No jurisdiction to bar business operations during tax recovery absent express statutory power.

A revenue authority may recover admitted sales tax arrears through the lawful revenue recovery process, but it cannot impose a separate prohibitory restraint on running or leasing a mill unless express statutory power exists. The court found no provision in the sales tax laws, their rules, or the revenue recovery law authorising such a direction, so the restraint was held without jurisdiction and unenforceable. Recovery of dues could proceed only through modes permitted by law.

---

---

Issues: Whether the revenue authority had jurisdiction to issue a prohibitory direction preventing the petitioner from running the mill or leasing it out, even though tax recovery proceedings had already been initiated for arrears under the sales tax laws.

Analysis: The liability of the erstwhile partners and the firm for the arrears was not in dispute, and the authority was entitled to recover the dues by adopting the process known to law, including proceedings under the revenue recovery mechanism. However, no provision in the Central sales tax law, the State sales tax law, their rules, or the revenue recovery law was shown to confer power on the authority to restrain the petitioner from carrying on the business or leasing the mill. The existence of recovery powers did not extend to imposing a separate prohibitory restraint on the running or leasing of the mill.

Conclusion: The prohibitory direction was without jurisdiction and unenforceable against the petitioner. The authority could proceed only in accordance with law for recovery of the dues.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of express statutory authority, a revenue authority cannot prohibit the owner or lessee from running or leasing a business establishment merely because tax recovery proceedings are pending; recovery must be pursued only through lawful modes of enforcement.

---