Personal liability in company complaints not made out where summons are directed through the executive chairman, not individually.

The complaint and summons were directed at the company through its executive chairman, not against the petitioner in his personal capacity, so he could not be treated as an individual accused. Inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not warranted because the merits of the complaint and the issuance of process against the company and other persons were matters for the trial magistrate. The challenge was therefore misconceived, and the application was rejected.

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Issues: Whether the petitioner, in his personal capacity, was liable to be treated as an accused or summoned in proceedings arising from a complaint against the company, and whether interference under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted.

Analysis: The complaint and the impugned order showed that the summons was intended to be issued to the company through the petitioner, who was described as its executive chairman, and not to him personally. The challenge was therefore misconceived, because the petitioner had not been made an accused in his individual capacity. The Court also noted that the merits of the complaint and the issuance of process against the company and other persons were matters for the trial magistrate, and there was no basis for exercising inherent jurisdiction at that stage.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not personally summoned as an accused, and the application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was rejected.

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