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Issues: Whether rectification proceedings initiated by show cause notice within the prescribed period under section 25-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 could be completed after expiry of that period, and whether section 8 of the Karnataka Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1970 governed rectification of orders made before the commencement of the amendment.
Analysis: The challenge rested on the plea that the rectification orders were made beyond five years from the dates of the original orders. The Court noted that the relevant orders sought to be rectified had been passed before the commencement of the Amendment Act and, therefore, fell within section 8 of that Act. Section 8 expressly permitted proceedings to rectify such earlier orders to be commenced within five years from the date of the order or within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act, whichever was later. The provision was held to prescribe only the time-limit for initiating rectification proceedings, not for concluding them. As it contained a non obstante clause, it prevailed over section 25-A of the principal Act for orders covered by the amendment.
Conclusion: The rectification proceedings were validly initiated within time, and there was no time-limit for completing them by passing the rectification orders. The contention of the assessees failed.
Final Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected, and the appeals were dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a later provision with a non obstante clause governs rectification of earlier orders, the statutory time-limit applies to commencement of proceedings only and not to their completion, unless the statute clearly says otherwise.