Issues: (i) Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals; (ii) Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether the Revenue appeal was maintainable where the amount involved was below the monetary threshold prescribed for departmental appeals.

Analysis: No customs duty, interest, fine or penalty was involved. Even treating the asserted MEIS entitlement as the disputed amount, its value was Rs. 47,19,103/-, below the Rs. 50,00,000/- threshold prescribed for Customs appeals before CESTAT. The dispute did not fall within any identified exception to the monetary-limit policy, and Section 131BA required due regard to such Board instructions.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under the applicable monetary-limit instruction, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether amendment of exported shipping bills from "NO" to "YES" for pursuing MEIS benefit was permissible under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 149 permits post-export amendment where it is supported by documentary evidence existing at the time of export. During the relevant export period, the provision contained no prescribed limitation period; the subsequently introduced restriction could not be applied retrospectively. Repeated "NO" declarations, delay, and possible fiscal consequences were relevant to discretion but did not create an absolute bar. Amendment of the shipping bills does not itself confer MEIS benefit, which remains subject to independent scrutiny by the competent authority under the applicable scheme.

Conclusion: Amendment under Section 149 was legally permissible, subject to the statutory requirement of contemporaneous documentary evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order permitting the respondent to seek amendment of the shipping bills remains operative, while entitlement to MEIS benefit must be determined independently by the competent authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-export amendment of customs documents under Section 149 cannot be denied solely because it may facilitate a fiscal incentive claim or because a later-introduced limitation period is invoked; the governing test is whether contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the amendment under the law applicable at the time of export.

Issues: (i) Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505; (ii) Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether imported natural rubber latex balloons were classifiable as toy balloons under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 rather than as inflatable rubber articles under Customs Tariff Heading 4016 or festive or entertainment articles under Customs Tariff Heading 9505.

Analysis: Heading 4016 is a residual, material-based heading for vulcanised-rubber articles not covered elsewhere, whereas Heading 9503 provides the specific functional classification for toys. The HSN Explanatory Notes expressly include toy balloons in Heading 9503 and are a safe guide to tariff interpretation. Under Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the heading and applicable notes govern classification before recourse to general or residual entries. The explanation inserted by Notification No. 02/2021-Customs also clarifies that toy balloons made of natural rubber latex fall under Heading 9503. Heading 9505 covers festive and carnival articles but does not include latex toy balloons; prior classification of differently described decorative or foil balloons did not govern the classification of the goods in issue.

Conclusion: The balloons are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading 9503 as toy balloons, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties for wilful misclassification and wrongful availment of customs-duty exemption were sustainable.

Analysis: The record showed that identical goods had initially been classified under Heading 9503, followed by changes to Headings 4016 and 9505. The proprietor admitted requesting suppliers to alter classification in shipping documents. The change from Heading 9503 to Heading 4016 was linked to avoiding BIS requirements, and the goods were described by a supplier as toy latex balloons. The inconsistent classifications and incorrect availment of exemption established malafide intent rather than a bona fide classification dispute.

Conclusion: The penalties are sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reclassification, consequential differential-duty liability, and penal consequences remain enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods are specifically covered by a functional tariff heading and the HSN Explanatory Notes, classification under that specific heading prevails over a general, material-based residual heading.

Issues: (i) Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful; (ii) Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.

Issue (i): Whether enhancement of the declared customs value of imported wall paper from USD 2.2 per kg to USD 3.5 per kg was lawful.

Analysis: The declared transaction value was rejected under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 on the basis of higher values of comparable imports available in the National Import Database. The reassessment under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied Rule 5 by relying on contemporaneous imports of wall paper at the same commercial level, quantity and country of origin. Of the comparable imports, USD 3.5 per kg was the lowest value. The prior self-assessed import relied upon was not comparable in time, and the available import documents did not establish a material difference in the description or specifications of the goods.

Conclusion: The enhancement of value to USD 3.5 per kg was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment of a separate Bill of Entry could be quashed because no speaking order was issued following remand.

Analysis: Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires issuance of a speaking order. The assessment had already been remanded with a direction to issue such order after affording a personal hearing. In those circumstances, the pending obligation to issue the directed speaking order did not justify quashing the assessment; recourse lay before the concerned customs authority for implementation of the remand direction.

Conclusion: Quashing of the assessment was not warranted, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The comparable-import valuation stands sustained, while the separate remanded assessment remains subject to issuance of the required speaking order by the competent customs authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a declared transaction value is validly rejected on reasonable doubt, customs value may be redetermined from the lowest reliable contemporaneous transaction value of comparable imports satisfying the prescribed criteria.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process; (ii) Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate debtor's application for initiation of CIRP under Section 10 was liable to be rejected as a malicious use of the insolvency process.

