Issues: (i) Whether an arbitral award-holder's claim, not lodged in the corporate debtor's CIRP and not included in the approved resolution plan, survives and permits continuation of the challenge to the award; (ii) Whether the amount deposited in court as security for stay of enforcement of the award is refundable to the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether an arbitral award-holder's claim, not lodged in the corporate debtor's CIRP and not included in the approved resolution plan, survives and permits continuation of the challenge to the award.

Analysis: An amount awarded under an arbitral award constitutes a claim and the award-holder is a creditor under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The approved resolution plan binds creditors, while claims not forming part of that plan stand extinguished. The award-holder did not submit its claim to the resolution professional; consequently, its claim was not incorporated in the approved plan. Continuance of the Section 34 challenge could not revive an extinguished claim.

Conclusion: The claim under the arbitral award stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan, and the challenge to the award became academic, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount deposited in court as security for stay of enforcement of the award is refundable to the corporate debtor after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A court deposit required as a condition for stay secures the award amount pending adjudication and does not transfer ownership of the money to the award-holder. Release remains subject to the court's control and may be conditioned or modified. Such deposited funds remain assets of the corporate debtor, notwithstanding custody by the court. Since the underlying award claim was extinguished, no unconditional right to the secured deposit remained with the award-holder.

Conclusion: The deposited amount, together with accrued interest, is refundable to the petitioner, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: Approval of the resolution plan eliminated the unsubmitted award claim and preserved the corporate debtor's entitlement to funds deposited merely as security.

Ratio Decidendi: A claim under an arbitral award that is not submitted and incorporated in an approved resolution plan is extinguished, and money deposited in court solely as security for that award remains an asset of the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority under the proviso to Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is mandatory before a liquidator institutes legal proceedings for a corporate debtor; (ii) Whether post facto approval validates an arbitration invocation made without such prior approval.

Issue (i): Whether prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority under the proviso to Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is mandatory before a liquidator institutes legal proceedings for a corporate debtor.

Analysis: The proviso expressly requires the liquidator to obtain "prior approval" before instituting proceedings. An arbitration request under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 commences arbitral proceedings upon receipt by the respondent. The statutory expression "prior" requires approval to precede the invocation.

Conclusion: Prior approval of the Adjudicating Authority is mandatory before the liquidator invokes arbitration on behalf of the corporate debtor; this finding is against the applicant on the requirement of prior approval.

Issue (ii): Whether post facto approval validates an arbitration invocation made without such prior approval.

Analysis: Unlike Section 28(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which expressly renders specified unauthorised actions void, Section 33(5) prescribes no consequence of voidness. The absence of prior approval therefore makes the invocation ineffective, rather than void ab initio. A purposive construction preserves the liquidation estate's recoveries and avoids requiring a fresh invocation with potential limitation consequences. Following approval, the invocation takes effect from the approval date, and subsequent procedural steps must run from that date.

Conclusion: Post facto approval renders the arbitration invocation effective from the date of approval, not from the original notice date; the application was maintainable and this finding is in favour of the applicant.

Final Conclusion: The Section 21 invocation was effective from 23 December 2022, when approval was granted, and a sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the contractual disputes.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Section 33(5) requires prior approval for a liquidator to institute proceedings but does not prescribe voidness for non-compliance, an unauthorised arbitration invocation remains ineffective until approval is granted and is treated as commenced on the approval date.

Issues: Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order, and whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the relevant review period.

Issue (i): Whether the order classifying the petitioner as fraud complied with the requirement of a reasoned order.

Analysis: Clause 2.1.1.4 of the Fraud Master Circular of 2024 requires the bank to serve a reasoned order setting out the relevant facts and circumstances relied upon, the response to the show-cause notice, and the reasons for classification. The impugned order merely reproduced the forensic auditor's observations and recorded the opportunities afforded to the petitioner, without addressing the petitioner's defences or explaining their rejection. Its contents substantially replicated the show-cause notice before declaring the petitioner as fraud.

Conclusion: The fraud-classification order was wholly unreasoned and unsustainable, in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the bank could be permitted to recommence fraud-classification proceedings for the review period from 1 April 2014 to 4 December 2018.

Analysis: The forensic audit report attributed no fraudulent transaction to the petitioner during his tenure as director. The petitioner had ceased to be a director before the account became an NPA, and the record did not establish that he had executed a personal guarantee. In these peculiar circumstances, fraud proceedings against him for the review period could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The bank was denied liberty to reinitiate fraud-classification proceedings against the petitioner for the specified review period, in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The fraud classification lacks a legally sustainable basis and cannot be revived on the forensic audit material relating to the specified review period.

