TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (4) TMI 505
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....25), Civil Appeal No(S). 000925 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 249/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000926 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2769/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000927 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2647/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000928 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2924/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000929 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 1574/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000930 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 1884/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000931 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2214/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000932 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2085/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000933 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2129/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000934 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 1667/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000935 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2966/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000936 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3048/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000937 Of 2026, (@SLP(C) No. 2958/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000938 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2572/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000939 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3046/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000940 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3159/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000941 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2776/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000942 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2649/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000943 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2645/2025), Civil Appeal No(S). 000944 Of 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 2482/20....
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....IVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000985 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6258/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000986 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5547/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000987 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4115/2025) CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000988 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3835/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000989 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3112/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 000990 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 3734/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000991 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5648/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000992 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5657/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000993 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4859/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000994 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4265/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000995 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5570/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000996 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7054/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000997 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4574/2025) CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 000998 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4218/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 000999 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 4513/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001000 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7129/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001001 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5886/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001002 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6535/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001003 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5266/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001004 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6687/2025), CIV....
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....L APPEAL NO(S). 001045 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7662/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001046 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8660/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001047 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9865/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001048 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8663/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001049 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6686/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001050 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8662/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001051 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7725/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001052 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7508/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001053 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7670/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001054 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7529/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001055 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6684/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001056 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 7504/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001057 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8655/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001058 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6688/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001059 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8668/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001060 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 6252/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001061 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8661/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001062 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8656/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001063 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 5939/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001064 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 8658/2025), CIVI....
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....025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001105 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9870/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001106 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10611/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001107 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10632/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001108 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10625/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001109 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9875/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001110 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9873/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001111 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9879/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 001112 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10610/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001113 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10626/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001114 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9872/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001115 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9864/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001116 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9861/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001117 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9867/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001118 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10615/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001119 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10630/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001120 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10614/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001121 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10612/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001122 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10613/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001123 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10627/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001124 OF 2026 (@SLP(C)....
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....SLP(C) No. 11689/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001164 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 10616/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001165 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15143/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001166 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13171/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001167 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14749/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001168 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11021/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001169 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 9856/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001170 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14751/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001171 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15146/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001172 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11019/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001173 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15137/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001174 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13179/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001175 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11798/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001176 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11023/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001177 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11024/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001178 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11030/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001179 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13178/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001180 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13170/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001181 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11020/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001182 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 11022/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)....
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....P(C) No. 15124/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001223 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13233/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001224 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15128/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001225 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13235/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001226 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15131/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001227 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15127/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001228 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13236/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001229 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15135/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001230 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15129/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001231 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 13232/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001232 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14763/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001233 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14779/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001234 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 16031/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001235 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15130/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001236 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15125/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001237 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14743/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001238 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 15132/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001239 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14745/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001240 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14750/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001241 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 14756/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).....
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....NO 005863 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30826/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001278 OF 2026 (@SLP (C) NO. 005864 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30831/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 001279 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005865 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30837/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001280 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005867 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30841/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001281 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005868 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30844/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001282 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005869 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30848/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001283 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005870 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30850/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001284 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005871 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30860/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001285 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005872 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30873/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001287 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005873 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30876/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001288 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005874 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 30881/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001289 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005875 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31734/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001290 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005876 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31966/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001291 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005877....
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....(S). 001323 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 16423/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001324 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005892 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31949/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001325 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005893OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31950/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001326 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005894 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31956/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001327 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17519/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001328 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005895 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31964/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001329 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005896 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31965/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001330 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005897 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 31971/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001331 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18939/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001332 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005898 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32046/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001333 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005899 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32048/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001334 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005900 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32049/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001335 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17482/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001336 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005901 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 32051/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001337 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 0059....
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....L NO(S). 001366 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005923 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33045/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001367 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005924 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33046/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001368 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17512/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001369 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18935/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001370 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17496/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001371 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17485/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001372 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17534/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001373 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17888/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001374 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) NO. 005925 OF 2026 @Diary No(s). 33164/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001375 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18964/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001376 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17520/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001377 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17511/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001378 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17521/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001379 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17494/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001380 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17491/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001381 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17858/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001382 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17508/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001383 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18960/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(....
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....OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18953/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001424 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17884/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001425 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17885/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001426 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17889/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001427 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 17890/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001428 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18950/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001429 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18959/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001430 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18965/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001431 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18942/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001432 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18966/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001433 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18949/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001434 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18955/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001435 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18954/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001436 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18951/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001437 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18961/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001438 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18946/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001439 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18952/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001440 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18962/2025), CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 001441 OF 2026 (@SLP(C) No. 18963/2025), JUSTICE M. M. SUNDRESH AND JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA For t....
