Exclusive jurisdiction under arbitration law follows the first Part I application, making later Section 34 challenges maintainable there.

Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court where the first application under Part I is made, so later applications arising from the same arbitration agreement and proceedings must be filed there. The definition of "court" in Section 2(e) includes the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and, where applicable, the High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The 1996 Act scheme differs materially from the Arbitration Act, 1940, making contrary earlier authorities inapplicable. On the stated facts, because the first application had already been filed in this court, the Section 34 challenge was treated as a subsequent application within Section 42.

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Issues: Whether an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an arbitral award had to be filed in the same court where an earlier application concerning the arbitration agreement had been made, even though the arbitrator was appointed by the Supreme Court.

Analysis: Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 defines "court" as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, including the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Section 42 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the court where the first application under Part I of the Act is made, for all subsequent applications arising out of the same arbitration agreement and arbitral proceedings. The scheme of the 1996 Act is materially different from the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the earlier authorities relied upon for the contrary proposition were found inapplicable. On the facts, the first application had been made in this court, and the present Section 34 challenge was a subsequent application within the meaning of Section 42.

Conclusion: The objection to territorial and statutory jurisdiction was rejected, and this court was held competent to entertain the Section 34 application.

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