Ratio Decidendi: A fraud-classification order must independently address the noticee's response and state reasons for rejecting it; a reproduction of the show-cause notice and audit observations does not satisfy the requirement of a reasoned decision.

Issues: (i) Whether the prayers for correction of the company master data and removal of purported directors survived after the Ministry's compliance; (ii) Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to direct investigation into the alleged fraud despite available statutory remedies and pending proceedings before competent fora; (iii) Whether the order permitting the IRP to take protective measures concerning assets should be recalled where affected third parties had not been heard.

Issue (i): Whether the prayers for correction of the company master data and removal of purported directors survived after the Ministry's compliance.

Analysis: The compliance affidavit established that the names reflected as director and additional director had been removed from the master data. The prior direction requiring the company's status to be shown as under CIRP also addressed the remaining status-related grievance.

Conclusion: The master-data and director-related prayers stood satisfied.

Issue (ii): Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised to direct investigation into the alleged fraud despite available statutory remedies and pending proceedings before competent fora.

Analysis: The investigation prayer had been rendered infructuous by subsequent restitution and investigative proceedings. Effective remedies were available under the insolvency, anti-money-laundering and company-law regimes, while the CIRP had been revived and the NCLT was already seized of the controversy. In the absence of circumstances warranting departure from the rule of alternative remedy, discretionary writ jurisdiction was not to be exercised.

Conclusion: No writ direction for investigation was warranted; the parties may pursue remedies before the competent statutory fora. This is against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the order permitting the IRP to take protective measures concerning assets should be recalled where affected third parties had not been heard.

Analysis: The affected applicants were not parties to the writ petition when the asset-protection order was made and had no opportunity of hearing. Further, once the writ petition was not being entertained on merits because alternative remedies were available, interim directions could not continue as the sole final relief.

Conclusion: The asset-protection order could not continue and was vacated. This is in favour of the recall applicants.

Final Conclusion: The surviving controversies concerning investigation, assets and restitution are to be pursued and determined by the competent statutory and judicial fora on their own merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an efficacious statutory remedy is available and the writ court declines merits adjudication, it cannot preserve interim relief as the sole final relief; an order materially affecting non-parties without a hearing also violates natural justice.

Issues: Whether supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 could be invoked to challenge orders of the NCLT, including an ex parte liability order and rejection of the application to set aside ex parte proceedings, when an appellate remedy was available under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Analysis: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code confers jurisdiction on the NCLT over claims and questions arising from liquidation proceedings and provides an appeal to the NCLAT against orders of the Adjudicating Authority. Rule 49 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules provides a mechanism to seek setting aside of an ex parte hearing. Supervisory jurisdiction is discretionary, to be exercised sparingly for jurisdictional errors, failure to exercise jurisdiction, transgression of jurisdiction, abuse of power or grave injustice, and cannot operate as an appellate remedy. The petitioner had knowledge of the NCLT orders but did not pursue the prescribed statutory remedy within time.

Conclusion: The petitioner's recourse to Article 227 was not justified in the presence of the statutory appellate remedy and absence of grounds warranting supervisory interference; the challenge to the NCLT proceedings failed.

Issues: (i) Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration; (ii) Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Issue (i): Whether the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India could act as the Disciplinary Committee and cancel an insolvency professional's registration.

Analysis: Section 220 requires the Board to constitute a Disciplinary Committee consisting only of whole-time members. The statutory composition of the Board and the service rules distinguish the Chairperson from a whole-time member. The delegation order authorised the Chairperson to constitute committees, but specifically reserved disposal of show-cause notices and cancellation of registration to the Disciplinary Committee. A statutory power required to be exercised in a prescribed manner cannot be exercised otherwise.

Conclusion: The Chairperson lacked jurisdiction to act as the Disciplinary Committee; the cancellation order was a nullity. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether a show-cause notice and disciplinary action could be founded on adverse observations of the appellate tribunal without an inspection or investigation under the statutory scheme.

Analysis: Sections 218 to 220 establish a sequence in which the Board, upon reasonable grounds, directs inspection or investigation, receives the resulting report, and may then issue a show-cause notice for disciplinary consideration. The prior inspection covering the petitioner's assignments, including the concerned corporate debtor, found no illegality. That report could not be disregarded while initiating proceedings directly from appellate observations, particularly when independent consideration had been required. The issuing officer also did not correspond with the authority designated under the applicable delegation order. The factual circumstances, including unavailable records and the company's non-going-concern status, required an appropriate statutory inquiry before disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and consequential disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by non-compliance with the mandatory inspection and investigation framework. The finding is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The statutory defects do not preclude the Board from initiating and pursuing fresh action on the same matters in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute confines disciplinary authority to a committee composed only of specified members and requires inspection or investigation before disciplinary action, an order made by an unauthorised functionary without following that statutory process is void.

