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2026 (5) TMI 1671
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....g Act, 2002 (PMLA) in the Original Application No. 236/2018 (OA) dated 28.06.2018. Cash amounts of Rs. 5,00,000/- & Rs. 12,00,000/-and 42 vehicles & 10 cars were seized for which the OA No. 236/2018 was filed, so as to continue with the seizure and retention. The Impugned Order allowed the retention and freezing. 2. Ld. Counsel for the Appellants submitted that in 2013, a FIR No. 216 of 2013 dated 30.09.2013 was registered by Mumbai Police against National Spot Exchange Limited (hereinafter referred as NSEL) and various defaulting parties. Subsequently, an ECIR was registered by the Respondent Directorate against various parties including the Appellants. The Appellant Company M/s. N. K. Proteins Ltd. was incorporated on 27.03.1992 under the Companies Act, 1956. Mr. Nimish K. Patel is the Chairman and Managing Director of the Appellant Company with Mr. Nilesh Patel as its Managing Director. The Appellant Company has been, inter alia, engaged in the business of edible oil refining and marketing of the same in the domestic market. The Appellant's group company, M/s N.K. Industries Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'NKIL) was incorporated on 19.08.1987 under the Companies ....
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....onding T+25 contracts. Further, an amount of Rs. 176.77 crores was paid by the Appellant to NSEL towards net purchases for delivery contracts. Thus, as on 31.08.2013, the net liability of the Appellant towards NSEL, as worked out by the ED, was Rs. 330.81 crores. Against the figure of 330.81 crores, as worked out in the table given in OA No. 236/2018, the ED has already attached properties worth Rs. 305.52 crores. Moreover, during investigations a sum of over Rs. 53.38 Crores was also repaid by the Appellant to NSEL in the escrow account maintained by Forward Market Commission (now merged with SEBI) and hence the net assets already under control of authorities is Rs. 305.52 crores as against alleged Proceeds of Crime (PoC) of Rs. 283.43 Crore. The Respondent had alleged under the OA that as per NSEL the total outstanding liability of the Appellant is Rs. 962.79 crores to NSEL on account of settlement of T+25 contracts, the respondent has therefore considered the entire amount of Rs. 962.79 crores to be proceeds of crime generated from alleged bogus Sale transactions. 4. Ld. Counsel for the Appellants contended that the Ld. AA had issued the Show Cause Notices (SCNs) without goin....
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....41 respectively in PMLA Case No.4 of 2015 already filed by the Directorate of Enforcement, Mumbai Zonal Office, Mumbai and presently pending before the Special PMLA Court for Greater Mumbai for the offences allegedly committed under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of PMLA. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Respondent Department in a connected matter arising from the same ECIR filed complaints viz OC No. 358/2014, OC No. 393/2015 and OC. 430/2015 before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority under section 5(5) of the PMLA against the same Appellants. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed those provisional attachments. 7. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the record of the proceedings before the Ld. Adjudicating Authority clearly demonstrates due application of mind. As is evident from the noting of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority, a conscious decision was taken after perusing the Original Application (O.A. No. 236/2018) and the documents filed therewith. Having perused the said material, the Ld. Adjudicating Authority formed the requisite belief that the Appellants prima facie appeared to have committed the offence of money laundering. This independent sati....
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....tly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The investigation in the present case is a continuous and evolving process. While the initial phase of investigation identified a net liability of Rs. 330.81 crores and led to the attachment of properties worth Rs. 305.52 crores, further investigation revealed the full magnitude of the fraud. The figure of Rs. 962.79 crores represent the gross liability of the N.K. Proteins Group towards NSEL, which is the direct consequence of the bogus circular trading carried out on the platform. 9. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the search and seizure operations of 30.05.2018 were a bona fide effort to trace the remaining proceeds of crime, which were suspected to have been laundered into various assets, including the vehicles and cash that are now the subject matter of the present proceedings. The Ld. Adjudicating Authority, by allowing the retention, has correctly facilitated further investigation required to unearth the complete money trail. The principle of proportionality, which the Appellants appear to invoke, was fully respected, since the Directorate did not freeze the e....
