Prepared meat classification turns on extent of processing, while a general manufacturer mark is a house mark, not a brand name.

Meat products undergo classification under Chapter 2 only if they remain in limited forms such as chilled, frozen, salted, dried or smoked; further preparation, cooking, seasoning or shaping shifts them to Chapter 16 as prepared meat products, so item-wise examination of processing is required. The mark "COSTA" was treated as a house mark because it functioned as a general identifier of the manufacturer across goods, not as a product-specific brand name, and this character was unaffected by later price stickers. Processing that created commercially distinct and marketable preparations was also recognised as manufacture under central excise law, and the dispute was remitted for fresh determination of classification and duty consequences.

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Issues: (i) Whether the disputed meat products were classifiable under Chapter 2 or Chapter 16 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. (ii) Whether the mark "COSTA" constituted a brand name or only a house mark for the purposes of Chapter 16 classification. (iii) Whether the processing of the meat products amounted to manufacture under central excise law.

Issue (i): Whether the disputed meat products were classifiable under Chapter 2 or Chapter 16 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: Chapter 2 covers meat products only in limited states such as chilled, frozen, salted, dried, or smoked, and not otherwise prepared. Where meat is subjected to further preparation, cooking, pre-cooking, seasoning, shaping, or similar processing, it moves out of Chapter 2 and falls within Chapter 16 as prepared meat products. The nature of processing on each item therefore becomes decisive for classification.

Conclusion: The proper classification had to be determined item-wise by reference to the extent of processing, and the matter required reconsideration on remand.

Issue (ii): Whether the mark "COSTA" constituted a brand name or only a house mark for the purposes of Chapter 16 classification.

Analysis: The mark "COSTA" was used across different goods and was not product-specific. A mark used as a general identifier of the manufacturer, rather than as a trade mark identifying a particular product in trade, is a house mark and not a brand name. The presence of the manufacturer's name and the manner in which the mark appeared on the packs supported that characterisation. The mark on the later price stickers did not alter that position.

Conclusion: "COSTA" was a house mark and not a brand name; the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this aspect was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether the processing of the meat products amounted to manufacture under central excise law.

Analysis: The processing carried out produced commercially distinct and marketable preparations, not merely raw meat in a different form. When processing brings into existence a new commodity known to the market by a different identity, manufacture is established for excise purposes.

Conclusion: The plea that no manufacture took place was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by remand for fresh determination of classification and consequential duty liability, while the character of "COSTA" as a house mark was affirmed and the objection based on absence of manufacture was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Meat products subjected to preparation beyond the limited processes contemplated for Chapter 2 cease to be covered by Chapter 2 and must be classified according to their extent of preparation under Chapter 16, and a mark used generally to identify the manufacturer across goods is a house mark, not a product-specific brand name.

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