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....ay M Nuli, Sr. Adv., Mr. Dharam Singh, Adv., Mr. Suraj Kaushik, Adv., Mr. Nanda Kumar K B, Adv., Ms. Akhila Wali, Adv., Mr. Shiva Swaroop, Adv., Mr. Abhishek Kanyalur, Adv., Ms. Divya Sinha, Adv., Mr. Ashritsai Torgal, Adv., For M/S. Nuli & Nuli, AOR Mr. Rahul Kaushik, Sr. Adv., Mr. L T P Radha Patil, Adv., Mr. Anil C Nishani, Adv., Mr. P Prasanna Kumar, Adv., Mr. Birdar Patil, Adv., Mr. Krishna M Singh, Adv., Mr. Anil C Nishani, Adv., Mr. Meenesh Dubey, Adv., Mr. Thamanna Hurpudi, Adv., Mr. Jyoti Kumar Mishra, Adv., Mr. Jyoti Kumar Mishara, Adv., Ms. Deepti Singh, Adv., Mr. Kushal U, Adv., Mr. Nalini Ranjan, Adv., Mr. Shivam Parashar, Adv., Mr. Garv Vikas, Adv., For M/s Krishna & Nishani Law Chambers, AOR Mr. Puneet Taneja, Sr. Adv., Ms. Laxmi Kumari, AOR Mr. Manmohan Singh Narula, Adv., Mr. Anil Kumar, Adv., Mr. Amit Yadav, Adv., Mr. Vikash Singh, Sr. Adv., Mr. Aman Panwar, A.A.G. Mr. Naveen Sharma, AOR Mrs. Swati Bhushan Sharma, Adv., Mr. S.k. Sharma, Adv., Mr. Abhinav Kumar, Adv., Ms. Deepeika Kalia, Adv., Ms. Vasudha Singh, Adv., Mr. Manav Kaushik, Adv., Mr. Sudeep Chandra, Adv., Ms. Khushi, Adv., Ms. Payal Gola, Adv., Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., Mr. S.J. Amith, Adv., Mr. Satish....
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....ubmissions have been perused and duly taken on record. 3. We are dealing with a batch of matters wherein the High Courts, vide the impugned judgments, have dismissed the first appeals filed by the appellant(s) under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 Act") as being barred by limitation. 4. The primary issue before us is on the interplay of Section 74 read with Section 103 of the 2013 Act, on the one hand, and Sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1963 Act") on the other. The incidental issue is on the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1894 Act") as against the 2013 Act in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act, but the award has been passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act. LAND RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE "Land is the foundation of all wealth and progress." - Mahatma Gandhi 5. Land has always occupied a unique and enduring position in the lives of human beings. It is not merely a means of livelihood, but th....
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....ere the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body without any restraint." 9. In this context, land acquisition laws assume critical importance. The history of land acquisition in India predates the Constitution and can be traced back to the Bengal Regulation I of 1824, when the British initiated land acquisition for the purpose of public welfare only in certain provinces. In Bombay, land acquisition was governed by the Building Act XVIII of 1839, while the Madras Act XX of 1852 governed acquisition in the Madras Presidency. The scope of what constituted 'public welfare' was expanded over the years in response to the developmental needs of the time. Thereafter, significant changes were brought in through enactments in the years 1857 and 1870. The 1870 enactment was subsequently replaced by the 1894 Act, which governed land acquisition for over a century, undergoing several amendments from time to time. However, its inadequacies, particularly its failure to adequately protect landowners and displaced persons, became evident, and after more than a century, it was repealed and replaced by the 2013 Act, marking a shift towards a more welfare-ori....
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....013 Act ensures that the State does not acquire land as a matter of routine and can do so only in strict adherence to the procedure contemplated thereunder. 13. When dealing with a beneficial legislation such as the 2013 Act, Courts must make a conscious endeavour to give effect to its avowed objectives. This Court has reiterated the said principle on several occasions. Union of India vs Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Ors (2008) 9 SCC 527 "12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1961 SC 647 (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (1984) 4 SCC 356 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 753 : AIR 1984 SC 1842] (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. [(1981) 2 SCC 238 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 316 : AIR 1981 SC 852] (AIR para 13), S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (2003) 4 SCC 2....
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....pose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).'..." (emphasis supplied) Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri, (2020) 15 SCC 328 "19. We must not forget that we are dealing with a beneficial legislation. The Preamble which has been referred to casts light on the object sought to be subserved by the 2013 Act in general, as well as by Section 24. We have already seen that land acquisition is to take place in a humane fashion, with the least disturbance to the owners of the land, as also, to provide just and fair compensation to affected persons. Viewed in the light of the Preamble, this legislation, being a beneficial legislation, must be construed in a way which furthers its purpose [see Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 15 SCC 133, para 115: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 588] at paras 106, 128, 129 and 131]. On the assumption, therefore, that two views are possible, the view which accords with the beneficial object sought to be achieved by the legislation, is obvi....
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....on (1) of Section 24 starts with a non-obstante clause. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) ensures that the benefits conferred under the 2013 Act are statutorily extended to the determination of compensation in cases where the land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act, but no award was passed under Section 11 of the said Act. In other words, Section 24(1)(a) facilitates the continuation of the acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act by taking off from the proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, qua compensation, when no award has been passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act. 17. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 leaves no room for any doubt by stating that all the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to the determination of compensation shall apply. Therefore, each and every provision of the 2013 Act dealing with the determination of compensation, in any manner whatsoever, be it procedural or substantive, would ipso facto apply to a case where no award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been passed. We clarify that there is no question of rehabilitation and resettlement under the 1894 Act and, hence, there is neither any duty to award it nor a ....
