Court clarifies "passing of an order" for timely payment, deems Form 2A direction inconsistent.

The court interpreted "passing of an order" as the date of communication to the declarant, not the date signed by the authority. It ruled the petitioner complied with the 30-day payment period by paying within 30 days of receiving the intimation. The direction on Form No. 2A was deemed inconsistent with statutory provisions. The court ordered the designated authority to issue the certificate in Form No. 3 to the petitioner, overturning the earlier denial. The writ petition was allowed, and parties were to bear their own costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "passing of an order" under section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998.
2. Compliance with the statutory period for payment under the scheme.
3. Validity of the direction at the foot of Form No. 2A.
4. Issuance of the certificate in Form No. 3 by the designated authority.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of "Passing of an Order" under Section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998:
The core issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "passing of an order" in section 90(2) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998. The court examined whether this phrase means the date on which the designated authority signs the certificate of intimation in Form No. 2A or the date on which the order is communicated or served to the declarant. The court concluded that the phrase "passing of an order" means the date when the order is communicated to the declarant. This interpretation ensures that the statutory right of the declarant to pay the determined amount within 30 days is preserved and not curtailed by any delay in communication by the designated authority.

2. Compliance with the Statutory Period for Payment under the Scheme:
The petitioner contended that he made a valid declaration and paid the tax within the prescribed period, i.e., within 30 days of receiving the intimation. The designated authority, however, refused to issue the certificate in Form No. 3 on the grounds that the petitioner did not deposit the amount within 30 days from the date the order was signed (February 25, 1999). The court held that the statutory period of 30 days for payment starts from the date the order is communicated to the declarant, not from the date it is signed by the designated authority. Thus, the petitioner complied with the statutory period by depositing the amount within 30 days of receiving the intimation on March 18, 1999.

3. Validity of the Direction at the Foot of Form No. 2A:
The court scrutinized the direction at the foot of Form No. 2A, which instructed the declarant to make the payment within 30 days from the date of the certificate. The court found this direction to be inconsistent with the scheme's statutory provisions. It emphasized that the legislative intent was to grant the declarant 30 clear days for payment from the date of communication of the order. The direction in Form No. 2A was thus deemed illegal and not in accordance with the scheme.

4. Issuance of the Certificate in Form No. 3 by the Designated Authority:
Given the court's interpretation that the period for payment starts from the date of communication, it held that the petitioner, having paid the dues within 30 days of receiving the intimation, was entitled to the issuance of the certificate in Form No. 3. The court directed the designated authority to issue the requisite certificate in Form No. 3 to the petitioner, thereby quashing the earlier communication dated June 22, 1999, which denied the issuance of the certificate.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the writ petition, quashed the communication denying the certificate, and directed the designated authority to issue the certificate in Form No. 3 to the petitioner. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

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