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.... named as an accused in the prosecution complaint. It is sufficient that a complaint alleging the commission of an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is pending before the competent court. Since a prosecution complaint is already pending, the retention of the seized and frozen properties can lawfully continue during the pendency of those proceedings. The absence of a supplementary complaint specifically naming Shri Priyam Patel or referencing the newly seized assets does not automatically invalidate the retention order. The investigation is ongoing, and the Directorate is entitled to the requisite period to complete its investigation and file a supplementary complaint if warranted by the evidence collected. 11. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the searches were conducted at the residential premises of the Appellant Late Shri Nilesh K Patel, which also constituted the residence of his son, Shri Priyam Patel. The luxurious vehicles, namely a Range Rover and a Mercedes, both registered in the name of Shri Priyam Patel, were found parked at these very premises. Given the staggering magnitude of the fraud and the close familial nexus between the parties, it was entirely....
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....Os No. 13 of 2014 dated 27.08.2014, No. 21 of 2014 dated 29.11.2014 and No. 03 of 2015 dated 10.03.2015 since the alleged PoC was of Rs. 283.43 crores. c. The seizure and the retention of the aforementioned cash and vehicles cannot be sustained on the grounds that the retention order under Section 20(1) of PMLA to be issued by the Directorate of Enforcement was neither issued nor supplied to the Appellants. During the course of our examination of the aforementioned three issues, we also intend disposing of other questions raised by the Appellants in the pleadings made in the Appeals as well as those raised by them during the course of the arguments. 13. It is on record that the Prosecution Complaint under PMLA in the same ECIR against the three Appellants M/s N. K. Proteins Ltd., Shri Nilesh K. Patel and M/s N. K. Industries Ltd. among others, was filed on 30.03.2015 in the City Civil Court & Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, where presently it is still pending as PMLA Case No. 4 of 2015. The seizure was made during the search proceedings under PMLA on 29/30.05.2018. It is thus clear that the search and seizure proceedings occurred after the filing of the Pr....
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....record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall- (a) continue during investigation for a period not exceeding three hundred and sixty-five days or the pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under this Act before a court or under the corresponding law of any other country, before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India, as the case may be; and (b) become final after an order of confiscation is passed under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of section 8 or section 58B or sub-section (2A) of section 60 by the Special Court; Explanation.-For the purposes of computing the period of three hundred and sixty-five days under clause (a), the period during which the investigation is stayed by any court under any law for the time being in force shall be excluded." We do not find that the aforementioned statutory provisions require a Prosecution Complaint under PMLA to be filed where there is already pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under the PMLA before the Court. In the present matter the Impugned Order has arisen out of OA No. ....
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....n the complaint to be filed by the authorised officer concerning offence under section 3 of the 2002 Act." (emphasis supplied) The aforementioned observations from the Judgment (supra) apply mutatis mutandis to the seizures made under Section 17 of PMLA. 15. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the Judgment dated 21.11.2025 in the matter of the Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement v. Amlendu Pandey (D) through LR [MISC. APPEAL (PMLA) 8/2022] has made the following observations in paragraphs from 37 to 41: "37. Section 17 of PMLA does not lay down that the search can be carried out in the premises of that person alone qua whom a complaint has been filed or report had been forwarded to the concerned Magisterial Court. The pre-condition is of 'prior institution of complaint or forwarding of a report under Section 157 Cr.P.C'. There is no mandate that search should also be of the person shown accused in such report or complaint. 38. A person may be in possession of proceeds of crime but still may not be accused of any scheduled offence or offence of money laundering. In a given situation, a person can be recipient of proceeds of crime, without....
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....ontracts lodged on the NSEL platform without having corresponding physical stock of the same. He also admitted that the sale transactions were only paper transactions. The funds so generated from NSEL were diverted for the purpose of investing in realty estate. It is also mentioned in the Impugned Order that Shri Anjani Sinha, Ex-MD of NSEL stated under Section 50 of PMLA that the Appellant Shri Nilesh Patel used the funds received from the Exchange for settling their bank loan and other debts. It is categorically mentioned in the Impugned Order in paragraph 3 (vi) that the Assistant Director of ED, the Complainant has recorded in the OA No. 236/2018 the following: "During the course of further investigation in the matter, it is noticed that huge transactions are/were being executed through accounts of NK Proteins Private Limited & its group companies. Shri Nilesh Patel and Shri Nimish Patel are the Directors of M/s. NK Proteins Ltd and main controllers of the activities of the group companies. The proceeds of crime totaling to Rs 657.27 crore is yet to be identified in this case. As such considering the diversion of funds received against non-existent stock of commodity b....
