High Court: Lamination Not Manufacturing under Sales Tax Act. Tribunal Decision Upheld

The High Court held that the lamination process conducted on sheets by the respondent did not amount to "manufacture" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The court relied on the similarity of facts with the State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons case, where certain processes were deemed not to constitute manufacturing. The Tribunal's decision aligned with established legal principles from apex court judgments on manufacture under Central Excise, leading to the rejection of the application seeking a reference on the interpretation of "manufacture" in this context.

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Issues:
- Interpretation of the definition of "manufacture" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.
- Whether the lamination process conducted on sheets amounts to manufacture.
- Comparison of the present case with the judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons.
- Consideration of judgments from the apex court regarding the concept of manufacture under Central Excise.

Interpretation of "manufacture" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959:
The application sought a reference on whether the lamination process conducted by the respondent on GI sheets, CRCA sheets, and aluminum sheets amounts to manufacture under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The Sales Tax Tribunal had to determine if the processes conducted by the respondent qualified as manufacturing activities. The applicant argued that the wide definition of "manufacture" under the Act, including terms like altering or processing, should encompass the lamination process. However, the respondent contended that providing PVC coating to the sheets did not involve any special activity distinguishing it from the judgment in the State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons case.

Lamination process and manufacture:
The key issue revolved around whether the lamination process conducted by the respondent on the purchased sheets constituted manufacturing. The respondent's position was that the activity of providing PVC coating did not amount to a significant process that would classify it as manufacturing. Reference was made to the apex court's decision in the State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons case, where a similar situation involving the charging of batteries was held not to be manufacturing. The Tribunal's decision was based on the similarity of facts with the apex court's ruling, indicating that the lamination process did not meet the threshold for being considered manufacturing under the Act.

Comparison with State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons:
The judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt Sons was pivotal in the arguments presented by both parties. The applicant relied on this case to emphasize the broad definition of "manufacture" under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, while the respondent used it to support the contention that the lamination process did not constitute manufacturing. The apex court's decision in Shiv Datt Sons regarding the activity of removing electrolyte before transporting batteries was cited to draw parallels with the present case, where the Tribunal's decision aligned with the court's interpretation that certain processes may not amount to manufacturing.

Consideration of apex court judgments on manufacture under Central Excise:
The parties referred to apex court judgments related to the concept of manufacture under Central Excise to support their arguments. While the applicant highlighted cases like Tega India Ltd. and Metlex (I) Pvt. Ltd., the respondent focused on the relevance of the Shiv Datt Sons case in determining whether the lamination process constituted manufacturing under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The High Court noted the consistency in the apex court's interpretation across similar cases, indicating that the Tribunal's decision was in line with established legal principles, thereby rejecting the application for a reference.

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