Continuing trespass and delivery up remedies: immovable property falls within delivery up and appellate suspension is discretionary.

Whether statutory 'delivery up' extends to immovable property: the HC concluded the term 'property' includes immovables and that an order to deliver up possession can cover immovable property (order affirmed for respondent). Whether alleged offence was time barred: the HC held continued possession after lawful tenure is wrongful withholding and constitutes a continuing trespass so limitation restarts during continuance; prosecution was timely (against petitioner). Whether appellate court must suspend sentence and deliver up order on appeal: suspension under the appellate discretion is not mandatory; refusal to suspend was a proper exercise of judicial discretion (petition dismissed).

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Issues: (i) Whether section 630 of the Companies Act applies to immovable property and authorises an order to "deliver up" possession; (ii) Whether the criminal complaint was barred by limitation under section 468(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code where the alleged offence arose on retirement; (iii) Whether the appellate court was bound to suspend sentence and the order under section 630(2) of the Companies Act under section 389(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Issue (i): Whether section 630 of the Companies Act covers immovable property and permits an order to deliver up possession of such property.

Analysis: Section 630 uses the term "property" without restricting it to movables; the phrase "deliver up" can apply to delivering possession of immovable property and is indicative that immovable property falls within the scope of the provision.

Conclusion: Section 630 of the Companies Act applies to immovable property and permits an order to deliver up possession of such property (in favour of Respondent).

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint was barred by limitation under section 468(2) CrPC for an offence alleged to have arisen on the date of retirement.

Analysis: The petitioner lawfully possessed the quarters while in service but continued possession after retirement amounted to wrongful withholding; trespass is a continuing offence and under section 472 CrPC a fresh period of limitation begins to run throughout the continuance of the offence.

Conclusion: The criminal complaint was not barred by limitation; the offence was continuing and prosecution remained timely (against Petitioner; in favour of Respondent).

Issue (iii): Whether the appellate court was obliged to suspend the sentence and the order under section 630(2) of the Companies Act under section 389(1) CrPC.

Analysis: Section 389(1) CrPC confers discretionary power on the appellate court to suspend sentence; the discretion must be exercised judicially and is not mandatory. Given that continued occupation after retirement would reward trespass, exercising discretion to refuse suspension was appropriate.

Conclusion: The Sessions Judge correctly exercised discretion under section 389(1) CrPC and was not bound to suspend the sentence or the deliver-up order; the petitioner's application for suspension was rightly refused (in favour of Respondent).

Final Conclusion: The petition is without merit and is dismissed; the conviction, sentence and the order to deliver up possession under section 630(2) of the Companies Act stand affirmed by the High Court's dismissal of the petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Trespass to property that continues after lawful possession ceases is a continuing offence for limitation purposes, and statutory provisions authorising "delivery up" of property include immovable property; appellate suspension under section 389(1) CrPC is discretionary and not mandatory.

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