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....of higher compensation in case of default for 5 years or more after award. xxx xxx xxx 366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act." (emphasis supplied) Haryana State Industrial and Infraastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 512 "34. In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the legislative intention we have no hesitation to hold that the point of initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the LA Act for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1) Notification in the Official Gazette of the appropriate Government. xxx xxx xxx 39. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under the LA Act prior to 1-1-2014 (date of commencement of the 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 1-1-2014 and, as to whether Section 6 Notification under the L....
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.... They are conducted either in the manner provided under the LA Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. 43. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the LA Act. We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act." (emphasis supplied) 18. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act clearly deals with a different category of cases where an award has been passed under the 1894 Act. It states that proceedings under the 1894 Act would continue unabated, as though the same had not been repealed. The idea is to give finality to the awards already passed under the 1894 Act, as the passing of an award leads to the determinat....
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....eared before him. "25. Period within which an award shall be made.-The Collector shall make an award within a period of twelve months from the date of publication of the declaration under section 19 and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the power to extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion, circumstances exist justifying the same: Provided further that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority concerned." (emphasis supplied) "26. Determination of market value of land by Collector.-(1) The Collector shall adopt the following criteria in assessing and determining the market value of the land, namely:- (a) the market value, if any, specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899) for the registration of sale deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area, where the land is situated; or (b) the average sale price for similar type of land situated in the nearest village or ne....
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....he floor price or minimum price per unit area of the said land based on the price calculated in the manner specified in sub-section (1) in respect of similar types of land situated in the immediate adjoining areas: Provided that in a case where the Requiring Body offers its shares to the owners of the lands (whose lands have been acquired) as a part compensation, for acquisition of land, such shares in no case shall exceed twenty-five per cent of the value so calculated under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) as the case may be: Provided further that the Requiring Body shall in no case compel any owner of the land (whose land has been acquired) to take its shares, the value of which is deductible in the value of the land calculated under sub-section (1): Provided also that the Collector shall, before initiation of any land acquisition proceedings in any area, take all necessary steps to revise and update the market value of the land on the basis of the prevalent market rate in that area: Provided also that the appropriate Government shall ensure that the market value determined for acquisition of any land or property of an edu....
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....hase of the proceedings lies before the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority established under Section 51 of the 2013 Act (hereinafter referred to as "Authority") as dealt with hereinbelow. Sections 51, 52, 53, 60, 61 and 63 of the 2013 Act "51. Establishment of Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority.-(1) The appropriate Government shall, for the purpose of providing speedy disposal of disputes relating to land acquisition, compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement, establish, by notification, one or more Authorities to be known as "the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority" to exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on it by or under this Act. (2) The appropriate Government shall also specify in the notification referred to in sub-section (1) the areas within which the Authority may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the references made to it under section 64 or applications made by the applicant under second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 64." (emphasis supplied) "52. Composition of Authority.-(1) The Authority shall consist of one person on....
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....ipt of such reference and make an award accordingly. (5) The Authority shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within a period of fifteen days from the date of such award." (emphasis supplied) "61. Proceedings before Authority to be judicial proceedings.-All proceedings before the Authority shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)." (emphasis supplied) "63. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.-No civil court (other than High Court under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition in respect of which the Collector or the Authority is empowered by or under this Act, and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any such matter." (emphasis supplied) 25. Chapter VIII of the 2013 Act provides for the establishment of the Authority which is entrusted with the function of dispos....
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.... person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Authority, as the case may be, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, the rights of Rehabilitation and Resettlement under Chapters V and VI or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested: Provided that the Collector shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of application, make a reference to the appropriate Authority: Provided further that where the Collector fails to make such reference within the period so specified, the applicant may apply to the Authority, as the case may be, requesting it to direct the Collector to make the reference to it within a period of thirty days. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six week....
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....the statute on the expiry of the stipulated time period. 31. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that when the power to condone delay by invoking Section 5 of the 1963 Act is not even available to a Tribunal in the ordinary course, certainly, the Collector, not being a Court, cannot exercise the same. Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 "V.B. Eradi, J.- In this appeal filed by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12, 1978 of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the sole question arising for decision is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal before the Collector under Section 90 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 - Act 21 of 1950 (hereinafter called "the Act"). xxx xxx xxx 3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah case [AIR 1978 AP 166 : (1977) 2 APLJ (HC) 382] is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this....
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.... is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah case [AIR 1978 AP 166 : (1977) 2 APLJ (HC) 382] that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector. 4. Our attention was drawn to the fact that subsequent to the decision of the High Court, the State Legislature has enacted the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1979 - Act 2 of 1979, whereby Section 93 of the Act has been amended and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have now been expressly made applicable to appeals and revisions preferred under Sections 90 and 91 of the Act. We see no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the said amendment is clarificatory in nature. The provisions of Section 93 as they stood prior to this amendment were free from any am....