Issues: Whether the suit, instituted during the operation of the interim moratorium under Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, was barred by law and liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The interim moratorium under Section 96 commences on the filing of an application under Sections 94 or 95 and continues until admission or rejection of that application. During that period, legal action or proceedings in respect of any debt are stayed and creditors are prohibited from initiating fresh proceedings. The Court held that the expression "debt" in Section 96 is not confined to any particular category of debtor for the purpose of the embargo, and that the statutory bar operates by force of law once the relevant insolvency proceedings are in motion. Since the suit was filed when the interim moratorium was operating, the Court held that the suit could not validly be instituted or received for adjudication. The argument that the plaint could be dissected among different defendants was rejected, as the suit was one composite plaint and the embargo attached to the institution itself.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by Section 96(1)(b)(ii) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and was liable to be dealt with under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; the decree based on such suit could not be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether SARFAESI enforcement against personal guarantors could continue after issuance of a demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the 2019 Rules, when no insolvency application had been filed against them under section 95(1) of the IBC; (ii) Whether the Bank's writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy before the DRAT.

Issue (i): Whether SARFAESI enforcement against personal guarantors could continue after issuance of a demand notice under Rule 7(1) of the 2019 Rules, when no insolvency application had been filed against them under section 95(1) of the IBC.

Analysis: A demand notice under Rule 7(1) does not amount to an application by a creditor under section 95(1) of the IBC. The interim moratorium under section 96(1) arises only upon filing of such application before the NCLT. The moratorium applicable to the corporate debtor under section 14 is distinct from the interim moratorium applicable to individuals and personal guarantors. Since no insolvency process was initiated against the guarantors, the pending CIRP against the corporate debtor neither barred SARFAESI measures against the guarantors nor attracted the consolidation mechanism under section 60. The confirmed auction and sale certificate, completed under the safeguards in Rules 8 and 9 of the 2002 Rules, could not be invalidated on the erroneous premise that parallel proceedings were pending against the guarantors.

Conclusion: SARFAESI possession, auction and sale proceedings against the personal guarantors were valid; the setting aside of those measures and the consequential directions in favour of the guarantors were unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the Bank's writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy before the DRAT.

Analysis: The question of alternative remedy was academic because the auction purchaser had already pursued the DRT order before the DRAT, and both writ petitions concerning the same parties and issues were heard together.

Conclusion: The Bank's writ petition was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The secured creditor retained its entitlement to enforce the security interest against the guarantors, and the auction purchaser's confirmed title was not displaced on account of the corporate debtor's CIRP.

Ratio Decidendi: Issuance of a demand notice to a personal guarantor does not trigger the interim moratorium under the IBC; absent an application under section 95(1), SARFAESI enforcement against the guarantor may proceed notwithstanding CIRP and moratorium against the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether the order classifying the petitioner's account as fraud was vitiated for want of reasons and failure to consider the petitioner's defence under the RBI fraud directions; (ii) Whether, on the facts of the case, the bank could restart or continue fraud proceedings for the relevant review period against the petitioner.

Issue (i): Whether the order classifying the petitioner's account as fraud was vitiated for want of reasons and failure to consider the petitioner's defence under the RBI fraud directions.

Analysis: Clause 2.1.1.4 of the Master Directions on Fraud Risk Management requires a reasoned order stating the relevant facts and circumstances, the submissions made against the show cause notice, and the reasons for classification as fraud or otherwise. The impugned order merely recited the background, reproduced the forensic auditor's observations, and recorded the issuance of opportunities, but did not deal with the petitioner's specific defences or explain why they were unacceptable. The order was found to be substantially a reproduction of the show cause notice, with conclusions appended without independent reasoning.

Conclusion: The fraud classification order was held to be wholly unreasoned and unsustainable, and it was quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts of the case, the bank could restart or continue fraud proceedings for the relevant review period against the petitioner.

Analysis: The petitioner had ceased to be a director before the account was declared NPA, and the materials relied upon did not disclose any transaction attributable to him during the short period in which he remained a director within the review period. In these peculiar facts, further fraud proceedings for the same review period were found incapable of being sustained.