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....ntention of the Appellants is considered, we still find that there remain claims made by the NSEL against the Appellants which have arisen due to the transactions indulged in by the Appellants on the platform of the NSEL. The said transactions are under question in the trial for the scheduled offences, as well as under the pending proceedings for the money laundering offences. The allegations are serious as such transactions were allegedly indulged in, on bogus documents such as warehouse receipts issued without the backing of the actual goods being available in the warehouses. Given the scale of the alleged scam, wherein the objectivity and the veracity of the transactions occurring on a public platform of NSEL are still under investigation, the possibility that the quantum of proceeds of crime was Rs. 962.79 Crores cannot be ruled out without completion of investigations. In this regard, Ld. Counsel for the Respondent in the written submissions filed on 10.03.2026 has reiterated that the investigation is presently at a crucial and sensitive stage and the continued retention of the seized and frozen property is imperative for its successful completion and for the eventual restitut....
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....f Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) and submitted that the judgment aforesaid is per incuriam, because it has gone against the statutory provision, thus, should not be applied. The counsel for the appellants made a serious contest on the aforesaid and accordingly we would be taking up the issue in reference to the rival submissions and for that even to examine the provisions and the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra). 32. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra), the Hon'ble High Court has rewritten the provision while giving interpretation to Section 8(3) and 17(4) of the Act of 2002. It may have been due to lack of proper assistance to the Hon'ble High Court. The judgment of Delhi High Court (supra) is even in conflict with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). The learned counsel for the respondents first made reference of Para 55 of the judgment which is reproduced hereunder: "55. It is here that the Appellant sets up a two-pronged challenge: (a). The Appellant would contend that Sections 17(4) and 20 operate differently....
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....on 18, the evidence on which he relies and other relevant information and particulars, and to show cause why all or any of such properties should not be declared to be the properties involved in money-laundering and confiscated by the Central Government: Provided that where a notice under this sub-section specifies any property as being held by a person on behalf of any other person, a copy of such notice shall also be served upon such other person: Provided further that where such property is held jointly by more than one person, such notice shall be served to all persons holding such property. (2) The Adjudicating Authority shall, after- (a) considering the reply, if any, to the notice issued under sub-section (1); (b) hearing the aggrieved person and the Director or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf; and (c) taking into account all relevant materials placed on record before him, by an order, record a finding whether all or any of the properties referred to in the notice issued under sub-section (1) are involved in money-laundering: Provided that if the property is claimed by a person, other ....
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....n conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act, the Special Court finds that the offence of money laundering has not taken place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it shall order release of such property to the person entitled to receive it. (7) Where the trial under this Act cannot be conducted by reason of the death of the accused or the accused being declared a proclaimed offender or for any other reason or having commenced but could not be concluded, the Special Court shall, on an application moved by the Director or a person claiming to be entitled to possession of a property in respect of which an order has been passed under sub-section (3) of section 8, pass appropriate orders regarding confiscation or release of the property, as the case may be, involved in the offence of money-laundering after having regard to the material before it. (8) Where a property stands confiscated to the Central Government under sub-section (5), the Special Court, in such manner as may be prescribed, may also direct the Central Government to restore such confiscated property or part thereof of a claimant with a legitimate interest in the property, who may ....
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.... the officer making such order, and a copy of such order shall be served on the person concerned. Provided that if, any time before its confiscation under sub-section (5) of sub-section (7) of section 8 or section 58B or sub-section (2A) of section 60, it becomes practical to seize a frozen property, the officer authorized under sub-section (1) may seize such property. (2) The authority, who has been authorised under sub-section (1) shall, immediately after search and seizure or upon issuance of a freezing order, forward a copy of the reasons so recorded along with material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope, in the manner, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such reasons and material for such period, as may be prescribed. (3) Where an authority, upon information obtained during survey under section 16, is satisfied that any evidence shall be or is likely to be concealed or tampered with, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, enter and search the building or place where such evidence is located and seize that evidence: Provided that no authori....