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....nted before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. It would thus be clear that if the interested person was present at the time the Collector made the award, he should make the application within six weeks from the date of the award of the Collector. In other cases, it should be made within six weeks after the receipt of the notice from the Collector/LAO under Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. Admittedly, the application for reference is beyond six weeks under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. 4. The question, therefore, is: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply? The High Court relied upon sub-section (3) of Section 18 which was made by way of a local amendment, i.e., the Land Acquisition (Maharashtra Extension and Amendment) Act 38 of 1964 which reads thus: "....
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....Act. The dichotomy of the Collector and the court cannot be lost sight of. 12. In Nityananda, M. Joshi v. LIC [(1969) 2 SCC 199], a Bench of three Judges of this Court was to consider whether the Industrial Tribunal is a court within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act when it entertains application under Section 33-C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was held that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies to an application referable under the CPC and it contemplates an application to the court as provided in the Third Schedule to the Limitation Act. Section 4 of the Limitation Act also refers to the closure of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies only to a court which is to entertain an application or an appeal after the prescribed period has expired on its satisfying that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application. The labour court was held not a court within the Limitation Act when it exercises the power under Section 33-C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 13. In Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad [(1976) 1 SCC 361], the question arose whether the Co....
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....resently before us. 15. In Prabhakar Vasudev Gadgil v. P.Y. Deshpande [AIR 1983 Bom 342 : 1982 Mah LJ 76], the question similar to the one presently under consideration had directly arisen. Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applied for condonation of the delay in seeking to make a reference under Section 18. It was contended that by operation of sub-section (3) as also applicable to States of Maharashtra and Gujarat, the Collector is a court which is amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC and that, therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. The Division Bench negatived the contention and held that the Collector is not a court under CPC attracting the provisions of the Limitation Act. The contra view taken by that court was held to be not a good law and accordingly the same was overruled. The same question had arisen in Kerala where there is no specific local provision like Section 18(3), locally amended by Maharashtra and Gujarat. Contention was raised that by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Section 5 stands attracted since there is no express exclusion of the limitation under the Act. Therefore, the dela....
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....o to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The Collector/LAO, therefore, is not a court when he acts as a statutory authority under Section 18(1). Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its finding that the Collector is a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis supplied) M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2015) 7 SCC 58 "Whether the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals? 11. A perusal of the Limitation Act, 1963 would show that the bar of limitation contained in the Schedule to the Act applies to suits, appeals, and applications. "Suit" is defined in Section 2(l) as not including an appeal or an application. The word "court" is not defined under the Act. However, it appears in a number of its provisions [see Sections 4, 5, 13, 17(2), 21]. A perusal of the Schedule would show that it is divided into three divisions. The First Division concerns itself with suits. Articles 1 to 113, all deal with "suits". xxx xxx xxx 14. A perusal o....
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....d to. On a plain reading of the provisions of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that suits, appeals and applications are only to be considered (from the limitation point of view) if they are filed in courts and not in quasi-judicial bodies. 20. Now to the case law. A number of decisions have established that the Limitation Act applies only to courts and not to tribunals. The distinction between courts and quasi-judicial decisions is succinctly brought out in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees [1950 SCR 459 : 1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188]. This root authority has been followed in a catena of judgments. This judgment refers to a decision of the King's Bench in Cooper v. Wilson [(1937) 2 KB 309: (1937) 2 All ER 726 (CA)] . The relevant quotation from the said judgment is as follows : (Bharat Bank Ltd. case [1950 SCR 459 : 1950 SCC 470 : AIR 1950 SC 188], SCR p. 477 : AIR p. 195, para 24) " 'A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites : (1) The presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascer....
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.... (emphasis supplied) 31. In a separate concurring judgment Raveendran, J. specifically held : (Consolidated Engg. Enterprises case v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169, SCC p. 190, para 44) 44. "It may be noticed at this juncture that the Schedule to the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation only to proceedings in courts and not to any proceeding before a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. Consequently Sections 3 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings before the tribunal. This means that the Limitation Act will not apply to appeals or applications before the tribunals, unless expressly provided." (emphasis supplied) 32. Obviously, the ratio of Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 does not square with the observations of the three-Judge Bench in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Irrigation Deptt. (2008) 7 SCC 169. In the latter case, this Court has unequivocally held that CST v. Parson Tools and Plants (1975) 4 SCC 22 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 185 : (1975) 3 SCR 743 is an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act will not apply to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals. To the extent....
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....nt calculated at the rate of twelve per cent per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification under Section 11 in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded. (3) In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Authority shall in every case award a solatium of one hundred per cent over the total compensation amount." (emphasis supplied) "70. Form of award.-(1) Every award under this Chapter shall be in writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Authority, and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of section 28, and also the amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses of the same sub-section, together with the grounds of awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award ....
