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Issues: (i) Whether the acquisition notification could be sustained on the ground of public purpose or was vitiated by colourable exercise of power; (ii) whether the State could invoke the urgency provisions where the land was not waste or arable land and whether exclusion of objections under section 5A was valid; (iii) whether the appellant had sub-soil and mineral rights in the land and was entitled to compensation for minerals; (iv) whether possession of the land could be restored to the appellant.
Issue (i): Whether the acquisition notification could be sustained on the ground of public purpose or was vitiated by colourable exercise of power.
Analysis: The declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was conclusive as to public purpose, and judicial review could not ordinarily go behind it. The only permissible challenge was on the limited ground that the power had been exercised colourably. On the facts, the appellant did not establish that the State's action was a colourable exercise of power.
Conclusion: The challenge based on absence of public purpose failed and the acquisition could not be struck down on that ground.
Issue (ii): Whether the State could invoke the urgency provisions where the land was not waste or arable land and whether exclusion of objections under section 5A was valid.
Analysis: The urgency power under section 17(1) was confined to waste or arable land. On the evidence, the land was forest land with substantial tree growth and could not be treated as waste or arable land. Since the jurisdiction to act under section 17(1) depended on that preliminary factual condition, the State could not confer jurisdiction on itself by an erroneous opinion. The direction excluding section 5A under section 17(4) also fell with the invalid assumption that section 17(1) applied.
Conclusion: The notification invoking sections 17(1) and 17(4) and excluding section 5A was ultra vires.
Issue (iii): Whether the appellant had sub-soil and mineral rights in the land and was entitled to compensation for minerals.
Analysis: The Sanads and surrounding historical materials showed that the grant covered the land and everything appertaining to it, without reservation of minerals. The Court treated the zamindar as proprietor of the soil for the relevant estate and held that, in the absence of express or implied reservation, minerals passed with the surface rights. Subsequent conduct and related documents supported that construction.
Conclusion: The appellant was held to be the owner of the minerals and sub-soil rights and the contrary view of the High Court was overruled.
Issue (iv): Whether possession of the land could be restored to the appellant.
Analysis: The claim for restoration could not survive in view of the later vesting of the appellant's intermediary interest under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, as already determined in the connected matter referred to by the Court.
Conclusion: The prayer for restoration of possession was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the acquisition notifications and all consequential proceedings were quashed, but the claim for restoration of possession was declined.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power conditioned on the existence of a jurisdictional fact can be judicially examined, and if the factual basis for invoking the power is absent, the resulting action is ultra vires; further, in the absence of reservation, a grant of land ordinarily carries the sub-soil and mineral rights with it.