Industrial de-licensing under statutory exemption power upheld as a valid executive policy choice in economic regulation.

Section 29B of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 was treated as wide enough to permit exemption of a scheduled industry when the Central Government considers continued application of the Act against the public interest. The Court noted that the Act disclosed the legislative policy and the grounds for exemption, so the power was not invalid for excessive delegation. In economic and industrial regulation, judicial review remains limited to illegality, unconstitutionality, mala fides, or patent arbitrariness. On that basis, de-licensing of the sugar industry through notification and press note was regarded as a lawful exercise of executive policy without need for legislative amendment or parliamentary approval.

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Issues: Whether the de-licensing notification and press note removing the sugar industry from compulsory licensing under Section 29B of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 were valid and whether the High Court was justified in quashing them.

Analysis: The exemption power under Section 29B was held to be wide enough to cover a scheduled industry where the Central Government forms the opinion that it is not in the public interest to continue applying all or any provisions of the Act. The Court found that the legislative policy was clearly disclosed in the Act, the grounds for exemption were specified, and the power was not vitiated by excessive delegation. It further held that in economic and fiscal matters the executive enjoys a broad area of policy choice, and judicial review is limited to cases of illegality, unconstitutionality, mala fides, or patent arbitrariness. The de-licensing of sugar industry was treated as a policy decision within executive competence, and the notification issued under Section 29B was held sufficient without requiring legislative amendment or parliamentary approval.

Conclusion: The de-licensing notification and press note were valid, and the High Court's judgment quashing them could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeals challenging the High Court's interference succeeded, and the impugned de-licensing policy was upheld as a lawful exercise of executive power in the field of industrial regulation.

Ratio Decidendi: A policy decision in an economic field, if authorised by statute and not shown to be illegal, unconstitutional, mala fide, or arbitrarily exercised, is entitled to judicial restraint, and a statutory exemption power may validly be used to de-license a scheduled industry.

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