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.... Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated." (emphasis supplied) 34. Section 74 of the 2013 Act provides for a statutory right to appeal against the award passed by the Authority under Section 69. The existence of such an appellate remedy reinforces that the proceedings before the Authority are original in nature and the award passed by it is a judgment and a decree. Further, Section 74 explicitly permits the requiring body or any person aggrieved by the award of the Authority to approach the High Court. Thus, one cannot presume that appeals under the said provision are only filed by one set of parties. 35. However, Section 74 provides a period of 60 days from the date of the award for filing an appeal before the High Court. The computation of the said 60 days would be from the date of the receipt of the said award by the aggrieved person. The proviso to Section 74 allows for an appeal to be filed within a further period of 60 days. It does not extend the period of limitation provided for filing the appeal, but brings a delayed filing within the....
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....oviso. Of course a proviso may be used to guide you in the selection of one or other of two possible constructions of the words to be found in the enactment, and shew when there is doubt about its scope, when it may reasonably admit of doubt as to its having this scope or that, which is the proper view to take of it; but to find in it an enacting provision which enables something to be done which is not to be found in the enactment itself on any reasonable construction of it, simply because otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless, would, as I have said, be in the highest degree dangerous. And for this reason: one knows perfectly well that it not unfrequently happens that persons are unreasonably apprehensive as to the effect of an enactment when there is really no question of its application to their case; they nevertheless think that some Court may possibly hold that it will apply to their case, and they suggest if it is not intended to be applicable no harm would be done by inserting a proviso to protect them; and, accordingly, a proviso is inserted to guard against the particular case of which a particular person was apprehensive, although the enactment was neve....
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.... 1959 SC 713 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256, 266 : (1959) 36 ITR 1; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST, AIR 1955 SC 765 : (1955) 2 SCR 483, 493 : (1955) 6 STC 627 ; Thompson v. Dibdin (1912) AC 533, 541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR 49] ; Rex v. Dibdin 1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125] and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231 . The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it....
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....ndustries Ltd v Arihant Threads Ltd & Ors - (2015) 1 SCC 166 "36 [Ed. : Para 36 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./61/2014 dated 25-11-2014.] . Sub-section (2) was added to Section 34 of the RDDB Act w.e.f. 17-1-2000 by Act 1 of 2000. There is no doubt that when an Act provides, as here, that its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of another law or laws, it means that the legislature intends that such an enactment shall coexist along with the other Acts. It is clearly not the intention of the legislature, in such a case, to annul or detract from the provisions of other laws. The term "in derogation of" means "in abrogation or repeal of". The Black's Law Dictionary sets forth the following meaning for "derogation": "derogation.-The partial repeal or abrogation of a law by a later Act that limits its scope or impairs its utility and force." It is clear that sub-section (1) contains a non obstante clause, which gives the overriding effect to the RDDB Act. Sub-section (2) acts in the nature of an exception to such an overriding effect. It states that this overriding effect is in relation to certain laws and that the ....
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....the Code, which is only a general enactment dealing with insolvency generally. From the introduction of the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f) of the Code, it is clear that Parliament was aware of RERA, and applied some of its definition provisions so that they could apply when the Code is to be interpreted. The fact that RERA is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force, also makes it clear that the remedies under RERA to allottees were intended to be additional and not exclusive remedies. Also, it is important to remember that as the authorities under RERA were to be set up within one year from 1-5-2016, remedies before those authorities would come into effect only on and from 1-5-2017 making it clear that the provisions of the Code, which came into force on 1-12-2016, would apply in addition to RERA." (emphasis supplied) Section 105 of the 2013 Act "105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications.-(1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2)....
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.... 2013 Act are in addition to and not in derogation of certain Central Acts dealing with land acquisition. Though the said provision specifically deals with the enactments relating to land acquisition, one can understand the scheme of the said Act through this provision, as no specific embargo with respect to the application of other Acts has been provided under the 2013 Act. Therefore, this provision, when read with Section 103, would only reiterate our view expressed earlier. Section 114 of the 2013 Act "114. Repeal and saving.-(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals." 40. Under Section 114, the repeal of the 1894 Act is made subject to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Though this provision is not of much relevance, it does help us to understand the reason behind the inclusion of Section 24(1)(a) in the 2013 Act. 41. To sum up:- From the above analysis, we hold t....
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....tion Act of 1859, for the first time, brought in a uniform law of limitation applicable to both Chartered and non-Chartered Courts. 46. The Limitation Act of 1859 was repealed by the enactment of the Limitation Act of 1871. The concept of 'sufficient cause' saw its genesis therein. Under Section 5(b), courts were empowered to admit appeals after the period of limitation upon satisfaction of a sufficient cause. Section 6 excluded the application of the Limitation Act, 1871 if any other law prescribed a different period of limitation. "Limitation Act, 1871 [Act 9 of 1871] [24th March, 1871] Repealed by Act 15 of 1877 PASSED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL. (Received the assent of the Governor General on the 24th of March 1871.) An Act for the Limitation of Suits and for other Purposes. PREAMBLE Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to the limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts; And whereas it is also expedient to provide rules for acquiring ownership by possession; It is hereby enacted as follows:- 4. Dismissal of suits &c. instituted, &c., after period of limitation.-Subj....
