Withdrawal of initial complaint equals acquittal barring retrial under Companies Act; subsequent complaint quashed.

The court held that the withdrawal of the initial complaint amounted to an acquittal under section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the petitioner could not be retried for the same offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, even if it is considered a continuing offence. The court quashed the order allowing the second complaint for the period subsequent to the withdrawal of the first complaint. The petition was allowed, and the impugned order was partially quashed.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the withdrawal of a complaint results in acquittal under section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Whether the offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, constitutes a continuing offence allowing for a second complaint.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Withdrawal of Complaint and Acquittal under Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The petitioner argued that the initial complaint lodged against him was withdrawn, which should be considered an acquittal under section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code"). Consequently, he could not be tried again for the same offence. The court examined whether the withdrawal of a complaint equates to an acquittal under section 300 of the Code.

The court referred to the Kerala High Court's decision in *Keciyo Coconut Oils P. Ltd. v. State of Kerala [2002] Crl. LJ 1087*, which stated that the dismissal of a complaint or the discharge of the accused is not an acquittal for the purposes of section 300. However, the explanation to section 300 does not explicitly state that the withdrawal of a complaint is not an acquittal. Therefore, the withdrawal of a complaint can be treated as an acquittal.

The court also referred to its own decision in *Nandlal Dahyalal Shah v. Lalchand Motichandbhai [1983] 2 GLR 1231*, which held that once a trial begins with the issuance of process, it must end in either acquittal or conviction. Therefore, the withdrawal of the complaint after the issuance of process amounts to an acquittal.

Issue 2: Continuing Offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956
The second issue was whether the offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, is a continuing offence, thereby allowing the filing of a second complaint for the same offence. The learned Additional Sessions Judge had concluded that the offence was continuous and, therefore, the second complaint was maintainable for the period subsequent to the withdrawal of the first complaint.

The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in *Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath [1991] 71 Comp. Cas. 403 [1991] 2 SCC 141*, which held that refusal to vacate company quarters after termination of service constitutes a continuing offence. However, the court noted that this principle is relevant only for overcoming the bar of limitation under section 468(2)(a) of the Code.

The court held that once the petitioner was acquitted of the offence under section 630 of the Companies Act after trial, he could not be tried again for the same offence, even if it is considered a continuing offence. The court emphasized that the second complaint was based on the same set of facts and for the same offence, albeit for a different period, which is still barred by section 300 of the Code.

Conclusion
The court concluded that the withdrawal of the initial complaint amounted to an acquittal under section 300 of the Code. Therefore, the petitioner could not be tried again for the same offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, even if it is considered a continuing offence. The court quashed the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge to the extent that it held the second complaint maintainable for the period subsequent to the withdrawal of the first complaint.

Final Order
The petition was allowed, and the impugned order dated March 17, 1994, was quashed to the extent that it held the second complaint maintainable for the period subsequent to November 30, 1988. The court confirmed the order to the extent that it held the complaint barred for the period up to the date of the earlier order of acquittal.

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