Invalid alienation of huq right: Plaintiffs' suits dismissed due to failure to implead necessary parties

The court concluded that the original plaintiff and his heirs could not maintain the suits without impleading Alagappa or his heirs. The alienation of the huq right was invalid, and the concept of de facto trusteeship did not confer any legal rights on the original plaintiff. The joint nature of trusteeship required all trustees to be parties to the suit. The plaintiffs' request to join necessary parties at a late stage was denied, and the suits were dismissed.

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Issues Involved:
1. Right of the plaintiff and his heirs to institute and maintain the suits.
2. Necessary parties to the suit and the impact of their absence.
3. Validity of the deed of transfer executed by Alagappa Mudaliar.
4. Alienation of the huq right and its validity.
5. The concept of de facto trusteeship and its legal standing.
6. Joint nature of trusteeship and the necessity of all trustees being parties to the suit.
7. Discretion of the court in allowing the addition of necessary parties at a late stage.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Right of the Plaintiff and His Heirs to Institute and Maintain the Suits:
The court examined whether the original plaintiff and his heirs had the right to institute and maintain the suits for ejectment. The original plaintiff filed the suits in 1921, and the suits were decreed by the Subordinate Judge in March 1935. However, the court noted that the charity was neither registered nor a juristic entity, raising concerns about the plaintiff's standing. The court decided to delve into the right of the plaintiff and his heirs to maintain the actions after his death.

2. Necessary Parties to the Suit and the Impact of Their Absence:
The court addressed whether Alagappa Mudaliar or his heirs were necessary parties to the suit. The defendants argued that the suits could not be maintained without impleading Alagappa or his heirs. The court examined the deed of transfer executed by Alagappa Mudaliar in 1914 and determined that the right to manage the charities was intended to be conveyed to the original plaintiff. However, the court concluded that Alagappa's heirs should still be considered joint trustees with the original plaintiff and defendant 1.

3. Validity of the Deed of Transfer Executed by Alagappa Mudaliar:
The court scrutinized the deed of transfer executed by Alagappa Mudaliar in 1914, which purported to convey a 6/12th share in the properties to the original plaintiff. The court found that the right of managing the charities was intended to be conveyed to the original plaintiff, and the consideration was paid for both the properties and the right of management. The court held that the right to conduct the charities was transferred to the original plaintiff for consideration by Alagappa Mudaliar.

4. Alienation of the Huq Right and Its Validity:
The court examined whether the alienation of the huq right was valid. The court cited several cases, including a Privy Council decision, which held that trustees could not lawfully alienate their right to manage endowed properties. The court concluded that Alagappa Mudaliar could not alienate his office in favor of the original plaintiff, and the alienation conferred no right on him. Consequently, Alagappa's heirs should still be considered joint trustees with the original plaintiff and defendant 1.

5. The Concept of De Facto Trusteeship and Its Legal Standing:
The court addressed the argument that the original plaintiff, as a de facto trustee, was entitled to institute the suits regardless of whether he was a trustee de jure. The court distinguished between a trustee de facto and a trustee de son tort, noting that a trustee de facto could not confer any legal rights on himself by acting in a wrongful manner. The court concluded that a trustee de facto is essentially a trustee de son tort and cannot maintain the suits.

6. Joint Nature of Trusteeship and the Necessity of All Trustees Being Parties to the Suit:
The court emphasized that the office of a trustee is a joint one, and co-trustees must execute their duties jointly. The court cited several cases to support the principle that no suit regarding trust properties would be maintainable by one or some of the trustees only if the remaining trustees are not before the court either as plaintiffs or defendants. The court held that the suits were not maintainable by the original plaintiff or his legal representatives without impleading Alagappa or his heirs.

7. Discretion of the Court in Allowing the Addition of Necessary Parties at a Late Stage:
The court considered the plaintiffs' request to join Alagappa's heirs as parties to the suits at a late stage. The court noted that the suits had been pending for 14 years, and the plaintiffs had been adamant in their opposition to the objection raised due to non-joinder of the remaining trustees. The court found that the plaintiffs' abstinence from making Alagappa or his heirs parties to the suits was deliberate. The court decided that exercising discretion in the plaintiffs' favor would neither be judicious nor judicial. Consequently, the court dismissed the suits.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the original plaintiff and his heirs could not maintain the suits without impleading Alagappa or his heirs. The alienation of the huq right was invalid, and the concept of de facto trusteeship did not confer any legal rights on the original plaintiff. The joint nature of trusteeship required all trustees to be parties to the suit. The plaintiffs' request to join necessary parties at a late stage was denied, and the suits were dismissed.

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