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Issues: (i) Whether the consolidation proceedings were invalid because the Consolidation Officer was appointed retrospectively after the proceedings had begun; (ii) Whether reservation of land for common purposes under the consolidation scheme amounted to acquisition by the State so as to attract the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution.
Issue (i): Whether the consolidation proceedings were invalid because the Consolidation Officer was appointed retrospectively after the proceedings had begun.
Analysis: A person cannot exercise the functions of a Consolidation Officer before appointment, and a retrospective appointment cannot ordinarily confer authority on acts done earlier. However, the challenge was brought long after the consolidation had been completed. The Court also noted the presumption that official acts are regularly performed and that the record did not displace the inference that a proper appointment had been made before the officer acted. In the circumstances, the discretionary refusal to entertain the objection on the ground of laches was upheld.
Conclusion: The objection to the consolidation proceedings on the ground of retrospective appointment did not succeed against the respondent.
Issue (ii): Whether reservation of land for common purposes under the consolidation scheme amounted to acquisition by the State so as to attract the second proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution.
Analysis: The expression "acquisition by the State" in the second proviso was held to bear its constitutional sense in Article 31A, extending beyond mere transfer of legal title and covering cases where the State, or an entity within the constitutional concept of State, in substance obtains the bundle of rights. At the same time, mere modification of rights does not amount to acquisition. On the facts, the scheme reserved land for village common purposes, but the title remained in the proprietary body, the Panchayat managed the land on behalf of the proprietors, and the income was for common needs and benefits. The majority held that the beneficiary was not the State and that the arrangement was a modification of rights rather than acquisition by the State attracting market-value compensation under the proviso.
Conclusion: The second proviso to Article 31A(1) was held inapplicable, and no compensation at market value was payable on the facts of the case.
Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge failed, and the consolidation scheme was sustained; the appeal did not succeed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a consolidation scheme merely rearranges proprietary rights for common village purposes, without the State becoming the real beneficiary of the land, the scheme amounts to modification of rights and not acquisition by the State under the second proviso to Article 31A(1); a stale challenge to the authority of the Consolidation Officer may also be refused on laches.