C and D forms filing deadlines cannot override statutory entitlement, though late compliance still depends on sufficient cause.

A rule made under the power to prescribe the manner of furnishing C and D forms cannot, without clear statutory authority, impose a rigid filing deadline that defeats the substantive entitlement to concessional tax; to that extent, the Bihar Rules were ultra vires. In the absence of a valid deadline, the declarations and certificates could be furnished after the return and before assessment, and in appropriate cases even later if sufficient cause was shown. On the facts, however, the assessee had already been given adequate opportunity and no legal error was found in refusing a further chance, so relief was denied on that issue.

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Issues: (i) Whether the rules requiring C and D forms to be attached with the return, insofar as they imposed a rigid time-limit, were within the rule-making power under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; (ii) whether declarations and certificates could be furnished after filing of the return and before assessment, or even after assessment at the appellate or revisional stage; (iii) whether refusal to grant a further opportunity in the facts of the case was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the rules requiring C and D forms to be attached with the return, insofar as they imposed a rigid time-limit, were within the rule-making power under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Analysis: Section 8(4) required furnishing of declarations or certificates in the prescribed manner, but the power to prescribe the manner did not extend to fixing a rigid time-limit by rule. The statutory scheme did not authorise the State Government, under section 13, to convert the procedural requirement into a mandatory deadline merely because the return itself was due within a fixed period. To the extent the Bihar Rules imposed such a time-limit by necessary implication, they travelled beyond the rule-making power.

Conclusion: The time-limit embedded in the Bihar Rules was ultra vires and invalid insofar as it prevented submission of the prescribed forms after the return.

Issue (ii): Whether declarations and certificates could be furnished after filing of the return and before assessment, or even after assessment at the appellate or revisional stage.

Analysis: The forms ordinarily should be available before assessment so that the assessing authority can verify the claim for concessional tax under section 8(1). However, in the absence of a valid statutory deadline, they could be filed after the return and before completion of assessment. If sufficient cause was shown, the appellate or revisional authority could also set aside the assessment and permit a fresh opportunity for compliance. The power, however, was not automatic and depended on the facts and sufficiency of cause.

Conclusion: The assessee could furnish the forms before assessment, and could in principle be allowed to furnish them later if sufficient cause was shown, but no absolute right to post-assessment acceptance existed.

Issue (iii): Whether refusal to grant a further opportunity in the facts of the case was justified.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had not filed the required declarations and certificates even before the assessment order, and the appellate and revisional authorities found that adequate opportunity had been available. The refusal to accept a further explanation or to direct a fresh opportunity was treated as a factual conclusion, and no legal error was found in that conclusion on the materials before the Board.

Conclusion: The refusal to grant a further opportunity was upheld on the facts of the case.

Final Conclusion: The legal position on the validity of the rule-based deadline was answered in favour of the assessee, but the request for relief on the facts was rejected, so the reference was answered only partly in the assessee's favour and otherwise against it.

Ratio Decidendi: A rule framed under the power to prescribe the manner of furnishing statutory declarations cannot, without clear legislative authority, impose a rigid time-limit that defeats the substantive entitlement to concessional tax; yet the grant of a further opportunity after assessment depends on sufficient cause and the facts of the case.

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