Deeming restrictive trade practices still require public interest review before coercive relief is granted.

A deeming amendment to Section 33(1) treats agreements within the specified clauses as restrictive trade practices without a fresh inquiry under the general definition in Section 2(o). Even so, proceedings for coercive relief require a separate examination of whether the practice is prejudicial to the public interest and whether the statutory gateways in Section 38 are satisfied. A finding that an agreement is restrictive does not by itself justify a cease-and-desist direction unless the Commission records reasoned findings on the material and the relevant exceptions. The matter was therefore remitted for fresh consideration in accordance with the Act.

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Issues: (i) Whether, after the amendment of Section 33(1), agreements falling within clauses (a) to (l) are deemed to be restrictive trade practices without further inquiry under Section 2(o). (ii) Whether, in proceedings under Sections 37 and 38, the Commission must separately examine whether the restrictive trade practice is prejudicial to the public interest and whether the relevant gateway in Section 38 is satisfied.

Issue (i): Whether, after the amendment of Section 33(1), agreements falling within clauses (a) to (l) are deemed to be restrictive trade practices without further inquiry under Section 2(o).

Analysis: The substituted Section 33(1) introduced a deeming clause by which every agreement falling within the specified categories is treated, for the purposes of the Act, as an agreement relating to restrictive trade practices. The effect of the amendment is that the listed categories are statutorily identified as restrictive trade practices and are not left to be tested afresh under the general definition in Section 2(o). The earlier approach based on the rule of reason under the pre-amendment text no longer governs agreements squarely covered by the enumerated clauses.

Conclusion: Yes. Agreements within the enumerated clauses of Section 33(1) are deemed to be restrictive trade practices and do not require a fresh merits inquiry under Section 2(o).

Issue (ii): Whether, in proceedings under Sections 37 and 38, the Commission must separately examine whether the restrictive trade practice is prejudicial to the public interest and whether the relevant gateway in Section 38 is satisfied.

Analysis: Even where an agreement is covered by Section 33(1), the Commission's function under Section 37 does not end there. It must still examine whether the practice is prejudicial to the public interest, and that inquiry must be conducted with reference to the gateways in Section 38. A finding that the practice is restrictive does not by itself justify a cease-and-desist order unless the Commission addresses the statutory exceptions and records a reasoned conclusion on the material placed before it. The impugned order was found deficient because it did not adequately examine the individual agreements and the specific public-interest implications of the objectionable clauses.

Conclusion: Yes. The Commission must independently consider public interest under Section 38 and record proper findings before passing directions under Section 37.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand because the Commission had not sufficiently examined the agreements and the statutory gateways on the material before it. The matters were sent back for fresh consideration in accordance with the Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute creates a deeming fiction that specified agreements are restrictive trade practices, the commission must still examine whether the practice is prejudicial to the public interest under the governing gateway provisions before granting coercive relief.

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