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....n Act of 1877. While Section 5 of the erstwhile Act, referred supra, was incorporated without any modification, Section 6 barred the application of the Limitation Act, 1877 to a special law when a period of limitation is specifically prescribed by such special law. "5. Proviso where Court is closed when period expires.-If the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, appeal, or application may be instituted, presented, or made on the day that the Court re-opens: Proviso as to appeals and applications for review. -Any appeal or application for a review of judgment may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal or making the application within such period. 6. Special and local laws of limitation.-When, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specifically prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed." The Limitation....
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....K. T. Chari, D. Narsa Raju, G. S. Pathak, and G. N. Joshi. The following are the relevant excerpts from the Report: "3rd Report of the Law Commission of India on Limitation Act, 1908 [M. C. SETALVAD, (Chairman), K. SRINIVASAN, DURGA DAS BASU, M. C. CHAGLA, K. N. WANCHOО, G. N. DAS, P. SATYANARAYANA RAO, N. C. SEN GUPTА, V. K. T. CHARI, D. NARSA RAJU, G. S. PATHAK, G. N. JOSHI] PART I - PRELIMINARY Chapter I - Introduction: The utility of a statute of limitation has never been a matter of serious doubt or dispute. It has been said that the statute of limitation is a statute of repose, peace and justice. It is one of repose because it extinguishes stale demands and quiets title; in the words of John Voet, controversies are restricted to a fixed period of time lest they should become immortal while men are mortal. It secures peace as it ensures security of rights; and it secures justice, as by lapse of time evidence in support of rights may have been destroyed. There can thus be no doubt that it rests on sound policy. The operation of the law of prescription has been explained by Lord Plunket in a striking metaphor. He stated that Time hold....
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....t too subject to such modifications as may be prescribed. We consider that there is no need for this restriction and that the principles contained in sections 4 to 25 should be made applicable to all special and local laws, leaving it open to the legislature to exclude the application of any or all of these sections, in any given case." (emphasis supplied) 50. The Report succinctly highlighted the need for a comprehensive change to the 1908 Act. The ambiguity surrounding the expression 'period prescribed' was clarified by providing a new definition for the same. Furthermore, while dealing with Section 29, the Committee was of the opinion that the restriction contained under the 1908 Act was no longer required. Thus, it recommended that Sections 4 to 24 should be made applicable to all special and local laws while keeping the window open for the Legislature to exclude their application in a given case. Accordingly, the 1963 Act came to be enacted. 51. With the above-stated understanding of the history of the law of limitation, we shall now venture into the relevant provisions of the 1963 Act. The Limitation Act, 1963 52. The 1963 Act is an endeavour to consolidate var....
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....e High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." (emphasis supplied) 54. Before analysing Section 5 of the 1963 Act, we would like to take note of the 89th Report of the Law Commission of India. 89th Report of the Law Commission of India 55. In 1983, the Law Commission of India took up a suo motu revision of the 1963 Act. Section 5 of the said Act has been discussed elaborately in Chapter 5 of its Report. A clear view has been expressed that Section 5 does not apply to the initiation of a suit. Relevant excerpts are extracted hereunder. "CHAPTER 5 SECTION 5: EXTENSION OF THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE 5.1. Section 5 empowers the court, for "sufficient cause", to entertain an appeal or application (except an application for execution) filed after expiry of the prescribed period. A number of points require to be considered with reference to this section. The section does not apply to suits. I. Suits 5.2. Section 5, as stated above, does not apply to suits. We have considered the question whether the section should be amended so as to include within its ambit ....
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....hich provides for the extension of the prescribed period in "certain cases". 57. The provision gives adequate discretion to the Court to condone the delay while facilitating and aiding justice to the parties. It provides only for an extension of the prescribed period. Therefore, the prescribed period which is the period of limitation arrived at after computation, can be extended by the Court on satisfaction of sufficient cause. Computation of Period of Limitation 58. Part III of the 1963 Act speaks of the computation of the period of limitation. An extension under Section 5 is distinct and different from exclusion as provided under this Part. For computation of the period of limitation, what is relevant is only the exclusion of certain time periods as provided under Sections 12 to 24. Therefore, once the Court is satisfied that a case is made out for exclusion of time, the resultant period becomes the period of limitation. However, this is not so in the case of the application of Section 5. In other words, the application of Section 5 results in the extension of the period of limitation and cannot bring the delay within the fold of the period of limitation, whereas the app....
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.... 24 of the 1963 Act has to be clear, apparent and manifest. Therefore, the language of Section 29(2), indicates the intention of the Legislature to extend the application of Sections 4 to 24 to all special or local laws. A specific exclusion alone would take away its application. The application of Sections 4 to 24 can be excluded by such laws either individually or in totality. The provisions pertaining to the exclusion of time can also be applied at different stages. Suffice it is to state that Sections 4 to 24 will not apply only when their exclusion is expressly provided by such special or local law. In other words, there is a debarment of the exercise of any implied exclusion as a matter of rule. However, it can be done by the Court only in exceptional situations and that too, when the person claiming so discharges the burden of proving the same through the scheme of the legislation. Mere incorporation of a specific period of limitation under the special or local law does not amount to express exclusion of the 1963 Act. Rather, it must indicate that Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act are excluded. As a matter of rule, the said words must be present in the special or local law. O....
