Remand under criminal procedure law remains valid without personal production when judicial discretion is exercised on recorded reasons.

A remand under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was stated to be valid even without the accused being personally produced before the Magistrate, because personal production is desirable but not an absolute statutory when the court acts within the remand framework. Section 344(1A) and its Explanation were described as supplying adequate guidance through written reasons, limited remand periods and a defined standard of reasonable cause, including where further evidence may likely be obtained. The provision was treated as applicable at the investigation stage, and the challenge to its validity and scope was rejected.

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Issues: (i) Whether an order of remand under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was invalid because the accused was not personally produced before the Magistrate; (ii) Whether Section 344(1A) and its Explanation were unconstitutional or inapplicable at the investigation stage for want of guidelines.

Issue (i): Whether an order of remand under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was invalid because the accused was not personally produced before the Magistrate.

Analysis: The remand power under Section 344 is exercised by the court while postponing or adjourning an inquiry or trial, and the provision does not make personal production of the accused an absolute legal requirement. The court relied on the governing principle that, although production is desirable as a matter of caution, a remand is not illegal merely because the accused was absent when the order was made, provided the court acts within the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The remand order was not invalid on the ground that the accused had not been personally produced.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 344(1A) and its Explanation were unconstitutional or inapplicable at the investigation stage for want of guidelines.

Analysis: Section 344(1A) permits postponement or adjournment only for absence of a witness or other reasonable cause, requires reasons to be recorded in writing, limits remand to fifteen days at a time, and leaves the matter to judicial discretion. The Explanation clarifies that where sufficient evidence raises suspicion and further evidence may likely be obtained by remand, that is reasonable cause. These features supply adequate guidance and show that the provision is capable of application even before trial when investigation is continuing.

Conclusion: Section 344(1A) and its Explanation were upheld, and they were held applicable to the investigation stage.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the impugned remand was within the statutory power and the challenge to the validity and scope of Section 344(1A) was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A remand under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is valid when made by a court in the exercise of judicial discretion on recorded reasons, and the provision is not unconstitutional merely because it leaves no rigid formula of guidance, since the statute itself supplies standards, limits, and an explanation defining reasonable cause.

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