Conclusion: Liberty to reinitiate fraud proceedings against the petitioner for the review period was declined.

Final Conclusion: The fraud declaration against the petitioner was set aside and no fresh fraud proceedings for the same review period were permitted, resulting in complete relief to the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a regulatory direction mandates a reasoned fraud classification order, the authority must independently address the noticee's defence and record reasons for rejecting it; a mere reproduction of the show cause notice or forensic report without such reasoning is invalid.

Issues: Whether a creditor must hold a decree or final adjudication order before lodging a claim with the official assignee under the Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, and how such claims are to be treated where civil or other proceedings are already pending on the date of adjudication.

Analysis: The statutory scheme uses inclusive definitions of creditor and debt, permits creditors to prove debts through the prescribed schedule and rules, and does not make a decree a universal pre-condition for lodging a claim. The Act contemplates claims by creditors who have not initiated proceedings as well as creditors whose proceedings are pending, while preserving the jurisdiction of the forum seized of those pending matters. The official assignee is required to independently examine the proof, admit or reject it for reasons, and cannot function as a trial court for complex disputes pending before another competent forum. For claims based on pending proceedings, the creditor may lodge the claim and inform the official assignee of the pending matter, but final quantification for dividend distribution must await the outcome of the competent forum. Where a claim is rejected, the Act provides appellate recourse.

Conclusion: A decree or final adjudication order is not mandatory at the stage of making a claim before the official assignee. A creditor may lodge a claim on the basis of a provable debt, whether or not proceedings were previously initiated, and in pending matters the final adjudication order is required only for distribution of dividend or settlement of the claim at the appropriate stage.

Issues: (i) whether a civil suit filed before an application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the basis of Sections 96, 101, 231 and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) whether the plaint could be rejected in part only against those defendants who had initiated insolvency proceedings.

Issue (i): whether a civil suit filed before an application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the basis of Sections 96, 101, 231 and 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The suit was instituted before the Section 95 applications were filed. Section 96 operates only upon filing of an application under Section 94 or 95, and its interim moratorium cannot justify rejection of a suit that was already pending on the date of initiation of insolvency proceedings. Section 231 does not create an en masse ouster of civil court jurisdiction merely because insolvency proceedings are subsequently commenced. On a meaningful reading of the plaint, the declaratory relief sought in respect of personal guarantees was within civil court jurisdiction at the time of institution, and the bar under Section 96 was not attracted when the plaint was presented.

Conclusion: the suit could not be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the ground of bar under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (ii): whether the plaint could be rejected in part only against those defendants who had initiated insolvency proceedings.

Analysis: Order VII Rule 11 does not permit rejection of a plaint in part. The plaint disclosed a composite cause of action against all defendants, and the court could not sustain rejection only against some defendants while allowing the suit to proceed against others on the same pleading.

Conclusion: partial rejection of the plaint was impermissible.

Final Conclusion: the impugned order rejecting the suit was unsustainable and was set aside, with the matter remitted to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A civil suit instituted before the filing of an application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) merely because later insolvency proceedings trigger statutory moratorium, and a plaint cannot be rejected in part.

Issues: Whether an arbitral award can survive where the respondent's pre-CIRP claims stood extinguished upon approval of a resolution plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The claims in dispute had arisen before commencement of CIRP. Once CIRP was initiated, the statutory moratorium operated and creditors were required to lodge their claims in the insolvency process. Upon approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority, claims not forming part of the plan stood extinguished by operation of law. The settled legal position is that a successful resolution applicant cannot be burdened with undecided or excluded claims, and any adjudication or award in respect of such extinguished claims cannot survive.

Conclusion: The award was liable to be set aside because the claims had ceased to survive after approval of the resolution plan.

Issues: Whether execution of the money decree against the corporate debtor could be stayed pending appeal after approval of its resolution plan, and whether deposit of the decretal amount was mandatory for such stay.

Analysis: The resolution plan approved by the adjudicating authority binds all creditors, including those who did not lodge claims, and claims not forming part of the plan stand extinguished. Continuation of proceedings founded on pre-approval claims would undermine the insolvency framework. The requirement of deposit while granting stay of a money decree is not mandatory where exceptional circumstances justify stay; the approved resolution plan and the statutory effect of Section 31 supplied such circumstances.

Outcome: Operation, execution and implementation of the impugned money decree were stayed until final disposal of the appeal; the application for additional evidence will be heard with the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies to pending insolvency-resolution applications against personal guarantors and removes the interim moratorium under Section 96(1); (ii) Whether limited protective relief for disclosure and preservation of guarantors' assets should be granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 pending arbitration.