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....tion (5) or sub-section (7) of section 8, Special Court shall direct the release of all property other than the property involved in money-laundering to the person from whom such property was seized or the persons entitled to receive it. (6) Where an order releasing the property has been made by the Special Court under sub-section (6) of section 8 or by the Adjudicating Authority under section 58B or sub-section (2A) of section 60, the Director or any officer authorised by him in this behalf may withhold the release of any such property for a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of such order, if he is of the opinion that such property is relevant for the appeal proceedings under this Act". The learned counsel for the respondents referred Para 59 to 62, 64 to 74 and 76 of the judgment in the case of Rajesh Agarwal (supra) to allege rewriting of the statutory provision by the High Court and otherwise in conflict to the judgment of the Apex Court. We may accordingly quote Para 59 to 62, 64 to 74 and 76 of the judgment in the case of Rajesh Agarwal (supra) and are quoted thus: "59. In its plain terms, the Section deals with the circumstance wh....
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....ation, makes it apparent that Section 17, in fact, does not contemplate a procedure where immediately after a seizure or freezing being effected, the adjudicatory powers of the learned AA could be resorted to. In the succeeding paragraphs, relating to Section 20, this aspect will be further elaborated upon. 67. Section 17(4) of the PMLA, which has been reproduced in the preceding paragraphs of this judgement, is what is sought to be relied upon by the Appellant to contend that the same allows the Appellant to file an application ".... requesting for retention of such record or property seized..." before the learned AA and upon the filing of such an application, the learned AA, without having an order of retention under Section 20(1) can proceed to pass an order permitting the retention of the same. 68. We are of the view that the same is clearly against the plain reading of the Statute itself. Section 17(4) cannot confer upon Section 8(3), a power to pass an order of Retention. Section 8(3) is confined to the confirmation of an order of retention. Surely, one cannot contend that the authority which is statutorily conferred the power to "confirm" an order can also ....
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....rovision makes it evident that the learned AA exercises power only in respect of the retention of the seized property beyond the period of 180 days, meaning thereby that the power to retain the seized goods for a period of 180 days, was never conferred upon the learned AA". 34. The learned counsel for the respondents referred to Section 8(3) of the Act to indicate that High Court has virtually rewritten the provision in regard to the retention of the property under seizure. To examine the issue, we may quote relevant part of Section 8(3) at the cost of repetition and is quoted thus; (3) Where the Adjudicating Authority decides under sub-section (2) that any property is involved in money-laundering, he shall, by an order in writing,................................................................ or retention of property or record seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect... The relevant part of Section 8(3) in regard to the seized or frozen property has been quoted leaving the part which is for provisional attachment of the property. It is to demonstrate that after an exercise under Section 8 (2), if the property i....
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.... The Apex Court has categorically held that Section 17(4) postulates an application before the Adjudicating Authority within a period of thirty days for retention of the record. The Adjudicating Authority, after giving an opportunity of hearing, pass an order of retention of the property seized or frozen, as the case may be. The judgment of the Delhi High Court (supra) from Para 59 onwards is in conflict with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), thus should not be applied. The learned counsel for the respondents made specific reference to Paras 59 and 60 of the judgment in the case of Rajesh Agarwal (supra) and for ready reference, those paras are quoted hereunder again: "59. In its plain terms, the Section deals with the circumstance where the learned AA is to "confirm" the "retention of property". It cannot be read in a manner such as to translate into the order of Retention itself, which, in our opinion, is the subject matter of Section 20. 60. Therefore, on a plain reading, it is manifest that the power under Section 8(3), being one for confirming any retention, there needs to be, in the first instance, an order for s....
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....rly appears to us to have been used to reflect the ordinary and normal sense, that is, to denote an alternative, giving a choice; and, we cannot assign it a different meaning unless it leads to vagueness or makes Clause 2(s) absolutely unworkable". Paras quoted above make it clear that the word "or" is normally disjunctive while the word "and" is normally conjunctive. The word "or" used under Section 8(3) is to separate two actions, one is for confirmation of the provisional attachment of the property under Section 5(1) of the Act of 2002 and the other is for retention of seized and frozen property under Section 17 and 18 of the Act of 2002. The Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) changed the word "retention" to "confirm the retention" going beyond its jurisdiction and according to the counsel for the respondents, it ignored the word "or" between two actions. 38. The learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even if the word "or" is taken to be used as conjunction, then also Section 8(3) cannot postulate confirmation of retention of the property seized under section 17 and 18. The "confirmation of retention" would pre-supp....