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....t in many special or local legislations, there is a primary limitation period and a secondary limitation period, with the latter being set out in a proviso. Such proviso must guardingly say that Section 5 is expressly excluded in order to curtail its application. When a law has serious economic and financial implications affecting public interest at large, the rigor of a provision with a limited period to seek relief may warrant a relaxation. 64. He further submits that on a proper reading of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act and in consonance with the view taken in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), Section 74 is not applicable to the present batch of matters, as except for provisions relating to the determination of compensation, no other part of the 2013 Act applies. Thus, matters will have to be relegated under the 1894 Act. SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 65. For the sake of brevity, we shall summarise the submissions advanced by the learned Senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, rather than dealing with them separately. 66. On the incidental issue, it is submitted that only the provisions relating to determination of compensation would ....
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....e standpoint of the State or the beneficiary, but also from the standpoint of the landowners as well. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 69. The learned Senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the contention of the appellants that an appeal against an award passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act would be governed by the 1894 Act and not the 2013 Act as the land acquisition proceedings in the present batch of matters have been initiated under the 1894 Act, is negated by the view expressed in the cases of Indore Development Authority (supra) and Deepak Agarwal (supra), which have clarified that in the event the award is passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act, then there would be continuity of the acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act. 70. It is further submitted that the 2013 Act is a comprehensive and self-contained Code. Time is of the essence and forms the schematic basis of this legislation, which aims to give quick and speedy relief to the concerned parties. Strict timelines have been provided for every stage of the land acquisition process, including appeals. The separate and distinct adjudicatory mechanism, th....
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.... extenso already. We have also dealt with the principles of law. Upon such analysis, we reiterate that the 2013 Act is a unique piece of legislation. The Collector is given two different and distinct roles up to a certain stage of the acquisition process. The first role is to facilitate the acquisition on behalf of the Government, and the other is with respect to the determination of the compensation. For both these roles, there is no question of application of any provisions of the 1963 Act, as the Collector either acts as a statutory authority on the executive side or as a quasi-judicial authority while determining the compensation or as an authority dealing with rights having civil consequences while making a reference. In all these three acts, there is no role that is exclusively judicial. As we have already discussed, only when the issue of compensation is decided by the Authority, who is a legally trained person entitled to exercise the powers of a Civil Court, followed by the declaration of an award deemed to be a decree, does an out-and-out judicial forum enter the picture. The proceedings before him are original in nature, with two parties appearing before him, of which ev....
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....ay the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview. 77. As Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act, a limited interpretation of Section 5 of the 1963 Act alone cannot be given. What applies to exclusion shall apply to extension as well. In our considered view, the High Court, while exercising the power under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, is certainly entitled to draw its power from the sources available under the 1963 Act. We cannot introduce words that are not available in Section 74 through an imaginary interpretation in holding the existence of an express exclusion. It is a conscious decision made by the Legislature, and its knowledge must be inferred and implied. Thus, we are inclined to hold that there is not much difference between the main provision contained in Section 74(1) and its proviso. There is only one period mentioned for filing the appeal, meaning thereby that the other one mentioned under the proviso gets subsumed within the period provided under Section 74(1). 78. Furthermore, the intention of Section 103 of the 2013 Act is also to be seen, which clarifies that it is in addition to a....
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....n the interest of justice, all the applications seeking condonation of delay are to be allowed, particularly when the High Courts have not substantially gone into the merits of the appeals and in light of the law governing limitation. Hence, we are inclined to allow these appeals by condoning the delay in filing the respective appeals before the High Courts. 83. Accordingly, the impugned judgments are set aside, and the applications for condonation of delay in filing the first appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act are allowed. The High Courts are expected to adjudicate on merits, except to the extent of observations made pertaining to the incidental issue. 84. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to flag certain concerns as to how collusion takes place with the active connivance of the officials. The very appeals before us, approximately 530 in number, are classic examples of such official connivance. As a matter of fact, we find that in most of these cases, even copy applications had not been filed within the time prescribed, pursuant to the judgments delivered by the Reference Court. Even after this judgment was reserved, numerous matters similar to the present ones ha....
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....take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness. xxx xxx xxx 41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] to condone the delay on account of the first respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests." (emphasis supplied) JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES 86....
