Limitation and mortgage decree applications: execution time, court closure, and hardship could not displace the statutory bar.

Time spent in execution proceedings was not excludable for limitation because the earlier proceeding was not for the same relief as an application for a final mortgage decree, and the statutory requirement of due diligence and good faith before a court unable to entertain the matter was not met. Court closure also did not extend the prescribed limitation period beyond the narrow rule allowing filing on reopening where the period expired during closure, so the application remained time-barred. The Limitation Act was treated as mandatory, and no general equitable discretion existed to relieve hardship outside its express terms.

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Issues: (i) whether the time spent in execution proceedings could be excluded under the limitation provision applicable to a subsequent application for a final mortgage decree; (ii) whether the period during which the court was closed could be excluded so as to save the application from being time-barred; and (iii) whether a court had any general discretion outside the Limitation Act to relieve a party from its operation on grounds of hardship.

Issue (i): whether the time spent in execution proceedings could be excluded under the limitation provision applicable to a subsequent application for a final mortgage decree.

Analysis: The exclusion provision applied only where the applicant had been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence and in good faith for the same relief in a court unable to entertain it because of defect of jurisdiction or a like cause. The execution proceedings were not for the same relief as an application for a final decree for sale in the suit. The requisite identity of relief was therefore absent.

Conclusion: The period spent in execution proceedings was not excludable, and the contention failed.

Issue (ii): whether the period during which the court was closed could be excluded so as to save the application from being time-barred.

Analysis: The provision dealing with closure of court did not alter the length of the prescribed limitation period. It only permitted an application to be made on the day the court reopened if the period expired on a closed day. On the facts, the application could not be brought within that rule, and the allowed excluded period still did not bring the application within time.

Conclusion: The vacation period could not save the application from limitation.

Issue (iii): whether a court had any general discretion outside the Limitation Act to relieve a party from its operation on grounds of hardship.

Analysis: The limitation statute was treated as mandatory, and the court was bound to give effect to it. No general residuary discretion existed to dispense with the statutory bar merely because hardship was alleged. The special discretionary provision invoked by the appellants was also inapplicable on the facts.

Conclusion: No such general discretionary power existed, and the plea of hardship was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The limitation bar remained effective against the application, and the appeal therefore failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Time spent in another proceeding is excludable only when that proceeding was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith for the same relief in a court that could not entertain it for want of jurisdiction or a like cause, and the Limitation Act cannot be relaxed by any general equitable discretion outside its express terms.

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