TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2026 (4) TMI 494
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....n dated 21.02.2023 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the order-in-Appeal dated 04.12.2025 passed by the respondent No.3 (hereinafter referred to as 'the impugned orders' for short) under the provisions of Section 107 of the Central Goods and Service Tax(CGST)/ Gujarat Goods and Service Tax Act (GGST), 2017 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') 4. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a proprietorship firm engaged in the business of manufacturing cake boxes and wooden cake bases made from plywood. For the said purpose, the petitioner got itself registered under the Act with registration no. 24LSOPS2490B1ZD with effect from 30.07.2021. 4.1. The petitioner had engaged a tax consultant to handle Goods and Service Tax compliance and was under a bona fide impression that returns were being filed in time. However, due to professional negligence and failure of the previous consultant, multiple returns remained unfiled, leading to issuance of the impugned show-cause notice by respondent No. 2 calling upon to reply as to why the registration should not be cancelled for the reasons of non-filing of GST returns for a continuous period, in terms of Rule 21A(2A) of the C....
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....early notified and effective opportunity of personal hearing, the Respondent No. 2 proceeded to pass the impugned order ex-parte, resulting in serious civil consequences to the petitioner, including retrospective cancellation of GST registration. The denial of a meaningful opportunity of hearing constitutes a breach of the audi alteram partem rule and vitiates the entire adjudicatory process at its very inception. Once the foundational order is rendered void for violation of natural justice, all proceedings emanating therefrom, including the impugned Order in Appeal dated 04.12.2025 passed by Respondent No. 3, are equally without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law. The impugned orders, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. 5.1 It was further submitted that the impugned Order for cancellation of registration dated 21.02.2023, passed by respondent No. 2 is a cryptic and non-speaking order and therefore the same is also required to be quashed and set aside. 5.2 It was further submitted that the respondent No. 2 and 3 failed to take into consideration the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Aggarwal Dyeing & Printing Works (supra). ....
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....as under:- "Section 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. (2) xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx (4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month." 8. Thus, the maximum period of presenting the appeal against the Order-in-Original was 3 months and thereafter, if the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause of presenting the appeal and the same can be allowed to be presented within further period of one month. Thus, the maximum period would be 120 days i.e. one month is only allowed if the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was....
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....der than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors., the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decis....
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....91) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584]. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of pr....
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....upra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. xxx xxx xxx 22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such." 14. Thus, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition is filed after the expiry of maximum prescribed period of limitation, though alternative efficacious r....