Highway encroachment control under the Tamil Nadu Highways Act bars executive permission for permanent arches and protects public use.

After the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 came into force, permission for permanent arches on highway land could not be granted under G.O.Ms. No.32 because Section 26 creates a mandatory prohibition against highway occupation and allows only limited temporary use through the statutory mechanism, with Highways authority approval, Collector concurrence, traffic-safety conditions, and prescribed charges. The statutory scheme leaves no independent executive power to sanction such use. The public trust doctrine reinforces that highway land must be protected for public passage and safety, so permission for private or political use inconsistent with the Act's object is unsustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether, after the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 came into force, permission for erection of permanent arches on a highway could be granted under G.O.Ms. No.32 or only under Section 26 of the Act. (ii) Whether the grant of such permission was sustainable in view of the public trust doctrine and the statutory prohibition against encroachment.

Issue (i): Whether, after the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 came into force, permission for erection of permanent arches on a highway could be granted under G.O.Ms. No.32 or only under Section 26 of the Act.

Analysis: Section 26(1) is couched in prohibitory language and operates mandatorily against occupation or encroachment on a highway. The exception carved out by Section 26(2) permits only temporary use, and that too by the Highways authority with the concurrence of the Collector and subject to traffic safety, conditions, and prescribed charges. The statutory scheme shows that once the Act came into force, the State Government was denuded of independent power to sanction such permissions under G.O.Ms. No.32. The power to permit erection of arches or similar constructions lay within the statutory framework of the Act, not under the earlier executive order.

Conclusion: Permission could not validly be granted under G.O.Ms. No.32 after the Act came into force, and the State Government had no jurisdiction to grant such permission independently of Section 26.

Issue (ii): Whether the grant of such permission was sustainable in view of the public trust doctrine and the statutory prohibition against encroachment.

Analysis: The definition of encroachment, the restrictions on highway occupation, and the penal consequence in Section 49 show that highway land is to be protected for public use. Even where some structures may be physically set back from the tar road, the controlling consideration is public interest, safety, and free passage of traffic, not private or political convenience. The public trust doctrine requires the State to act as a protector of citizens' rights and not to permit use of public highway land for private or political purposes inconsistent with the statutory objective.

Conclusion: The permission was unsustainable as it conflicted with the statutory protection of highways and the public trust obligation.

Final Conclusion: The permission for the arches could not stand under the governing highway statute, and the appellants succeeded in having the impugned judgment overturned.

Ratio Decidendi: After the commencement of the highway statute, the prohibition against highway encroachment is mandatory, the statutory exception is limited to temporary use by the highway authority, and any executive permission inconsistent with that framework is without jurisdiction and invalid.

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