Statutory discretion cannot be replaced by circulars; retrospective amendment also displaced the earlier precedent on security for form XXXI.

Section 8-C(2) vested discretion in the assessing authority to determine the security for use of form XXXI, so the Commissioner could not replace that statutory judgment by circular fixing a set amount. The circulars were therefore inconsistent with the provision and invalid to that extent. The earlier decision upholding the circular under the unamended law did not govern after the retrospective amendment, because the legislative change materially altered the statutory scheme and displaced the basis of that precedent. The impugned circulars were quashed, and the assessing authority remained free to act under section 8-C(2) in accordance with law.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Commissioner of Sales Tax had jurisdiction to issue circulars fixing the amount of security to be furnished for use of form XXXI when section 8-C(2) vested the discretion in the assessing authority. (ii) Whether the earlier decision upholding the circular could continue to govern after the retrospective amendment of section 8-C.

Issue (i): Whether the Commissioner of Sales Tax had jurisdiction to issue circulars fixing the amount of security to be furnished for use of form XXXI when section 8-C(2) vested the discretion in the assessing authority.

Analysis: The amended section 8-C(2) required the assessing authority to determine the amount of security to be furnished by a dealer for proper custody or use of the prescribed forms. That discretion was conferred on the assessing authority alone and not on the Commissioner. A circular fixing a specified amount of security amounted to substitution of administrative direction for statutory discretion and was inconsistent with the scheme of the provision.

Conclusion: The Commissioner had no jurisdiction to fix the security amount by circular, and the circulars were invalid and inoperative to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the earlier decision upholding the circular could continue to govern after the retrospective amendment of section 8-C.

Analysis: The earlier decision had interpreted the unamended provision, under which no such discretion was vested in the assessing authority. The retrospective amendment materially altered the statutory position by expressly conferring that discretion on the assessing authority. A judicial declaration of the law operates only so long as the law remains unchanged, and loses efficacy where the legislature retrospectively amends the provision.

Conclusion: The earlier decision did not continue to control after the retrospective amendment and did not prevent the Court from holding the circulars invalid.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the impugned circulars were quashed, while the assessing authority was left free to act under section 8-C(2) in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute vests discretion in a specified authority, an administrative circular cannot supplant that discretion; and a precedent based on an earlier statutory regime loses its governing force when the legislature retrospectively amends the provision on which it was based.

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