Issue (i): Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 applies to pending insolvency-resolution applications against personal guarantors and removes the interim moratorium under Section 96(1).

Analysis: Section 96(4), effective from 26 May 2026, excludes applications concerning personal guarantors to corporate debtors from Section 96. The expression "where an application is filed" encompasses applications already filed and pending on the effective date. Its application to an ongoing proceeding is retroactive, not retrospective, because it operates prospectively upon an existing and continuing status without impairing vested rights. The identity of the person who initiated the insolvency application is immaterial under the amended provision.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium in respect of the personal guarantors ceased from 26 May 2026; the Section 9 petition was not barred. This issue is in favour of the Petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether limited protective relief for disclosure and preservation of guarantors' assets should be granted under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 pending arbitration.

Analysis: The arbitration agreements and indebtedness were undisputed. The relief sought was confined to asset disclosure and restraint against dissipation, rather than any direction for deposit. Such limited measures were equitable and appropriate pending arbitration, particularly after cessation of the moratorium.

Conclusion: The guarantors must disclose their assets and are restrained from dealing with the disclosed assets pending arbitration. This issue is in favour of the Petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The amended insolvency regime permits recourse to interim arbitral protection against personal guarantors whose insolvency applications remain pending, and limited asset-preservation measures may be granted pending commencement and conduct of arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory exclusion introduced prospectively may apply to pending proceedings founded on an existing status without being retrospective; accordingly, Section 96(4) removes the automatic interim moratorium for pending insolvency applications against personal guarantors to corporate debtors.

Issues: Whether the respondent could demand pre-CIRP outstanding electricity dues and late payment surcharge as a precondition for a fresh electricity connection after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: The petitioner was a successful resolution applicant under an approved resolution plan. The record showed that the claimed LPSC had already formed part of the pre-disconnection dues before commencement of CIRP, and the respondent's contention that the surcharge arose only upon the later demand was contrary to the records. Once the resolution plan was approved, claims not provided for in the plan stood extinguished on the clean slate principle, and the respondent could not reopen pre-CIRP electricity liabilities indirectly by insisting on payment of LPSC. The authorities on section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 were distinguishable because they concerned escaped assessment or later correction of billing errors, not a pre-existing surcharge already reflected in the bills before CIRP.

Conclusion: The demand for pre-CIRP outstanding electricity charges and the connected LPSC was held to be unlawful, and the respondent was restrained from denying electricity supply on that basis.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the petitioner obtained relief against recovery of the impugned pre-CIRP electricity-related dues as a condition for reconnection.

Ratio Decidendi: After approval of a resolution plan, pre-CIRP claims not provided for in the plan, including connected statutory levies arising from the same period, stand extinguished and cannot be enforced indirectly against the successful resolution applicant.

Issues: Whether pendency of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings and the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 bar the Competent Authority from exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 to grant deemed conveyance in favour of a flat purchasers' society.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 obliges the promoter to convey title to the society and enables unilateral deemed conveyance where the promoter fails to do so. The Court held that this is a statutory, non-monetary function meant to perfect title and does not amount to recovery or enforcement of a debt. It further held that the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not extinguish or suspend statutory duties owed under MOFA, and that the deemed conveyance mechanism is not inconsistent with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court relied on the principle that statutory obligations and regulatory actions in public interest continue despite insolvency, and that the corporate debtor's alleged asset could not be treated as a bar to the Competent Authority acting under MOFA.

Conclusion: The pendency of CIRP did not bar adjudication of the deemed conveyance application, and the Competent Authority was bound to decide it on merits.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking directions for early hearing of the transfer application and for a status quo order against pending insolvency proceedings before the tribunal was maintainable, in view of the availability of alternative remedies and the settled limits on interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The reliefs sought did not challenge any adjudicated order of the tribunal but asked for directions to secure urgent listing of the transfer application and to restrain further proceedings in the insolvency matter. The constitution of a special bench and vacation listing lay within the tribunal president's domain, and the petitioner had not first exhausted the remedies available before the tribunal or the appellate forum. The Court also noted that the transfer application was filed at a belated stage after participation in the insolvency proceedings, and that multiple forums had been approached for substantially similar reliefs. In these circumstances, invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction against a pending tribunal matter was unwarranted.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and the requested directions could not be granted. The petition was dismissed, with costs, against the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: High Courts should ordinarily decline to exercise writ jurisdiction to grant directions affecting pending tribunal proceedings where an alternative statutory remedy exists and the litigant has engaged in forum shopping or abused the process of law.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in refusing leave to file additional objections and documents under the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, and whether the impugned order warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Rule 55 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits subsequent pleadings after reply only with the leave of the Tribunal on such terms as it deems fit, and Rule 11 preserves the Tribunal's inherent power. The petitioner had filed the reply within the short time granted and sought to place additional objections and documents with reasons. The order rejecting that request proceeded on the footing that there was no provision to entertain such material, yet it simultaneously permitted the documents to be relied on to a limited extent. In these circumstances, the refusal to entertain the additional objections could not be sustained, especially when the materials were sought to be introduced for fair adjudication and no prejudice was shown to justify exclusion. The objection also raised a natural justice concern.

