AI Drafter 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (5) TMI 1504
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....GST Act, 2017 seeking an advance ruling on whether the value of diesel supplied free of cost (FOC) by the service recipient is liable to be included in the taxable value of transport services. 2.2. In the said proceedings, respondent No.3, being the jurisdictional as well as the concerned officer under Section 98 of the RGST Act, participated in his official capacity and supported the case of the petitioner. 2.3. He (respondent No.3) took a categorical stand that GST is not leviable on FOC diesel supplied by the service recipient when such goods remain within the contractual scope of the recipient. 2.4. Respondent No.2 i.e. Rajasthan Authority for Advance Ruling, Goods and Service Tax, Kar Bhawan Ambedkar Circle, Jaipur passed an Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 holding that the value of such diesel is not includable in the taxable value of goods transport services. 2.5. Thereafter, two appeals were filed against the said Advance Ruling, one by respondent No.6 and second by respondent No.3 itself. 2.6. Upon the petitioner seeking clarification from the office of respondent No.2, it was revealed that the ruling was dispatched in June 2022 and duly delivered to the conc....
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.... the petitioner further stated that Chapter XVII of the RGST Act, dealing with advance ruling, is a complete code in itself prescribing strict timelines for expeditious adjudication. The absence of expressions such as "as far as possible" or "where it is possible" in Section 101(2), unlike other provisions, reflects a clear legislative intent to make the 90-day period mandatory. 3.4. He submitted that no proceedings were conducted for more than 1.2 years after filing of the appeals and preliminary objections, and therefore, the proceedings are vitiated on account of inordinate delay. 3.5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the appeals filed by respondent No.3 and respondent No.6 are barred by limitation, having been filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 100(2) of the RGST Act, and that respondent No.1 has no authority to condone delay beyond the permissible period. 3.6. He submitted that the Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 was duly communicated in June 2022 through Speed Post as well as by uploading on the GST portal, which constitutes valid service under Section 169 of the Act, and therefore, the appeals filed thereafter are time-barred. ....
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....ithout granting an effective opportunity to rebut the same, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. 3.16. He submitted that the advance ruling provisions are special provisions intended to provide clarity on tax issues in a time-bound manner, and therefore, the limitation periods prescribed therein must be strictly construed. 3.17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in terms of Section 103 of the CGST/SGST Act, an advance ruling is binding in personam, and permitting multiple or parallel appeals would defeat the object of the statutory scheme. 3.18. He submitted that the Advance Ruling dated 16.06.2022 is a well-reasoned and speaking order passed after considering all relevant facts and does not warrant interference. 3.19. Learned counsel for the petitioner also stated that this Court had earlier granted liberty to challenge the order deciding the preliminary objections, and hence, the present petition is maintainable. 3.20. Lastly, he submitted that the issuance of the personal hearing notice dated 03.07.2024 immediately after passing the impugned order, without granting reasonable time to challenge the same, is arbitrary and unsustainabl....
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....0.2022 within 30 days thereof. The appeal filed by respondent No.6 (CGST) on 11.08.2022 was within the permissible extended period of 60 days and the condonation granted is in accordance with law. 4.6. It is further submitted that the procedure prescribed under Rule 106 for filing appeals is directory in nature and does not bar manual filing. Rule 107 permits filing of appeals manually, and therefore, the objection regarding filing of appeal in hard copy is untenable. 4.7. On the issue of jurisdiction, it is submitted that the 'concerned officer' and 'jurisdictional officer' are distinct authorities. Under the GST framework, both Central GST and State GST officers exercise territorial jurisdiction over a taxable person, and therefore, both are entitled to file appeals against an advance ruling. In the present case, the SGST officer is the jurisdictional officer and the CGST officer is the concerned officer. 4.8. The respondents further submit that the petitioner, instead of participating in the proceedings before the AAAR and making submissions on merits, has approached this Court at a premature stage on technical grounds. The impugned order only calls upon the petitioner ....
