Company accommodation after termination: pending industrial dispute did not bar prosecution for unauthorised retention.

Retention of company accommodation after termination of service was treated as unauthorised where the right to occupy the quarter arose only as an incident of employment. The pendency of an industrial dispute challenging the termination did not preserve any continuing right to remain in occupation, because section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act restrains alteration of service conditions during pending proceedings, not a termination already effected. In the absence of any stay of termination or other labour forum protection, prosecution under section 630 of the Companies Act was not barred for continued retention of the accommodation, and prior permission under section 33(1) was held inapplicable on these facts.

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Issues: Whether a prosecution under section 630 of the Companies Act could be maintained for retention of company accommodation after termination of service when an industrial dispute challenging the termination was pending and no permission under section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act had been obtained.

Analysis: The applicant's right to occupy the quarter arose only as an incident of service. Once the service stood terminated and a notice to vacate had been issued, the mere pendency of proceedings challenging the termination did not preserve a continuing right to retain the accommodation. Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act restrains alteration of service conditions during pending proceedings, but the present case did not involve alteration of service conditions; it involved termination of service already effected. In the absence of any stay of termination or other protection from the labour forum, the applicant could not claim a legal entitlement to continue occupying the quarter. The authorities relied upon for the proposition that prior permission was necessary were held inapplicable on these facts.

Conclusion: The prosecution under section 630 of the Companies Act was not barred by the absence of permission under section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the discharge application was rightly rejected.

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