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....xercised, it would entitle retention of the seized or frozen property for a period beyond 180 days and upto 360 days. The provision of Section 8(3), therefore, would be exercisable for the purpose of retention of the property for a period beyond 180 days, meaning thereby the power of Adjudicating Authority for retention of the property or record is not exercisable for a period of 180 days. No such arrangement or provision to that effect exists in any of the provisions of the Act of 2002. The Delhi High Court has virtually re-written the provisions, having no jurisdiction to do so and accordingly counsel for the respondents laid much emphasis to analyse each issue carefully. It is in view of the fact that Para 61 of the judgment is even in conflict with the statutory provisions of Section 20 which also does not provide that power of Adjudicating Authority for retention to be exercised after a period of 180 days. Para 61 of the judgment (supra) is quoted hereunder again for ready reference: 61. The other aspect is that, the power of confirmation, once exercised, would entitle the retention of the seized or frozen property for a period beyond 180 days and up to 365 days. The ....
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....s' Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). It is otherwise dehors to Section 8(3) of the Act of 2002, which provides for adjudication of an application under Section 17 and 18 of the Act, while according to the High Court in the case of Rajesh Agarwal (supra), Section 17 is silent for adjudication. The finding has been recorded by reading only one provision, while it was required to be read along with Section 8(3) of the Act of 2002. 42. The counsel for the respondents further made a reference of Para 68 of judgment of the Delhi High Court where again, analogy drawn in the earlier paras of the judgment in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) has been reiterated. It is held that the power of Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) is only for "confirmation of retention". The word "confirm" under Section 8(3) has been used in a case of provisional attachment of the property and not for seized or frozen property as the word "or" has been used between the two different actions governed by different provisions, one under Section 5(1) for provisional attachment of the property and the other under Section 17 and 18 to seek retention of se....
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..... It cannot even re-write or substitute the word inserted by the legislature with intent. 46. The Delhi High Court in the case (supra) has otherwise reframed Section 8(3) for the power of the Adjudicating Authority for retention of seized or frozen property only after 180 days of the retention by the authorized officer of the ED under Section 20(1) whereas Section 8(3) does not provide exercise of power by the Adjudicating Authority after 180 days of the retention. Para 76 of the judgment of the Delhi High Court is quoted hereunder for ready reference: "76. A plain reading of this provision makes it evident that the learned AA exercises power only in respect of the retention of the seized property beyond the period of 180 days, meaning thereby that the power to retain the seized goods for a period of 180 days, was never conferred upon the learned AA". 47. The counsel for the respondents submitted that in Para 76, the Delhi High Court has virtually re-written the provision of Section 8(3) and even Section 20(1) of the Act of 2002. If both the provisions are read together, it does not provide that the Adjudicating Authority would exercise the power for rete....
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....he Act of 2002. It would either pass an order for retention or continuance of the seized or frozen property or to deny it. The final word for retention of seized property or continuance of frozen property is exercised by the Adjudicating Authority which has been taken away by the High Court, giving this power of retention under Section 20 of the Act to the officer authorized without realizing that power of the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(3) could not have been made redundant while giving interpretation. It otherwise goes in conflict with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudary (supra). 50. According to the counsel for the respondents, second part of action can be under Section 20 of the Act of 2002 which, according to him, is an alternative action provided by the legislature under their wisdom. It was submitted that if the Department chooses to take an action under Section 20(1) and 20(2), then such an action permits them to pass an order for retention of the property. Such an action by authorized officer would be on the basis of the material which may form "reasons to believe" to be recorded in writing and to be sent for adjudicati....
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....t judgment of the Delhi High Court may not be applied. The reference of the judgment of the Apex Court has been given to show that the High Court or the Courts have no jurisdiction to rewrite or substitute the words in the statutory provisions as they have no legislative competence. It is also for the reason that the judgment in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra) is in conflict with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). 53. The serious contest to the argument raised by the counsel for the respondents was made. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case (supra) is not per incuriam; rather, it has given plain interpretation of the provisions relevant to the case. A prayer was made to reject the argument raised by the counsel for the respondents against the application of the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar Agarwal (supra). 54. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and before we make analysis of the arguments, it would be gainful to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). P....
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....erated by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Agarwal, reported in MANU/SC/0013/1992 : 1991:INSC:219 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323: It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the Legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the Legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the Constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities". Another judgment of Supreme Court is in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Ors. Vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwa....