Analysis: Section 10 permits a corporate debtor to seek insolvency resolution, but the Adjudicating Authority must assess whether the application is a bona fide attempt at resolution and is not being used to frustrate creditor recovery. The filing followed commencement of recovery measures, while substantial hypothecated plant and machinery was found missing, no satisfactory explanation or supporting fixed-asset records were furnished, and the corporate debtor had no meaningful receivables or immovable assets. These circumstances supported the finding that the application sought a moratorium to obstruct recovery proceedings rather than to achieve genuine resolution.

Conclusion: The rejection of the Section 10 application was justified; the application was initiated with malicious intent and amounted to abuse of the insolvency process. This issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the monetary penalty imposed upon the corporate debtor required interference on proportionality grounds.

Analysis: A penalty for fraudulent conduct must be supported by reasons demonstrating the nature and magnitude of the conduct and must conform to the principle of proportionality. The record did not disclose reasons justifying the quantum of Rs. 10 lakh, notwithstanding the finding of malicious intent.

Conclusion: The penalty was excessive and was reduced from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 5 lakh. This issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The finding that the insolvency application was a mala fide attempt to secure protection from creditor recovery remains operative, while the financial sanction is recalibrated to a proportionate amount.

Ratio Decidendi: An application for corporate insolvency resolution may be rejected where the surrounding conduct establishes that it is a fraudulent or malicious device to defeat creditor recovery, and any resulting penalty must be reasoned and proportionate.

Issues: Whether admission of an application for initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process could be sustained when the outstanding financial debt on the date of the admission order was below the statutory default threshold.

Analysis: The admitted payment records showed that the corporate debtor had repaid Rs. 2.25 crore of the principal debt before the admission order. The remaining amount of Rs. 93,88,310 was below the threshold of Rs. 1 crore. The financial creditors had received those payments but had not placed that material fact before the Adjudicating Authority before the order was made. Consequently, the prerequisite default amount for admission under Section 7 was not present on the relevant date.

Conclusion: The admission of the insolvency application was legally unsustainable and was set aside, in favour of the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice; (ii) Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Issue (i): Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice.

Analysis: Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires the proper officer to record reasons to believe that goods are liable to confiscation. Where physical seizure is impracticable, the provisos require a statutory order governing custody or restraining dealings with the goods. Instruction No. 01/2017-Cus. dated 08.02.2017 likewise requires an appropriate seizure order, in addition to a panchnama, recording such reasons. A panchnama directing the importer not to deal with the vehicle was only detention and could not substitute the required statutory order.

Analysis: The seizure memo was issued more than a year after detention, followed by the confiscation notice. The authorities could not retain the vehicle indefinitely under the label of detention and then restart the limitation period by issuing a delayed seizure memo. The six-month period, with only the permissible further extension contemplated by Section 110(2), stood exhausted from the detention.

Conclusion: The delayed seizure memo and consequential confiscation notice could not sustain continued retention of the vehicle, which was required to be released.

Issue (ii): Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Analysis: The provisional-release conditions requiring a bond and bank guarantee were founded on paragraph 2 of Circular No. 35/2017-Customs dated 16.08.2017. That paragraph had been set aside to the extent it curtailed the adjudicating authority's discretion. Reliance on the invalidated paragraph rendered the conditions unsustainable.

Conclusion: The provisional-release order and its conditions were illegal.

Final Conclusion: Customs authorities must exercise seizure powers through the statutory procedure and cannot use prolonged detention without a valid order to defeat the prescribed time limits; the vehicle must be released within two weeks, with costs imposed on the authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A panchnama-based detention cannot replace a reasoned statutory seizure or restraint order under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the authorities cannot defer the statutory limitation for confiscation proceedings by subsequently issuing a seizure memo after prolonged detention.

Issues: Whether an applicant claiming GST budgetary support must be afforded an opportunity to explain an apparent discrepancy between its declaration and the Chartered Accountant certificate before its claim is concluded.

Analysis: The declaration stated a higher input tax credit figure than the Chartered Accountant certificate furnished at the respondents' direction. The certificate disclosed the figure claimed to be the actual eligible credit, yet the proceedings were concluded by relying on the declaration without seeking an explanation for the discrepancy. The absence of a specific provision permitting post-filing revision did not dispense with the obligation to act fairly where the discrepancy was apparent from the record. A declaration is not invariably conclusive where the claimant asserts an error and seeks to substantiate it with supporting material.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to explain and substantiate the alleged error in the declaration before the claim could validly be concluded.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's cancelled GST registration could be considered for revocation upon filing the pending returns and fulfilling statutory requirements.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to apply for revocation within one week, and the respondents were directed to promptly communicate any required compliance and consider revocation after such compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.

Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.

Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.

Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.

Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.

Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.

Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.

Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.

Issues: Whether a CIRP admitted under Section 9 can be closed by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a settlement reached after admission, before constitution of the Committee of Creditors.

Analysis: The settlement was executed after commencement of CIRP and expressly recognised that closure was subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amended Section 12A imposes a non obstante statutory framework for withdrawal of an admitted application and bars withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The authorities relied upon concerned settlements completed before admission of CIRP and predated or did not attract the amended statutory position.