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....n 61 of the I&B Code, 2016 15. Mohd. Abaad Ali & Anr. vs. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, (2024) 7 SCC 91 Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 87. At the outset, we have no hesitation in holding that any pari materia provision contained in any other legislation, similar to the one under the 2013 Act, may not have the same meaning and, therefore, a word of caution is required for the Court while dealing with the interpretation of such provisions. The reason is rather simple. Such an approach might destroy the very object enshrined under the 2013 Act, being a welfare legislation. In other words, interpretation of a word or a provision must be made contextually with respect to each statute and, therefore, importing any understanding to a different statute would be fraught with dangerous consequences. Our view is fortified by the following decisions: D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 : (1952) 2 SCC 619 "(12) These remarks are necessary for a proper understanding of the meaning of the terms employed by the statute. It is no doubt true that the meaning should be ascertained only from the words employed in the definitions, b....
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....construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some Act which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone." (Macbeth & Co. v. Chislett [1910 AC 220, 223 : 79 LJKB 376 : 102 LT 82 (HL)] )" (emphasis supplied) State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360 "30. The counsel for the respondent has contended that the term "university" needs to be read in accordance with Sections 2(f), 3 and 23 of the UGC Act, wherein a "deemed university" is different from a "university", stricto sensu. However, we do not subscribe to such contention for the reasons provided below. 31. The contention of the respondent is that the term "university" needs to be read in accordance with the UGC Act, wherein only those universities covered under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act are covered under the PC Act. Such an interpretation by importing the technical definition under a different Act may not be feasible herein. It is a settled law that technical definitions under one statute should not be imported to another statute which is not in pari materia wi....
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.... the same purpose or object.' xxx xxx xxx 58. It can be concluded that though the ESI Act, the 1948 Act and the 1961 Act deal with labour and workmen, in essence and spirit they have a different scope and application. The Acts do not appear to have any overlap in their fields of operation and have mutually exclusive schemes. Therefore, the argument that the Acts are pari materia with each other, must fail. 59. This Court must also address the issue that arose in the course of the arguments that the word "shop" has been used in the impugned notifications as well as the 1948 Act and the 1961 Act and therefore assistance may be taken from the latter statutes to interpret the notification. This argument, in light of the above discussion, does not appeal to us." It is for the same reasoning that we are of the opinion that the High Court's reliance on the judgment of this Court in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro [(2018) 1 SCC 468], was not appropriate, as the same was with reference to enactments relating to administration/regulation of universities, and is unconnected with the Objects of the PC Act." (emphasis supplied) Gujarat....
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....1957 SC 912] and that when a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute [State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751] . The principle of literal construction of the statute alone in all circumstances without examining the context and scheme of the statute may not serve the purpose of the statute [RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424]." (emphasis supplied) 88. We refrain from dealing with each and every relied upon judgment as broadly two different views have been taken by this Court. While the first set of judgments is in favour of the respondents, starting with Hukumdev (supra), the other view in favour of the appellants emanates from Mangu Ram (supra) which distinguishes Kaushalya Rani (supra) since it was a case that dealt with the 1908 Act. We also take note of the fact that in Hukumdev (supra), this Court has distinguished Vidyacharan (supra) since it also dealt with the 1908 Act. 89. We shall first deal with the law as laid down by Hukum Dev (supra), followed in the subsequent decisions ....
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....to the nature of the proceedings under the Act, unless expressly excluded, would be attracted. But this is not what Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act says, because it provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded, all of them would become applicable. Whether those Sections are applicable is not determined by the terms of those Sections, but by their applicability or inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. A person who is a minor or is insane or is an idiot cannot file an election petition to challenge an election, nor is there any provision in the Act for legal representation of an election petitioner or respondent in that petition who dies, in order to make Section 16 of the Limitation Act applicable. The applicability of these provisions has, therefore, to be Judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Act relating to the filing of election petitions and their trial to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provi....
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....nsolidating Engineering Enterprises (supra) and taken note of in Kalpraj (supra), the issue was with respect to the application of the law of limitation to a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is purely a commercial dispute between two individuals. 94. In New India Assurance Company (supra), the facts are totally different. This Court was dealing with a complaint given for the first time before the consumer forum. Therefore, the said proceedings were original in nature. On the contrary, we are dealing with the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act to an appeal against a deemed decree. Furthermore, neither the scope of Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act nor that of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which is a pari materia provision to Section 103 of the 2013 Act, was considered and discussed in the said decision. Thus, we are inclined to state that the said decision, not having considered the issues dealt with by us, cannot be termed as a binding precedent. Reference can be made to the following decisions: Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 494 "14. On the subject ....
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....servations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) 'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, ...' 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require quali....
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....t was dealing with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which is a general law applicable to criminal proceedings only. 96. As repeatedly mentioned in our judgment, we are concerned with a special law which provides for just and fair compensation, along with the relief of rehabilitation or resettlement. Therefore, without discussing the decisions relied upon by the parties any further, we only say that one must see the exclusive mechanism provided under a statute to be used for achieving the goal. Suffice it is to state that after the exhaustive and threadbare analysis of the provisions available under both the 2013 Act and the 1963 Act, we find that the decisions cited by the Bar do not have any application to the present batch of matters and therefore, deserve to be discarded. CONCLUSION 97. We conclude as follows: (i) Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act is applicable to all those cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act. (ii) For passing the award under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the 2013 Act alone will have to be followed, except for the rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements. (iii) The first appeals b....