Sales tax default is not a continuing offence where the statute lacks express authority for successive prosecutions.

A default in paying a sales tax assessment was held not to be a continuing offence that permits successive prosecutions or fresh daily fines unless the statute expressly creates that liability. On the statutory scheme considered, Section 15 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 did not authorise a new prosecution each day for the same non-payment. The earlier conviction therefore barred a second prosecution for the identical assessment default, and the later conviction and sentence could not stand.

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Issues: Whether a person already convicted and fined for default in payment of a sales tax assessment could be prosecuted again for non-payment of the same assessment, and whether the default constituted a continuing offence permitting fresh prosecutions and penalties each day.

Analysis: The statutory scheme was examined to determine whether the old provision imposing an additional daily penalty for continued breach also authorised repeated prosecutions for the same default. The text of Section 15 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 was treated as not authorising a new prosecution every day or the imposition of a fresh maximum fine for each day of non-payment. In the absence of express language creating successive offences, the earlier conviction operated as a bar to being tried again for the identical assessment default. The default was held not to be comparable to a continuing trespass or other daily recurring offence.

Conclusion: The second conviction and sentence could not stand, and the petitioner was entitled to acquittal in the present proceeding.

Final Conclusion: Repeated prosecution for the same unpaid assessment was impermissible, and the prior conviction remained the basis for collection of the tax, not for a fresh criminal liability.

Ratio Decidendi: A default in paying a sales tax assessment is not a continuing offence authorising successive prosecutions unless the statute expressly creates that liability; an earlier conviction bars a second prosecution for the same default.

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