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Generate professional replies to Show Cause Notices, assessment orders, audit objections, and other legal communications using TaxTMI's AI Drafter.
Step 1 – Issue Identification & Review
The AI analyses your query, notice, order, or uploaded documents and identifies the key issues involved.
• Review the issues identified by the AI
• Add, edit, remove, or refine issues as required
Step 2 – Draft Generation
Once you approve the issues, the AI performs issue-wise legal research and prepares a structured draft response.
• Relevant statutory provisions
• Judicial precedents and Supreme Court, High Court and other citations
• Issue-wise legal analysis
• Practical arguments and supporting content
• Professionally structured draft ready for further review. 
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Issues: Whether Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 could be invoked by a widow who had acquired the premises by purchase against a tenant already in occupation before such purchase.
Analysis: The governing interpretation of Section 14-D was settled by the Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi, which held that the expression "let out by her, or by her husband" is unambiguous and must be given its normal meaning. The provision confers a special right only on a limited class of widows, namely, those who let out the premises or whose husband had let them out before his death. A widow or her husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot use Section 14-D to evict a pre-existing tenant. That construction is binding under Article 141 and controls pending proceedings.
Conclusion: Section 14-D was not applicable, and eviction of the appellant under that provision was impermissible because she was a pre-existing tenant before the respondent's acquisition of the property.