Retrospective operation of judicial declarations governs pending turnover tax matters on wheat products; revisional power and circulars followed suit.

A judicial declaration of law ordinarily applies retrospectively to pending and unfinalised matters unless the deciding court expressly limits it prospectively. On that basis, the Supreme Court ruling treating wheat products as distinct from wheat governed open turnover tax matters, and reassessments or revisions made on the basis of the earlier view could be sustained while the statutory revision period remained available. The departmental circular based on the overruled High Court decision ceased to bind authorities once the Supreme Court declared the law, and administrative instructions could not override that declaration. The Joint Commissioner also had revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by Assistant Commissioners that were prejudicial to revenue.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's decision holding that wheat products are distinct from wheat applied only prospectively or also governed pending and unfinalised turnover tax matters; (ii) whether the revisional orders taxing wheat products could be sustained after the reversal of the earlier decision of the High Court; (iii) whether the departmental circular issued on the basis of the earlier High Court decision continued to bind the authorities after the Supreme Court's ruling; and (iv) whether the Joint Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to revise the orders in question.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's decision holding that wheat products are distinct from wheat applied only prospectively or also governed pending and unfinalised turnover tax matters.

Analysis: A decision declaring the law ordinarily operates retrospectively because a court only declares the true position of law and does not create it. The doctrine of prospective overruling is an exception that can be applied only when the court rendering the decision restricts its own ruling to future operation. The earlier decisions relied on by the assessees related to cases where the Supreme Court itself had expressly protected past transactions from reopening. No such restriction was attached to the later Supreme Court ruling on wheat products. The impugned assessments and revisions were still open to appeal, revision, or rectification and had not attained finality, so the declared law applied to them.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court ruling applied to pending and unfinalised transactions and was not confined to future cases only.

Issue (ii): Whether the revisional orders taxing wheat products could be sustained after the reversal of the earlier decision of the High Court.

Analysis: Once the earlier view treating wheat products as part of wheat stood reversed, the authorities were entitled to correct assessments and revisional orders that had been made on the basis of that earlier view, so long as the statutory period for revision remained available. The assessees could not invoke estoppel, acquiescence, or waiver against the application of the law as finally declared. The turnover tax on wheat products was therefore rightly brought to tax in the light of the later binding decision.

Conclusion: The revisional orders were valid and sustainable.

Issue (iii): Whether the departmental circular issued on the basis of the earlier High Court decision continued to bind the authorities after the Supreme Court's ruling.

Analysis: The circular merely implemented the earlier High Court decision and lost its effect once that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. A fresh circular was not necessary for the authorities to give effect to the law as declared by the Supreme Court. Administrative instructions cannot prevail over the binding declaration of law by the Supreme Court.

Conclusion: The circular did not bind the authorities after the Supreme Court's ruling.

Issue (iv): Whether the Joint Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to revise the orders in question.

Analysis: Section 21(2) authorized the Joint Commissioner to examine the record of orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes that were prejudicial to the Revenue. The revisions were directed against orders of Assistant Commissioners and were within the statutory framework. The contention based on the substitution of designations had no factual or legal basis.

Conclusion: The Joint Commissioner had jurisdiction to exercise revisional power.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the levy and revision of turnover tax on wheat products failed, and the writ petitions were not entitled to relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A judicial declaration of law applies retrospectively to pending and unfinalised matters unless the deciding court expressly limits its operation prospectively, and subordinate authorities must give effect to that declaration within the limits of their statutory powers.

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