an alternative remedy was treated as a relevant circumstance in the exercise of writ discretion under Article 226, not as an absolute bar. The appellate remedy under Sections 128 and 129 of the U.P. District Boards Act, 1922 was considered adequate because the tax was not large, deposit was required only before hearing of the appeal and not before filing it, and there was no sufficient material to show that the appellant's financial condition made compliance practically impossible. The objections urged against the levy raised no difficult or insurmountable question that could not be effectively examined by the statutory appellate authority.

Conclusion: The petition was properly refused on the ground that the appellant had an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy, and the dismissal in limine was justified.

Issue (ii): whether Rule 6 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of Court, which required dismissal where an alternative remedy existed, was ultra vires the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, and whether relief could be granted against an extinct body.

Analysis: The existence of an alternative remedy does not oust the Court's power under Article 226, and a rule framed under Article 225 cannot take away the constitutional discretion vested by Article 226. On the facts, another independent ground also existed against the appellant because the body against which relief was sought had ceased to exist and had been replaced by a new statutory authority, making the writ relief unavailable against the extinct body.

Conclusion: Rule 6 was held to be ultra vires to the extent it curtailed constitutional discretion, but the appeal still failed because no effective relief could be granted and the proceeding was liable to be dismissed in any event.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the levy did not succeed, and the appellate court declined to interfere with the summary dismissal of the writ petition.

Ratio Decidendi: The existence of an adequate alternative statutory remedy is a material factor in writ discretion under Article 226, and where the statutory appeal is efficacious, the High Court may properly refuse to entertain the petition in limine; a procedural rule cannot abrogate that constitutional discretion.

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