AI OCR 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (4) TMI 1855
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....bmitted by the petitioner are pending consideration. The penalty proceedings under Sections 271D and 271E of the Act are initiated by the authorities, pending consideration of the said appeals. The challenge raised against the said proceedings is mainly on the ground that the said proceedings, which were initiated by the 1st respondent in all these cases, were without proper authority, as the penalty was imposed without prior approval as contemplated under Section 274(2) of the Income Tax Act. 3. Sri Anil D. Nair, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, brought to the attention of this Court, the impugned orders wherein, it is mentioned that, the orders are passed with the prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Range, Kochi, and pointed out that the prior approval from the said authority is not sufficient for imposing a penalty under Sections 271D and 271E, in the light of the statutory requirements contemplated under Section 274(2) of the Act, as according to him, the requirement is to have the prior approval of the "Joint Commissioner", and not the "Additional Commissioner". 4. Sri Jose Joseph, learned Standing Counsel appearing fo....
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....Officer in this regard, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, are subject to Section 274(2) of the Act. The said provision reads as follows: "Section 274(2) - No order imposing a penalty under this Chapter shall be made- (a) By the Income -tax Officer, where the penalty exceeds ten thousand rupees; (b) By the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, where the penalty exceeds twenty thousand rupees, except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner." 7. It is the contention of the petitioners that, since Sub-section (2) of Section 274 specifically contemplates that the penalty can be imposed only with the prior approval of the "Joint Commissioner", the impugned orders could have been passed, only after obtaining the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner, whereas, in this case, going by the impugned orders, the prior approval obtained is that of the Additional Commissioner. In response to the contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent based on the definition of Joint Commissioner as contemplated under Section 2(28C), it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner t....
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....e Commissioner (Appeals) in the course of any proceedings under this Chapter, may direct that a person shall pay by way of penalty a sum which shall be equal to fifty per cent. Of tax so leviable in respect of undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 158 BC: Provided that no order imposing penalty under this section or sub-section (1) of section 271AAD or section 271 DA or section 272E shall be made for the block period in respect of a person if - (i) such person has furnished a return under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 158BC; (ii) the tax payable on the basis of such return has been paid or, if the assets seized consist of money, the assessee offers the money so seized to be adjusted against the tax payable; (iii) evidence of tax paid is furnished along with the return; and (iv) an appeal is not filed against the assessment of that part of income which is shown in the return: Provided further that the provisions of the first proviso shall not apply where the undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer is in excess of the income shown in the retu....
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....e immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period the period of limitation referred to in Sub-section (3) available to the Assessing Officer for making an order under sub-section (2) of this section is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly: Provided further that where after exclusion of the period referred to in the first proviso, the period of limitation for making of an order for imposition of penalty expires before the end of a month, such period shall be extended to the end of such month. (5) An income-tax authority on making an order under sub-section (2) imposing a penalty, unless he is himself an Assessing Officer, shall forthwith send a copy of such order to the Assessing Officer." 9. After carefully going through the statutory stipulations contained in various provisions referred to above, I find merit in the submission made by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent. This is particularly because, as far as Section 2(28C) of the Act is concerned, the same clearly defines the expression "Joint Commissioner", and as per ....
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....e the amount of penalty exceeds Rs. 2 Lakhs (Rupees Two lakhs only), and the same has to be done with the previous approval of the Additional Commissioner or Additional Director or the Joint Commissioner or the Joint Director, as the case may be. However, the crucial aspect to be noticed is that, merely because of the reason that the aforesaid provisions specifically refer to the authorities by naming the "Joint Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner", it cannot be concluded that the definition of the expression "Joint Commissioner" as made in Section 2(28C) would be applicable only in cases covered by the aforesaid provisions. On the contrary, the only conclusion possible is that, Section 151 as well as Section 158BFA wanted to provide more clarity to the said provisions, and merely because of that reason, it cannot be concluded that the definition made in 2(28C) would stand altered with respect to the other statutory stipulations in the Act, where the powers and functions of the Joint Commissioner become a matter of relevance. If such an interpretation highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is adopted, the definition of the term "Joint Commissioner" as ....
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....fort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16) "16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. 'Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly war....
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....e context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, a defined word when used in the body of the statute may have to be given a meaning different from that contained in the interpretation clause; all definitions given in an interpretation clause are therefore normally enacted subject to the qualification-'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context', or 'unless the context otherwise requires'. Even in the absence of an express qualification to that effect such a qualification is always implied. However, it is incumbent on those who contend that the definition given in the interpretation clause does not apply to a particular section to show that the context in fact so requires. An argument based on contrary context which will make the inclusive definition inapplicable to any provision in the Act cannot be accepted as it would make the definition entirely useless. Repugnancy of a definition arises only when the definition does not agree with the subject or context; any action not in conformity with the definition will not obviously make it repugnant to subject or context of the provision containing the term defined ....