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Issues: (i) Whether the sanction granted for prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was valid; (ii) whether a conviction under the Arms Act, 1959 could be sustained when the trial by the Designated Court itself was without valid sanction under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Issue (i): Whether the sanction granted for prosecution under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 was valid.
Analysis: Sanction under Section 20A(2) is a condition precedent to cognizance and must reflect a real and conscious application of mind by the competent authority. The material placed before the sanctioning authority consisted only of the FIR and a brief request letter, without the underlying investigative record or meaningful scrutiny of the facts. The sanction order itself did not disclose a sanction to prosecute, but merely an irregular permission to add provisions of the Act. On that basis, the sanction was held to be mechanically granted and legally ineffective.
Conclusion: The sanction was invalid and could not support cognizance or trial under the Act.
Issue (ii): Whether a conviction under the Arms Act, 1959 could be sustained when the trial by the Designated Court itself was without valid sanction under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
Analysis: The Designated Court's power to try other offences under Section 12 of the Act is incidental to a valid trial for an offence under the Act. Where the foundational trial under the Act itself is vitiated for want of valid sanction, the court cannot independently sustain a conviction for a connected offence under the Arms Act on the same proceedings. The jurisdiction to try the Arms Act charge was therefore absent in the circumstances of the case.
Conclusion: The conviction under the Arms Act was not sustainable.
Final Conclusion: The convictions and sentences were set aside and the accused were acquitted, leaving the State free to consider a fresh prosecution with lawful sanction.
Ratio Decidendi: A sanction under Section 20A(2) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 must be a conscious and valid authorization to prosecute, and where such sanction is absent or ineffective the Designated Court lacks jurisdiction to try the case or to sustain connected convictions under other laws through Section 12 of the Act.
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