TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (7) TMI 990
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....the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter, 'NI Act'), was dismissed. 3. Along with the petition, CRL.M.A. 19750/2026 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Sections 438, 442 and 528 of the BNSS, seeking condonation of delay of 603 days in filing the petition. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4. The case set up by the respondent/complainant is that the parties were on friendly terms, and in December, 2016, the petitioner approached him for a friendly loan of Rs.2,55,000/- for his personal requirement, which was advanced to him in cash. Towards discharge of this liability, the petitioner issued cheque bearing no. 544430 dated 09.05.2017 for Rs.2,55,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Kamla Nagar, Delhi, in favour of the respondent. 5. On presentation, the cheque was returned dishonoured with the remarks "Funds Insufficient" vide return memo dated 26.05.2017. The respondent served a legal demand notice dated 09.06.2017 (Ex. CW1/3) through counsel at both the addresses of the petitioner. The demand was not met, and the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act was instituted on 12.07.2017. 6. Notice under Section 251 CrPC was framed against the ....
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.... DW-1 made the following admission: "It is correct that the cheque in question Ex. CW1/1 belongs to me. It is also correct that the signature which is on Ex. CW1/1 is mine. The addresses given in the memo of parties of the complaint are mine. It is correct that the addresses mentioned in the legal notice Ex. CW1/3 is also mine. It is correct that I am still residing in the same address which is mentioned in the Ex. CW1/3. I do not know the cheque in question was dishonored or not. It is correct that I know the cheque in question was dishonoured on 26.05.2017. Again said, I know about all the details after the filing of the case. I did not received the legal notice Ex CW1/3. It is correct that the address mentioned on the legal notice Ex. CW1/3 is mine. I know the complainant Naresh Kumar since 2016." 11. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned Trial Court convicted the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act vide judgment dated 17.04.2023. The learned Trial Court held that the foundational facts stood undisputed, since the cheque in question belonged to the petitioner, bore his signatures and was drawn on an account maintained by him....
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....ed. The respondent, who is himself engaged in the business of financial consultancy and claims to pay income tax, could not, in the ordinary course, have advanced such a substantial amount in cash without any documentation. The conviction, it is contended, rests on the bare word of the respondent. 17. On the aspect of delay, learned counsel submits that, after dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner engaged his previous counsel, paid the requisite fees and signed the papers for filing the revision petition. It is submitted that the petitioner was repeatedly assured that the petition had been filed and learnt only towards the end of 2025 that no revision petition had in fact been instituted. Thereafter, he approached the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee and filed the present petition. It is contended that the petitioner, being an uneducated litigant, had bona fide relied upon his previous counsel and ought not to suffer for the latter's default. 18. In support of the prayer for condonation of delay, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court to contend that the expression "sufficient cause" deserves a liberal con....
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....iteracy takes the matter no further. Illiteracy is not, by itself, a ground to condone delay, and it does not absolve a litigant of ordinary diligence, least of all a litigant so conversant with court proceedings. The conduct disclosed is negligence, not a bona fide impression created by counsel. 24. The legal position admits of no doubt. In Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, 2025 INSC 672, the Supreme Court reiterated that while considering a plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the Court is to ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered, and only when the explanation and the opposition to it stand on an equal footing may the court look to the merits of the main matter. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: - "31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balance....
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....ar v. Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, the Supreme Court, reiterating the principles summarised in Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418, observed as under: "25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence." 30. In Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148, the Supreme Court explained the effect of the presumptive device in the following terms: "As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden on the accused... Until this e....
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....re of Rs. 38,900/-, which in the Section 313 CrPC statement was the amount repaid by the petitioner, now became the amount allegedly filled in on a misused cheque bearing no. 488639. 36. On a comparative reading of these statements, the identity of the lender, the recipient and the number of the alleged security cheques, and the mode, amount and payee of the alleged repayment have each changed from stage to stage. A defence whose foundation shifts every time it is stated is not a probable defence. The contradictions are not peripheral rather they strike at the root of the case by which the petitioner seeks to displace the statutory presumptions. 37. The solitary document produced in defence, the bank passbook Ex. DW1/1, in fact cuts the other way. A perusal of the passbook shows a credit of Rs. 29,200/- received by the petitioner through NEFT from Kamal Singh on 06.04.2016, and a single payment of Rs. 6,500/- made to Kamal Singh through cheque bearing no. 544429 on 28.04.2016. The document thus corroborates the receipt of the loan from Kamal Singh but falls far short of establishing its repayment. A payment of Rs. 6,500/- squares neither with the claim of repayment of Rs. 29,....
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....lled in and presented for lakhs of rupees, one after another, does not remain a silent spectator. Both the courts below have concurrently noticed this circumstance, and the silence of the petitioner is wholly inconsistent with the defence set up by him. 42. The respondent, on the other hand, has maintained a consistent case throughout. His case has been that a friendly loan of Rs.2,55,000/- was advanced in cash in December, 2016, and that the cheque in question was issued towards its discharge. Nothing material was elicited in his cross-examination to dent this case. The admission that he holds no documentary proof of the cash loan apart from the cheque, and that no witness was present when the money was advanced, does not assist the petitioner. The transaction pleaded is a friendly loan in cash between persons known to each other, and, more importantly, once the petitioner failed to discharge the evidential burden cast upon him, the presumed fact must be taken to be true without expecting the complainant to prove anything further, as held in Rajesh Jain (supra). 43. Considering the legal position and the facts discussed above, this Court is of the view that the petitioner fa....