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....say so, what the High Court has done in this case is a clear and naked usurpation of legislative power". 56. The learned counsel for the respondents further referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manish Kumar Vs. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No.26 of 2020) reported in (2021) 5 SCC 1. The relevant para 236 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder: "326. Further, the appeal to invoke the principle of reading down the proviso is untenable. In his judgment for the majority Sawant, J. in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress104 held as follows: "255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible - one rendering it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from 104 (1991) Suppl.(1) SCC 600 its violation of any of ....
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....y different. It cannot, in our opinion, be right to say that in such a case the court is entitled to disregard the statutory provision and is bound to follow a decision of its own given when that provision was not present to its mind. Cases of this description are examples of decisions given per incuriam. 34. The decision in Young (supra) was subsequently approved by the House of Lords in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company, Ltd. reported in 1946 AC 163 at page 169 of the report. 35. Lord Viscount Simon in the House of Lords expressed His Lordship's agreement with the views expressed by the Lord Greene, the Master of Rolls in the Court of Appeal on the principle of per incuriam (see the speech of Lord Viscount Simon at page 169 of the report). 36. Those principles have been followed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0083/1955 : 1955 (2) SCR 603 (See the discussion in pages 622 and 623 of the report)". 58. The same principle has been reiterated by Lord Evershed, Master of Rolls, in Morelle Ld. v. Wakeling and Anr. (1955) 2 QB 379 at page 406. The princi....
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.... legislature enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse.) The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. [See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd. Rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn, L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, quot....
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....nd produce a wholly unreasonable result", we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC where at AC p. 577 (All ER p. 664 1) he also observed: "This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges." 24. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae fraquentius accidunt " But," on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom (see Fenton v. Hampton) A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislatores, the rul....
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.... in writing, confirm the attachment of the property made under sub-section (1) of section 5 or retention of property or record seized or frozen under section 17 or section 18 and record a finding to that effect, whereupon such attachment or retention or freezing of the seized or frozen property or record shall- (a) continue during investigation for a period not exceeding three hundred and sixty-five days or the pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence under this Act before a court or under the corresponding law of any other country, before the competent court of criminal jurisdiction outside India, as the case may be; and (b) become final after an order of confiscation is passed under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of section 8 or section 58B or sub-section (2A) of section 60 by the Special Court. Explanation. For the purpose of computing the period of three hundred and sixty five days under clause (a), the period during which the investigation is stayed by any court under any law for the time being in force shall be excluded". Section 8 is titled for "Adjudication". Sub-section (3) quoted above make a reference of sub-section (2) ....
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.... even Para 87 and other paras where it has been held that if Section 17(4) is taken for the purpose of retention of seized or frozen property, then, according to the High Court, it was nothing but a short cut without providing statutory safeguards. The counsel for the respondents submitted that provision of Section 17 coupled with Section 8 has been ignored by the High Court because required safeguards have been provided even under Section 17 coupled with Section 8 of the Act. It has been clearly ruled by the Apex Court in Para 84 of the judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). If an overlapping action after Section 17 is to be resorted to by taking the action under Section 20, it may not only delay the proceedings but would be an overlapping action which may affect even the person whose property is seized or frozen because original application under Section 17(4) is to be filed within 30 days and according to the High Court in the judgment (supra) it should be followed by an order under Section 20(1) where order for retention can be passed within a period to remain in operation for 180 days and according to the Delhi High Court, the Adjudicating Authority would th....
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....aside because the Adjudicating Authority's noting referred to an ongoing investigation rather than to an opinion on the commission of an offence. The fresh noting dated 30.08.2018, however, correctly and specifically records the requisite statutory satisfaction. On perusal of the Impugned Order, we find that the Ld. AA has after inviting the replies from the Appellants and having considered the same arrived at the conclusion to allow the retention of the seized properties. Moreover, a person can be said to have "reason to believe" a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. If the material in hand has no nexus with the belief or there is no material or tangible information for the formation of belief then in such a case the reasonable belief may be vitiated. It is open to examine the question whether the reason for the belief have a rational connection or a relevant bearing to the formation of the belief and are not extraneous or irrelevant to the purpose of the section. So, if there are reasonable grounds to believe, whether those grounds are adequate or not, is not a matter for the court to look into. 21. On perusal of the Impugned Order, w....