Joint trusteeship and necessary parties rule defeat an appeal filed by only some co-trustees.

An appeal against a decree affecting a public trust was held incompetent when filed by only some co-trustees, because trustees hold office jointly and all necessary trustees must be before the appellate court where trust property liability is in issue. The court rejected reliance on procedural provisions allowing representation by one of several parties, finding that omission to implead all co-trustees left the appeal inherently defective and exposed the matter to conflicting decrees. It also held that the appellate court's power to proceed against non-appearing parties could not cure the defect in the appeal itself.

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Issues: Whether an appeal against a decree affecting a public trust was competent when filed only by some of the co-trustees and not by or against all trustees concerned.

Analysis: The decree under challenge was treated as one affecting the trust and its trustees in their joint capacity. The reasoning proceeded on the footing that trustees hold the office jointly and, where liability of trust property is in issue, the remaining co-trustees are necessary for a competent appeal. Reliance placed on the procedural provisions for representation by one of several parties was rejected because the omission to bring all co-trustees on record left the appellate proceeding inherently defective and created a risk of conflicting decrees. The court also found that the alternative reliance on the appellate court's power to proceed against non-appealing parties could not cure the defect in the appeal itself.

Conclusion: The appeal by only some of the co-trustees was incompetent and could not sustain the appellate decree.

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