Reference to High Court requires a real question of law, not an unargued or merely academic alleged error.

A reference under section 35G lies only where the Tribunal's order gives rise to a real question of law; an alleged error that was not actually canvassed or considered does not by itself create a referable issue. The commentary notes that a claimed mistake on limitation or condonation of delay in a rebate claim was treated as insufficient to justify High Court reference, and that appellate statutory tribunals may validly exercise condonation powers where the adjudicating authority had such discretion. It also states that retrospective application of procedural limitation amendments will not be presumed where vested or accrued rights are affected unless the statute clearly so provides. The reference application was rejected.

---

---

Issues: Whether any question of law arose from the Tribunal's order so as to merit a reference to the High Court under section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, having regard to the contentions regarding retrospective applicability of section 11B and the power to condone delay under rule 12 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.

Analysis: The application concerned a reference on the footing that the Tribunal had erred in dealing with limitation and condonation of delay in a rebate claim. It was held that an erroneous finding by the Tribunal, even if alleged to be per incuriam, does not by itself create a referable question of law where the issue was not actually canvassed or considered. The power of an appellate statutory tribunal to exercise condonation where the adjudicating authority has such discretion was also treated as legally tenable. The plea of retrospective operation of limitation was regarded as academic on the facts, and it was observed that retrospective application of procedural amendments will not be assumed where vested or accrued rights are affected unless clearly provided by statute.

Conclusion: No question of law arose for reference to the High Court; the reference application was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The order finally declined to invoke the reference jurisdiction and left the Tribunal's disposal undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reference under section 35G lies only where a real question of law arises from the order under challenge, and not where the alleged error is merely academic, unargued, or does not independently generate a referable legal issue.

---