No-confidence against directly elected municipal presidents upheld; legislative reduction of the qualifying period survived Article 14 scrutiny.

A no-confidence motion under the U.P. Municipalities Act was treated as applicable to a President elected directly by the electorate because the statutory scheme created no distinction between election modes beyond the method of election, and the Board's power of removal remained part of the integrated municipal structure. The accompanying consequences under Section 47-A were also held to operate. The article further notes that reducing the period for moving a no-confidence motion from two years to one year was regarded as a legislative policy choice, not arbitrary or violative of Article 14, in the absence of demonstrated unconstitutionality.

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Issues: (i) whether a motion of no-confidence under Section 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the consequential obligation under Section 47-A applied to a President elected directly by the electorate under Section 43(2); (ii) whether reduction of the period within which a no-confidence motion could be moved from two years to one year was constitutionally invalid as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether a motion of no-confidence under Section 87-A of the U.P. Municipalities Act and the consequential obligation under Section 47-A applied to a President elected directly by the electorate under Section 43(2).

Analysis: The statutory scheme treated the President and the Board as parts of an integrated municipal structure, with checks and balances between them. The power to move a no-confidence motion vested in the Board, which was a representative body of the electors, and the Act made no distinction between a President elected by the Board and one elected directly by the electorate except in the mode of election. The historical development of the provisions showed that the legislature consistently retained removal by no-confidence through the Board, even when direct election of the President was introduced. The proviso to Section 47-A could not be used to cut down the plain operation of the main provision, and the earlier legislative history did not justify reading an exclusion into Section 87-A or Section 47-A.

Conclusion: The provisions applied to a President elected directly by the electorate, and the no-confidence motion and its consequences were valid in law.

Issue (ii): Whether reduction of the period within which a no-confidence motion could be moved from two years to one year was constitutionally invalid as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The reduction of the qualifying period was a matter of legislative policy within the legislature's competence. The Court found no factual foundation or legal basis to treat the amendment as arbitrary or motivated in a manner that would attract Article 14. The change was also not unprecedented in the legislative history of the Act, and the wisdom of the policy choice could not be examined as a constitutional infirmity in the absence of demonstrated arbitrariness or lack of competence.

Conclusion: The reduction of the period was not unconstitutional and did not violate Article 14.

Final Conclusion: The statutory provisions governing no-confidence and resignation operated against a President elected directly by the electorate, and the challenged amendment was upheld, leaving the appellant without relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute creates no distinction between modes of election, a no-confidence and recall mechanism enacted by the legislature may validly operate against a directly elected office-bearer, and a policy choice on the timing of such motion is not unconstitutional absent arbitrariness or lack of competence.

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