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Issues: Whether the settlement contracts for jute goods were void and unenforceable under the West Bengal Jute Goods Future Ordinance, 1949 on the ground that the respondent was not a person who habitually dealt in jute goods involving the actual delivery of possession thereof.
Analysis: The Ordinance prohibited contracts relating to jute goods futures, but excluded persons who habitually dealt in the sale or purchase of jute goods involving the actual delivery of possession thereof. The dispute turned on the meaning of "actual delivery of possession" and whether chain contracts using delivery orders and mate's receipts amounted to such delivery. The evidence showed that the documents represented the goods, were passed from seller to buyer against cash, and ultimately resulted in physical delivery to the final buyer. The narrow view that only manual or physical delivery by each intermediate dealer would satisfy the Ordinance was rejected as inconsistent with the language and commercial reality of the jute trade. The term "involving" was read as meaning resulting in actual delivery in the ultimate analysis, and constructive or symbolic delivery through documents of title was sufficient where the transaction was part of a genuine chain of deliveries.
Conclusion: The settlement contracts were not void or unenforceable on the footing adopted by the Appeal Court, and the appellant was entitled to recover on the contracts.