Conclusion: The post-admission settlement could not justify closure of CIRP in the appeal; the IRP may seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit under Section 35FF is payable for the entire period from the date of deposit until the actual refund, including the period attributable to the appellant's delay in seeking refund.

Analysis: Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on a pre-deposit required to be refunded consequent to an appellate order, running from the date of payment until the date of refund. The provision does not qualify this entitlement by reference to the cause of delay in refund. Although the appellant delayed for over five years in furnishing the High Court judgment and seeking refund, the statutory language governs regardless of hardship, fairness, neglect, or the party responsible for the intervening delay.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 35FF is payable to the appellant for the entire period from the date of pre-deposit until the date of actual refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service.

Analysis: The appellant was constituted under statute to undertake welfare activities for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated deployment of guards and collected remuneration for onward payment to them, without earning profit or carrying on commercial business. Fees collected by a public authority in discharge of statutory functions were not liable to service tax. The activity did not satisfy either the definition of security agency or the taxable category of security agency service.

Conclusion: The appellant did not render taxable security agency service; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Analysis: The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief arising from legal interpretation, which justified waiver of penalty, negated the ingredients required for the extended period. Revenue did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands fail both because the activity was outside the taxable security-agency category and because the extended limitation period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory welfare body which merely facilitates deployment of personnel and passes remuneration to them without commercial profit-making activity is not a security agency; a bona fide interpretative belief and absence of suppression preclude invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Issue (i): Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: During the relevant period, the taxable entry for selling of space for advertisement required a service to be provided by a person. A sovereign local body was not covered by the term "person" before that expression was defined under the service-tax law. Further, the amount collected under the municipal law for display of advertisements was advertisement tax, a statutory levy authorised by Article 243X of the Constitution of India, and not consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation was not liable to service tax on the advertisement tax or licence fee collected during the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the charging provisions, and no suppression with intent to evade tax could be attributed to a government local body. The adopted ruling held that the extended limitation period was therefore unavailable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable; consequently, no interest or penalties could survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Before the relevant statutory definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax as a statutory levy was not providing a taxable service, and extended limitation cannot rest on alleged suppression in such an interpretative dispute.

Issues: Whether collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State-regulated bus terminals under a concession agreement constitutes taxable Support Services of Business or Commerce.

Analysis: Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual nexus between the service provider and the recipient. The concession arrangement was between the appellant and the State Government/PUNBUS; no contract existed between the appellant and individual bus operators. The bus terminals were public-utility infrastructure developed and operated under State regulation, and the appellant's collection of adda-fee was authorised under the concession arrangement in consideration of its investment, rather than consideration for support provided to bus operators. The applicable precedent had determined that such collection, absent a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, is not Business Support Service.

Conclusion: Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement did not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce; service tax was not payable by the appellant.

Issues: Whether the notional cost of buyer-supplied drawings and designs, and royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator, is includible in the assessable value of automobile components under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adoption of transaction value where the buyer and manufacturer are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only of the money value of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Buyer-supplied drawings or designs are includible only where they are used in, or necessary for, production and relieve the manufacturer of an expense otherwise required to be incurred by it.

Analysis: The drawings supplied at the vendor-selection stage were only specifications enabling prospective vendors to understand requirements and quote prices. They were not detailed manufacturing drawings used for production; the manufacturer remained responsible for preparing the detailed designs required for manufacture. No consideration in addition to the agreed price flowed from the buyer after selection of the manufacturer. The buyer's royalty payment to its foreign collaborator was not consideration flowing to the manufacturer and had no nexus with the manufacture or clearance of the components.

Conclusion: The notional value of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment are not includible in the assessable value; the demand, interest and penalty based on such inclusion cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased; (iii) Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Issue (i): Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset.

Analysis: The registered sale deed described the land as industrial-purpose land, the revenue record showed it as uncultivated, and the purchaser acquired it for non-agricultural use. The assessee had also returned the gain from its sale as capital gain. Applying the test concerning the actual and intended use of land, these circumstances established that its character at the time of sale was non-agricultural.

Conclusion: The land was a capital asset and not agricultural land; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased.

Analysis: The purchased land was classified in the registered purchase deed as industrial-purpose land. Further, the sold land had not been used for agricultural purposes during the prescribed preceding period, as reflected by the revenue record and its established industrial character. The statutory conditions for the deduction were therefore not met.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54B was not allowable; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Analysis: The revision order had not been independently challenged. The appeal arose from the appellate order concerning the consequential assessment, and did not permit a challenge to the unappealed revision order.

Conclusion: The challenge to the revision order was barred in these proceedings; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment treating the transferred land as a taxable capital asset and denying the claimed agricultural-land reinvestment relief remains sustained, and the unchallenged revision order cannot be assailed collaterally.

Ratio Decidendi: Land is not excluded as agricultural land where the cumulative evidence of its recorded status, contractual description, use and intended non-agricultural exploitation establishes its non-agricultural character; deduction for reinvestment in agricultural land requires satisfaction of the prescribed agricultural-use conditions.