TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (5) TMI 1850
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....uraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short, "Adhiniyam"), calling upon him to explain why an Externment Order should not be passed against him. The appellant submitted his reply; however, the District Magistrate passed the Externment Order dated 18.06.2025, directing the appellant to be externed from District Balodabazar- Bhatapara for a period of one year. Aggrieved, he preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam before the State Government. However, by order dated 03.10.2025, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, per which an appeal against the order of the Collector dated 18.06.2025 ought to have been preferred by the appellant within a period of thirty (30) days, but the same was filed only on 12.09.2025, i.e., after approximately 50 days, by the appellant. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the appellant preferred a writ before the High Court. However, the same also came to be dismissed vide the impugned order dated 16.10.2025. Hence, this appeal. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ashish Kumar Pandey and learned A.A.G. Sri Rajat Nair for the State of Chhattisgarh. We have perused the material on record. ....
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....atural justice and accordingly, a show-cause notice was issued to him on 24.04.2025. On 05.05.2025, the appellant submitted his reply to the show cause notice and only thereupon, after due consideration of the material available on record, the District Magistrate passed the Externment Order dated 18.06.2025 directing the appellant to remove himself from District Balodabazar-Bhatapara for a period of one year. (iii) The appeal against the said order was filed on 12.09.2025 which was beyond the prescribed limitation period of 30 days as stipulated under Section 9(1) of the Adhiniyam. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 03.10.2025 as being barred by limitation. That Section 9 of the Adhiniyam prescribes a period of limitation for filing appeal. The appeal, having been filed only on 12.09.2025, i.e., after approximately 50 days, was rightly held barred by limitation. (iv) In any case, the appellant had not preferred an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the appeal before the State Government against the Externment Order passed by the District Magistrate. Be that as it may, the State Government, while dismis....
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....ion shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum setting forth concisely the grounds of objection to the order appealed against, and shall be accompanied by a certified copy thereof. (3) On receipt of such appeal, the State Government may after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to be heard either personally or by a legal practitioner and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, confirm, vary or rescind the order appealed against: Provided that the order appealed against shall remain in operation pending the disposal of the appeal, unless the State Government otherwise directs. (4) In calculating the period of thirty days provided for an appeal under this Section, the time taken for granting a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded." 10. It is a settled position of law that the right to file an appeal is a statutory right or a creature of the statute and no other right to file an appeal can be recognized de hors a statute. A right of appeal is a creature of statute and no appeal can be filed unless it is clearly expressed in terms of a statute. Further, the right of appeal is a substantive ri....
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....the procedure for hearing canalises so that extravagant prolixity or abuse of process can be avoided and a fair workability provided. Amputation is not procedure while pruning may be. That an appeal is a remedial right and if the remedy is reduced to a husk by procedural excess, the right becomes a casualty. That cannot be." 14. With regard to filing of a suit or an appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, this Court has held as under: "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending unce....
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....sed only up to a certain period and not beyond. The Limitation Act therefore does not confer any substantive right nor define any right or cause of action. The law of limitation is based on delay and laches. It is well known that the Limitation Act only bars the remedy without extinguishing the rights. It is made to ensure that a plaintiff does not resort to procrastination or dilatory tactics, but seeks the remedy within a time fixed by the legislature. But in certain special circumstances like Section 27 of the Limitation Act, once the remedy becomes barred by limitation, the right itself gets extinguished, that is, when a suit for possession of any property gets extinguished on the determination of period of limitation. That unless there is a complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot be complete cause of action unless there is a person who can sue and a person who can be sued. There is also an important principle which has crystallized in the form of the maxim that "when once the time has begun to run, nothing stops it". The public policy underlying the law of limitation is "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" meaning, that it is in the welfare of th....
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....inary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court." XXX 29. Savings .- (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, a....
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....s containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." There is no difficulty insofar as the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to the present case is concerned. The Adhiniyam, being a special law, prescribes in Section 9 a period of limitation for appeals against the order of the District Magistrate, i.e. 30 days. What remains to be seen is, whether, Section 9 of the Adhiniyam excludes the operation of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) and in particular Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (ii) In Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 133, this Court interpreted Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act against the argument that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was argued that the words "expressly excluded" appearing in Section 29(2) would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. Rejecting the argument, the three-Judge Be....
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....ribunal's order. Since the application in that case was filed beyond the prescribed period, the issue was, whether, the High Court possessed the authority to extend the limitation period. Upon analysing the framework of the Central Excise Act and the nature of the statutory remedy, this Court held that the said Act constituted a self-contained code governing limitation for proceedings under it. This Court also observed that even where a special statute does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, exclusion may still arise by "necessary implication" from the scheme, object, and structure of the special law. The determination as to whether Section 5 applies, therefore, depends not merely upon the language of the Limitation Act, but upon whether the special enactment manifests an intention to exclude such applicability expressly or even by necessary implication. It was noted as under: "35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to ....
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....ation provision itself prescribed both the original period and the maximum extent to which delay could be condoned. The Court inferred from this scheme that the Parliament intended to place an absolute outer limit on the power to condone delay. Accordingly, it was held that once the aggregate period of 120 days had expired, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked to enlarge the limitation further, and any appeal filed beyond that period was not maintainable as being barred. (vi) In Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association vs. Kalyan Chowdhury, (2018) 3 SCC 41 ("Bengal Chemists"), the question was, whether, under Sections 421(3) and 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, an appeal from the orders of the Tribunal could be preferred after the limitation period of forty- five (45) days prescribed in Section 421(3) plus additional forty- five (45) days in its proviso had lapsed. This Court observed that Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 does not merely contain the initial period of 45 days for filing an appeal, but also grants a further period of 45 days, being the grace period. This grace period of 45 days was held to be a special in-built variant of Section 5 of ....
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.... extent to which delay could be condoned, leading the Court to conclude that Parliament intended to impose an absolute outer limit beyond which no extension was permissible. So also in Bengal Chemists, the expression "not exceeding 45 days" in the proviso to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act was held to have the same restrictive effect as the phrase "but not thereafter," thereby excluding recourse to Section 5 beyond the prescribed grace period. 24.1 Even in cases where the statute did not expressly exclude Section 5, the Court examined whether exclusion arose by necessary implication from the scheme and structure of the enactment. Thus, in Hongo India, the Central Excise Act was treated as a self-contained code and the limitation prescribed therein was held to be rigid and unextendable. 24.2 However, when we revert to the present case, the statute in question stands on an entirely different footing. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely prescribes that an appeal may be filed within thirty days and does not contain any expression akin to "but not thereafter," "not exceeding," or any other restrictive expression indicating that delay beyond the prescribed period cannot be condon....
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.... or erroneous exercise of power under the Adhiniyam. In such a context, the right of appeal itself is to be treated as an integral component of fair procedure. Such a right should not ordinarily be defeated on technical grounds unless, of course, the statute clearly mandates strict exclusion which, as we have already stated, it does not. Hence, a purposive interpretation ought to be made of Section 9 of the Adhiniyam having regard to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 24.5 The law of limitation is intended to regulate the exercise of remedies and ensure diligence, but it is not meant to extinguish rights, particularly civil rights, in the absence of express legislative command. Consequently, where the statute is silent on the exclusion of condonation powers, as in the present case, the interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances substantial justice ought to be preferred over one that defeats the remedy on that technicality alone. As noted, this principle will acquire greater significance where the consequences are grave. Denial of appellate scrutiny solely on account of delay, despite sufficient cause being shown, may result in irreversible prejudice, in fa....