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....GST Rules expressly saves manual filing, and online filing is merely a facilitative measure and not a jurisdictional requirement. 6.4. On the fourth objection challenging the locus of the CGST authority, the Authority held that "concerned officer" and "jurisdictional officer" are two distinct authorities under Sections 98 and 100, ibid of CGST Act, one from Central GST and one from State GST, and both are independently entitled to file appeals, making the CGST appeal perfectly maintainable. 6.5. On the fifth objection of estoppel, the Authority held that there is no estoppel against the State or against a statute, and that the initial stand taken by the subordinate State GST officer without approval of higher authorities was not binding on the department. The appeal filed after due consideration by competent higher authorities was held to be maintainable. All preliminary objections were accordingly rejected and the appeals were held to be maintainable and directed to be heard on merits. DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 7. Having given our thought to the rival arguments and the appellate order as well as having also gone through the order passed by the advance ruling authority we o....
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....e argument that the absence of the phrase "as far as possible" in Section 101(2), unlike in Sections 101C and 107 of CGST Act, demonstrates a conscious legislative intent to make the timeline mandatory is a purely textual argument. No doubt, ordinarily word 'shall' prima-facie is used as an imperative. However, the settled principle is that legislative intent is also to be gathered from the statute as a whole and not just from the presence or absence of particular phrases in isolation. More importantly, the petitioner's interpretation leads to an absurd and unjust consequence, that the right of appeal conferred upon the jurisdictional and concerned officers by Section 100 is automatically extinguished by the mere passage of time, regardless of the reasons for delay and regardless of whether the parties were even heard. A provision whose strict construction destroys the very right it was designed to protect cannot be read as mandatory. The 90- day period is therefore directory, being an outer limit to ensure expeditious disposal and not a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of appellate power. 8.3. The use of the word "shall" in a statute does not by itself thu....
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....ersonally worked for gain; or (f) if none of the modes aforesaid is practicable, by affixing it in some conspicuous place at his last known place of business or residence and if such mode is not practicable for any reason, then by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the office of the concerned officer or authority who or which passed such decision or order or issued such summons or notice. (2) Every decision, order, summons, notice or any communication shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which it is tendered or published or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in subsection (1). (3) When such decision, order, summons, notice or any communication is sent by registered post or speed post, it shall be deemed to have been received by the addressee at the expiry of the period normally taken by such post in transit unless the contrary is proved." 9.1. Section 169 prescribes modes of service, but communication for the purpose of limitation must be reckoned from the date of actual receipt where such date is specifically established. Appellant No.2 received the order on 15.09.2022 and filed the appeal on 14.10.2022, which i....
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....GST authority filed its appeal within 56 days, which is well within this outer limit. The Appellate Authority has dealt with this aspect in detail in the impugned order and the condonation granted is neither mechanical nor arbitrary, it is a valid exercise of statutory discretion in accordance with the proviso to Section 100(2), ibid. 9.5. In light of the above, no further elaborate reasons are required to be recorded for condonation of a delay of merely 15 to 21 days in a matter involving a question of law of significance to the entire State. There is no infirmity in this finding. 10. As regards the locus standi of respondent No.6, it is clear from the plain language of Sections 98 and 100 of the Act that the terms "concerned officer" and "jurisdictional officer" refer to two distinct authorities, one from Central GST and one from State GST. For ready reference Section 98 is reproduced hereinbelow:- "98. Procedure on receipt of application- (1) On receipt of an application, the Authority shall cause a copy thereof to be forwarded to the concerned officer and, if necessary, call upon him to furnish the relevant records: Provided that where any recor....
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.... or represent the department before the AAR. Jurisdiction and right of appeal are statutory, they do not depend upon prior participation in the proceedings below. 11. Also, on the question of jurisdiction and locus standi, the petitioner's argument that the CGST authority was neither the concerned officer nor the jurisdictional officer is directly answered by the plain language of Section 100(1), ibid, which confers the right of appeal upon the concerned officer, the jurisdictional officer, or the aggrieved applicant. Under the GST framework, two officers exercise territorial jurisdiction over every taxable person, one from CGST and one from SGST. They occupy distinct roles and cannot be treated as one and the same. This is further evident from the AAR's own letter at page 207 of the writ petition, which clearly identifies the SGST officer as the jurisdictional officer and the CGST officer as the concerned officer. Both are therefore independently entitled to file an appeal, and the CGST authority's appeal is perfectly maintainable under Section 100(1), ibid. 12. On the argument that reliance on correspondences dated 31.05.2024, 05.06.2024, and 12.06.2024 without ....