Delayed payment surcharge on electricity dues can arise with each belated instalment, and limitation may not run from the original bill.

Delayed payment surcharge on electricity dues may accrue on each belated instalment payment, rather than only once on the original supplementary bill, where the payment schedule and regulatory framework make surcharge payable on default. The analysis treats liability as arising whenever the consumer misses the due date, so recovery is not confined by a limitation argument calculated only from the date of the supplementary bill. Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 was not treated as a bar on these facts because the claim related to delayed payment surcharge linked to repeated defaults, not a single static demand for consumption charges. The demand was therefore considered valid and recoverable on the facts discussed.

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Issues: Whether delayed payment surcharge on electricity dues could be levied and recovered by treating each default in instalment payment as the relevant point of liability, and whether Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 barred such recovery on the footing that limitation ran from the original supplementary bill.

Analysis: The Court held that delayed payment surcharge is attracted by the consumer's default in making payment on the due date and is not a static demand arising only once from the original bill. On the combined effect of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the applicable regulatory provisions, and the payment schedule agreed between the parties, liability to pay surcharge arose whenever an instalment was paid belatedly. The Court distinguished the authorities cited on the ground that they concerned recovery of consumption charges and not delayed payment surcharge. It was further held that the plea that limitation must be computed only from the date of the supplementary bill was unsustainable because the surcharge claim arose with each default in payment.

Conclusion: The delayed payment surcharge demand was held to be valid and recoverable, and Section 56(2) did not bar its levy on the facts of the case.

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