Inherent power to quash criminal proceedings remains exceptional; tax deduction default and non-prosecution-linked delay did not justify quashing.

Failure to deduct tax at source on payments to contractors was treated as a contravention capable of attracting prosecution under section 276B, and the complaint was not quashed on the ground that section 194C was inapplicable. Prolonged trial delay did not justify quashing where the delay was not attributable to the prosecution, particularly because the trial record had remained untraceable for a considerable period. The inherent power to quash criminal proceedings was held to be exceptional and confined to recognised cases of abuse of process or failure of justice, so the petition was rejected and expeditious disposal was directed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the complaint alleging failure to deduct tax at source on payments to contractors disclosed an offence under section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to justify prosecution under section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether prolonged pendency of the trial and delay in its completion justified quashing of the criminal proceedings under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint alleging failure to deduct tax at source on payments to contractors disclosed an offence under section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 so as to justify prosecution under section 276B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The petitioners admitted that the alleged default related to non-deduction of tax at source on payments made to contractors. The Court held that the complaint alleged a contravention attracting the statutory obligation to deduct tax, and that the case did not fall within the limited categories in which the extraordinary power to quash criminal proceedings could be exercised.

Conclusion: The prosecution was not liable to be quashed on the ground that the complaint did not attract section 194C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (ii): Whether prolonged pendency of the trial and delay in its completion justified quashing of the criminal proceedings under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Court found that the delay in completion of the trial was not attributable to the prosecution, as the trial court record had not been traceable for a considerable period. In these circumstances, delay by itself was held insufficient to justify quashing of the proceedings, though an expeditious disposal was directed.

Conclusion: The proceedings were not liable to be quashed on the ground of delay or alleged denial of speedy trial.

Final Conclusion: The petition for quashing was rejected, and the criminal proceedings were allowed to continue with a direction for expeditious disposal by the trial court.

Ratio Decidendi: The inherent power to quash criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and only within recognized categories of abuse of process or failure of justice, and delay in trial not attributable to the prosecution does not by itself warrant quashing.

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