Limitation for cognizance turns on the charged offence, not the eventual conviction, under CrPC limitation rules.

For limitation under Section 468 CrPC, cognizance depends on the offence charged at the stage of cognizance, and where offences are triable together the period is governed by the graver offence. Because the respondents were charged with offences punishable beyond the three-year threshold, no limitation bar applied to cognizance, even though they were ultimately convicted of lesser offences. Section 473 had no role because it operates only where a limitation period exists under Section 468. The Supreme Court therefore held that the High Court erred in treating cognizance as barred and set aside the acquittal based on limitation.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether cognizance of the offences for which the respondents were ultimately convicted was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when the respondents had originally been charged with graver offences carrying a higher punishment. (ii) Whether the absence of a specific order under Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, could sustain the High Court's conclusion that cognizance was barred.

Issue (i): Whether cognizance of the offences for which the respondents were ultimately convicted was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when the respondents had originally been charged with graver offences carrying a higher punishment.

Analysis: Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 bars cognizance only where the offence charged falls within the limitation periods prescribed in sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) makes it clear that, where offences are triable together, limitation is determined with reference to the offence carrying the more severe punishment. The decisive point is the offence charged at the stage of cognizance, not the offence ultimately proved. Since the respondents had been charged with offences carrying punishment beyond three years, no limitation period under Section 468 applied.

Conclusion: The cognizance was not barred by limitation, and the High Court was wrong in holding otherwise.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of a specific order under Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, could sustain the High Court's conclusion that cognizance was barred.

Analysis: Section 473 empowers the Court to extend limitation where the delay is properly explained and where the extension is necessary in the interests of justice. That provision operates only where a limitation period exists under Section 468. As no limitation period applied to the charged offences in this case, Section 473 had no role to play. The High Court's reliance on the absence of a condonation order was therefore misplaced.

Conclusion: The absence of a Section 473 order did not bar cognizance in the facts of this case.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's acquittal on limitation was set aside, and the matter was directed to be decided on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, limitation is determined by the offence charged and, where offences are triable together, by the most serious charge; if no limitation period applies to the charged offence, cognizance is not barred and Section 473 is not attracted.

---