Tariff classification of metallised yarn followed High Court ruling, while refund relief remained limited by statutory time bar.

Metallised yarn was classified under item 15A(2) and not item 18 for the material period, because the Tribunal followed the existing High Court ruling that such yarn was not manufactured out of man-made fibres, and no contrary Supreme Court or High Court authority was shown. The refund claim was held subject to the statutory one-year limitation under rule 11 read with rule 173-J, so the barred portion could not be granted unless the assessee proved that duty had been paid under protest throughout. The classification issue was decided in favour of the assessee, while refund relief was restricted by limitation in favour of the revenue.

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Issues: (i) whether metallised yarn was classifiable under item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff or under item 18 for the material period; (ii) whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under rule 11 read with rule 173-J of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and whether the claim could be saved by proof that the duty had been paid under protest.

Issue (i): whether metallised yarn was classifiable under item 15A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff or under item 18 for the material period.

Analysis: The relevant High Court decision had held that metallised yarn was not manufactured out of man-made fibres and, therefore, did not fall under item 18. There being no contrary decision of any other High Court or of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal followed that ruling in the interest of uniformity of assessment. The attempt to distinguish the earlier Tribunal decision was rejected because the point there involved was different and the present issue was already covered by the High Court ruling.

Conclusion: Metallised yarn was held to fall under item 15A(2) and not under item 18 for the material period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether the refund claim was barred by limitation under rule 11 read with rule 173-J of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and whether the claim could be saved by proof that the duty had been paid under protest.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that part of the refund claim was beyond the one-year period prescribed by the then applicable refund limitation rules. The only possible escape from the bar of limitation was proof that the duty had been paid under protest throughout, and the refund was directed to be regulated accordingly.

Conclusion: The limitation objection was accepted to the extent applicable, and the refund was restricted unless payment under protest was established, in favour of the revenue on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on classification, but the refund relief was confined by the statutory time bar and the requirement of proof of payment under protest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific High Court ruling on tariff classification exists and no contrary higher authority is shown, the Tribunal will follow it for uniform assessment; refund claims remain subject to the statutory limitation period unless payment under protest is proved.

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