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Issues: (i) Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could prevent the State Legislature from amending the sales tax law so as to withdraw the turnover-tax benefit claimed by eligible small-scale industrial units; (ii) whether sales made by newly set up small-scale industrial units under rule 3(66) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 were "generally exempt" within section 6B(2)(e) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941; and (iii) whether the 1987 amendment deleting section 6B(2)(e) was invalid for being retrospective or violative of the Constitution.
Issue (i): Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could prevent the State Legislature from amending the sales tax law so as to withdraw the turnover-tax benefit claimed by eligible small-scale industrial units.
Analysis: The benefit claimed by the applicants rested on a statutory scheme and not on a mere executive assurance. The settled rule applied was that promissory estoppel may operate against governmental executive action where a representation has induced alteration of position, but it cannot curtail legislative power or prevent the Legislature from enacting or amending law. A citizen and the Revenue alike are bound by the law as enacted. The authorities relied upon by the applicants concerned executive notifications or assurances and did not establish that a Legislature could be precluded from making a valid amendment.
Conclusion: The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not bar the Legislature from amending the law, and the challenge on that basis fails against the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether sales made by newly set up small-scale industrial units under rule 3(66) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941 were "generally exempt" within section 6B(2)(e) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941.
Analysis: Section 6B(2)(e), as it stood before amendment, referred only to sales of goods which were generally exempt under section 5(2)(a)(vi). The expression "generally exempt" could not be stretched to cover conditional exemptions available only upon fulfilment of specified requirements. Rule 3(66) granted exemption only to eligible small-scale industrial units subject to conditions and did not create a general exemption from tax. The Court also noted that the legislative scheme and the contemporaneous transfer of several items to the tax-free schedule showed that the omission of clause (e) was intended to remove uncertainty and clarify that condition-based exemptions were not within the phrase used in section 6B(2)(e).
Conclusion: Sales under rule 3(66) were not sales of goods "generally exempt" within section 6B(2)(e), so the applicants could not claim turnover-tax exclusion on that footing.
Issue (iii): Whether the 1987 amendment deleting section 6B(2)(e) was invalid for being retrospective or violative of the Constitution.
Analysis: The amendment was treated as clarificatory and as a minor repair designed to remove ambiguity in the existing scheme, not as the imposition of a new tax. Since the applicants were never entitled to deduction of rule 3(66) sales for turnover-tax purposes merely by reason of that rule, retrospective deletion of clause (e) did not create a fresh burden in a constitutionally impermissible manner. The challenge under Article 14 therefore failed. The reliance on Article 304(b) also did not assist the applicants because the factual and legal setting was different from cases where a tax directly impeded trade in a constitutionally objectionable manner.
Conclusion: The 1987 amendment deleting section 6B(2)(e) was valid both prospectively and retrospectively and was not unconstitutional.
Final Conclusion: The applicants were not entitled to exemption from turnover tax during the tax-holiday period merely because they held eligibility certificates under rule 3(66); the legislative amendment was upheld and the demands for turnover tax survived.
Ratio Decidendi: A conditional exemption granted to small-scale industrial units does not amount to a general tax exemption for turnover-tax purposes, and promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to restrain a valid legislative amendment withdrawing or clarifying such fiscal benefit.