Limitation for statutory appeals runs from communication of the order, and no separate notice is required before rejecting a time-barred appeal.

An appellate authority under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act was not required to issue a separate prior notice before rejecting a time-barred appeal, because the statute placed the burden on the appellant to file within time and seek extension if delayed, and no prejudice from lack of notice was shown. The phrase "from the date of such order" was construed to mean the date of communication of the order, not the date it was signed, because limitation for appeal cannot fairly run before the order is communicated to the aggrieved party. On that basis, the appeal filed after communication was treated as within time and the matter was directed to be heard on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether an appellate authority under section 12(1) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 was bound to issue a separate notice before rejecting an appeal as barred by limitation. (ii) Whether the expression "from the date of such order" in section 12(1) means the date of passing of the order or the date of communication of the order.

Issue (i): Whether an appellate authority under section 12(1) of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 was bound to issue a separate notice before rejecting an appeal as barred by limitation.

Analysis: The statutory scheme did not disclose any mandatory requirement that the appellate authority must issue a prior notice whenever an appeal appears to be time-barred. The provision itself placed the obligation on the appellant to file the appeal within time and, if delayed, to show cause for extension of time. On the facts, no prejudice or breach of natural justice was shown to have resulted from the absence of such a notice.

Conclusion: The contention that rejection of the appeal was illegal for want of a prior notice was not accepted.

Issue (ii): Whether the expression "from the date of such order" in section 12(1) means the date of passing of the order or the date of communication of the order.

Analysis: The phrase was construed purposively and not literally. The right to appeal arises only when the aggrieved party receives communication of the order, and limitation cannot fairly run before such communication. A literal construction would create prejudice and arbitrariness. Since the penalty order had been communicated to the applicants on 8 March 1995 and the appeal was filed on 3 May 1995, the appeal was within the prescribed period of sixty days.

Conclusion: The expression "from the date of such order" was held to mean the date of communication of the order, and the appeal was not barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the appeal was directed to be heard and decided on merits after giving the applicants an opportunity of hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory appeal must be filed within a fixed period from the date of an order, limitation runs from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved party, unless the statute clearly provides otherwise.

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