Conclusion: The impugned order refusing leave for additional objections and documents was not sustainable and was set aside. The additional objections and documents were directed to be considered by the Tribunal while dealing with the insolvency petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Rule 55 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, read with the Tribunal's inherent power, subsequent pleadings and supporting documents may be entertained on terms of leave where their exclusion would impede fair adjudication, and an order rejecting such material on an erroneous premise is liable to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceeding arising out of the FIR disclosed the ingredients of offences under Sections 406, 418, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, or whether the dispute was only a civil dispute arising out of a commercial transaction and novation of contract, warranting quashing of the proceeding.

Analysis: The allegations showed that money had been paid for proposed flat transactions, that the project later stalled, and that the parties subsequently converted the advance into a loan arrangement with agreed interest. The Court found that the material did not establish dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, nor prima facie entrustment coupled with misappropriation necessary for criminal breach of trust. The alleged forgery was also treated as an afterthought, since the alleged fake documents were not shown to have induced the initial payment and no contemporaneous allegation of forgery appeared in the earlier insolvency proceedings. The Court further held that the subsequent loan arrangement amounted to novation under Section 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and that the grievance, at its highest, reflected a claim for recovery of money or breach of contract. The unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of the essential ingredients of the penal offences supported the conclusion that the criminal process was being used as a recovery mechanism.

Conclusion: The proceeding did not disclose a prima facie criminal offence under the cited penal provisions and was liable to be quashed in favour of the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The criminal case was held unsustainable in law as the dispute was essentially civil in nature, lacking the foundational ingredients of cheating, criminal breach of trust, or forgery, and the continuation of the prosecution was treated as an abuse of process.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the foundational facts show a commercial transaction later novated into a repayment arrangement, and the allegations do not establish dishonest intention at inception or the essential ingredients of the charged offences, criminal proceedings cannot be used as a mechanism for civil recovery and may be quashed as an abuse of process.

Issues: (i) Whether, after approval of the resolution plan, Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred continuation of attachment proceedings against the corporate debtor's property under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999; (ii) Whether the impugned attachment had already vested in the competent authority on publication of the attachment notification, so as to keep the property outside the resolution process.

Issue (i): Whether, after approval of the resolution plan, Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred continuation of attachment proceedings against the corporate debtor's property under the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999.

Analysis: Section 32A was held to grant immunity from prosecution to the corporate debtor for prior offences once a resolution plan approved under Section 31 results in a change in management or control, and to bar action against the corporate debtor's property in relation to such offences where the property is covered by the approved plan. The expression "action against the property" was understood to include attachment, seizure, retention and confiscation. On the facts, the corporate debtor satisfied the statutory conditions, the resolution plan had been approved, and the corporate debtor was proceeding on a clean slate. The attachment, therefore, could not survive.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 32A applied, and continuation of the attachment was impermissible. This issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned attachment had already vested in the competent authority on publication of the attachment notification, so as to keep the property outside the resolution process.

Analysis: Under Sections 4 to 7 of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999, attachment on publication is only provisional and vesting remains inchoate until the Designated Court, after inquiry, makes the attachment absolute under Section 7. Since no order under Section 7 had been passed making the attachment absolute, the property had not finally vested in the competent authority. The attempt to treat the mere notification as completed vesting was rejected.

Conclusion: The attachment had not matured into final vesting, and the property remained capable of being released from attachment. This issue was decided in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The attachment could not be sustained after approval of the resolution plan, and the impugned notification was liable to be quashed in relation to the subject property, with consequential return of the bank guarantee.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a resolution plan satisfying Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is approved, all action against the corporate debtor's property for prior offences, including attachment, ceases; under the MPID Act, attachment becomes final only when the Designated Court makes it absolute under Section 7.