Company quarters, continuing offence, and discretionary suspension power under criminal procedure were upheld against the petitioner.

Section 630 of the Companies Act was held to cover immovable property, including company quarters, because "property" is of wide import and "deliver up" can apply to possession of such premises. Continued occupation of the quarter after retirement was treated as wrongful withholding and a continuing offence, so limitation under section 472 of the Criminal Procedure Code ran afresh during the continuance of the offence and the complaint was not time-barred. Section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code was also held to confer a discretionary, not mandatory, power to suspend sentence and the consequential delivery order; refusal to suspend was therefore upheld.

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Issues: (i) whether section 630 of the Companies Act applied to immovable property such as company quarters; (ii) whether the complaint was barred by limitation in view of the alleged date of offence; and (iii) whether the appellate court was bound to suspend the sentence and the consequential delivery order under section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issue (i): whether section 630 of the Companies Act applied to immovable property such as company quarters.

Analysis: The expression "property" in section 630 is of wide import and is not confined to movable property. The words "deliver up" are capable of applying to possession of immovable property, and the section contains nothing, express or implied, to restrict its operation only to movables.

Conclusion: The provision applies to immovable property as well, and the contention of the petitioner was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the complaint was barred by limitation in view of the alleged date of offence.

Analysis: After retirement, continued occupation of the company quarter amounted to wrongful withholding of possession and was treated as trespass. Trespass of this nature is a continuing offence. Under section 472 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment during which a continuing offence continues.

Conclusion: The complaint was not barred by limitation, and the plea of the petitioner failed.

Issue (iii): whether the appellate court was bound to suspend the sentence and the consequential delivery order under section 389 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Analysis: Section 389 confers discretionary power on the appellate court, and the word "may" does not create a mandate to suspend the sentence or the consequential order. The discretion is judicial, and on the facts the refusal to suspend was justified.

Conclusion: The appellate court was not bound to suspend the sentence or the delivery order, and the petitioner's contention was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed on all grounds, and the conviction-related interim relief sought by the petitioner was refused.

Ratio Decidendi: Wrongful continued occupation of company accommodation after cessation of service is a continuing offence, and the appellate power to suspend sentence under section 389 is discretionary rather than mandatory.

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